HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

Past – Present – Future

Edited by Edward L. Mienie

UNG
UNIVERSITY of NORTH GEORGIA™
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Preface

Edward Mienie, Ph.D.
University of North Georgia

The University of North Georgia's (UNG) annual Strategic and Security Studies Symposium, now in its eighth year since its inception under the auspices of the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies (ILSS), in 2023 explored *Human Security Challenges: Past – Present – Future*. The ILSS, the College of Education, and the Strategic and Security Studies Program in collaboration with the US Army War College, the Association of the United States Army, and the Army Strategist Association hosted this year's symposium. The symposium attracted scholars and practitioners from South Africa, Poland, Romania, Lithuania, and Estonia to around the United States.

The focus of this year's symposium examined the role of state, non-state, and international actors in solving or mitigating human security challenges. Human security, as a governing principle, emphasizes freedom from want and freedom from fear as opposed to traditional national security, which emphasizes sovereignty and territorial integrity. After laying the groundwork for the concept of human security and its evolution, Dr. Franke discussed the need for protecting human security at the intersection of peace and development. He examined some of the key challenges with liberal international development using his Liberia project as a case study.

Major General Joe Jarrard explained how the National Guard is invested in human security through their unique work in the Counterdrug Program. This program conducts an enduring campaign that bridges the gap between the Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense institutions in the fight against illicit drugs and transnational threats to the homeland. Another area where the National Guard helps to mitigate threats to human security is in their support of civil authorities during events which include the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction; terrorist attacks or

threatened terrorist attacks; and release of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, or toxic and poisonous chemicals. Other areas of support directly related to human security include supporting operations on the Southwest border, wildfire missions, severe weather response, migrant operations, and pandemic outbreaks.

Dr. Petrin discussed why human security matters to the military, police, and others in uniform. She focused on global data indicators that can be considered for measuring economic, health, political, and environmental challenges that can help to analyze human security threats either within a country or a community context. Dr. Pfaff talked about human security in the Ukraine. He posited that, while national security privileges the state's rights, sovereignty, and territory, human security privileges the individual's rights to freedom from want and fear, and that both frameworks provide practical and ethical guidance to the human security challenges. Each approach identifies relevant factors to be taken into consideration and, as a result, they come up with different priorities and in some cases offer different responses to the same problem.

Col. (Ret.) Barlow, focused on strategic intelligence as a mitigator to the human security challenges in Africa. Africa is associated with numerous security deficits that should not be viewed through a European lens, since Africa has such diverse cultures, traditions, languages, ethnic groups, and religions. All the challenges, threats, and problems that Africa faces can be directly linked to dysfunctional or problematic national strategies coupled with disconnected leadership and a lack of good governance. Foreign actors are contributory factors to amplifying the threats to human security in Africa. The challenge for African states is to have actionable, credible, focused, preemptive, strategic, and operational intelligence.

Dr. Chirikov addressed the profound effect that the Ukrainian war has had on higher education in the country and provided information on the resilience of Ukrainian universities as they face the challenges of the war. The tightening ideological control and weaponization of Russian universities, the repression of anti-war academics, and the universities' role in supporting state propaganda is of concern. He explored meaningful ways in which scholars and students at risk could be supported and how

Ukrainian higher education can be helped to grow and develop in the aftermath of the war.

In addressing logistics and supply chain management through a human security lens, Lt. Gen. Mcquistion explained that the world relies on a global supply chain to provide for many of its needs and desires. However, the threat to supply chains pose a potentially significant negative impact on human security as globalization has shifted production of products throughout an increasingly hostile world. The war in Ukraine is the most prominent example where we see daily instances of insecurity, specific targeting of infrastructure and supply chains, causing the migration of many refugees. The world experienced supply chains that were severely tested in the COVID era and interruptions can have serious effects on human and national security. Such interruptions make it more difficult to meet basic needs, food, health, shelter, and achieve overall quality of life.

Five symposium panels addressed the following topics: "Human Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Societies," "Role of National Defense in Mitigating Human Security Challenges," "Topics in Human Security Challenges," "It's a Jungle Out There: The Growing Threat of Environmental Crimes to National Security," and "Putting the Past on Ice: Evolving Security Considerations Among Human Populations in a Warming Arctic." Discussions ranged from the conceptual to the practical. Panelists engaged the audience that included discussions from the military, non-governmental organizations, academia, government agencies, and industry. Notwithstanding the broad range of viewpoints, the outcome supports the concept that there is much that can and has to be done to mitigate threats to human security, which ultimately morphs into threats to national security interests if left unmitigated.

UNG, its Cadet Leadership Academy, and Strategic and Security Studies Program are pleased to present this symposium collection in the hope that it will encourage its readers to continue this debate in the interests of national and international security. We must continue to discuss issues that relate to strategy and strategic decision making to ensure effective efforts towards strengthening conflict management and peacebuilding.

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Hope as a Catalyst for Human Security

Dr. Volker Franke

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

It's a pleasure to be here, and when Dr. Mienie sent me the invitation to participate in the symposium, I thought this would be a great opportunity to go back to something that I had actually worked on twenty years ago, when the field of Human Security was just beginning to be popular. So, today, I want to talk about hope as a catalyst for human security to set the stage, hopefully, for our panel, and I will talk a little bit about the Liberia project that Dr. Mienie mentioned.

For many people, the world today is an insecure place, full of threats and challenges. Natural disasters, violent conflicts, persistent poverty, epidemics, economic downturns—all affect how people live and undercut the prospects for peace and sustainable development. Acting on any of these insecurities and isolation is insufficient. Today's insecurities must be tackled comprehensively and collaboratively.

When the United Nations established the concept of human security in its 1994 Human Development Report, the world was different from what it had been during the state-centric Cold War. It was also different from our world today. What I want to do with you this morning is to talk to you briefly about the evolution of the concept of human security. This is the starting presentation basically for the symposium and I wanted to lay the groundwork and talk a little bit about where the concept comes from

and how it evolved, discuss the need for protecting human security at the intersection of peace and development, examine some of the key challenges with liberal international development as we've known it, and then outline key components of our ongoing hope for a better future project in Liberia.

Achieving human security starts with people—their needs, their hopes, their challenges. What is hope? How can hope promote human security? Nelson Mandela said, "Our human compassion binds us the one to the other, not in pity or patronizingly, but as human beings who have learned how to turn our common suffering into hope for the future." What is hope? In 2002, C. R. Snyder published a seminal article entitled "Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind." "Hope Theory" defines hope as the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired goals and to motivate oneself to use those pathways. The 1994 *Human Development Report* described the changing global security context. For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of cataclysmic world events. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution? In 1994, the report presented a radical departure from the predominant view of security at the time by shifting the focus from territorial security to people security. This meant looking beyond protecting the nation-state to also protecting basic needs, physical integrity, and human dignity.

The 1994 *Human Development Report* highlighted four key characteristics—universalism, interdependence, prevention, and people centeredness—and seven dimensions of human security—economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security. The conception of human security from this report was expanded by the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, who, in their 2003 *Human Security Now* report offered a new definition of human security centered on ensuring the integrity of a vital core in human lives or a set of basic capabilities to protect this vital core of all human lives in ways that

enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. The report explained that human security means protecting fundamental freedoms, freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that, together, give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity. It became clear that human security requires interventions that connect ideas and bring together actors working at the intersection of peace, security, and development. In 2012, the UN General Assembly recognized the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.

In 2022, the United Nations Development Program revisited the concept of human security and found a series of new threats impacting human security, freedom, and dignity. These threats include climate change, the downsides of digital technology, violent conflict, the spread of infectious diseases, and evolving challenges to health care systems. The impact of climate change and conflict can be seen in the rapidly growing population of displaced persons and political or economic refugees. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us the limits of existing health care systems. The 2022 UN *Sustainable Development Goals Report* concluded that the 2030 agenda for sustainable development is in grave jeopardy due to multiple cascading and intersecting crises. The 2021 World Values Survey found that most people in the world feel insecure. Fewer than one in seven at the global level feel secure or relatively secure. More than half of the global population feels affected by very high human insecurity. Our attempts at broadening the conception of human security based on freedom from fear and freedom from want and now, also, freedom from disruptions of planetary processes, have been criticized for being ambiguous, hard to measure, and prone to over-securitization.

So, is the concept of human security still relevant today? Our expectation was that, with the end of the Cold War, or as Francis Fukuyama

described it in *The End of History,* a new world order would bring peace and prosperity—that development aid, more or less by itself, would lead to higher incomes, which in turn would bring about freedom from fear and want and respect of human rights and dignity.

What constitutes fear, want, or dignity? That depends largely on values and beliefs. Those are always personal or society-specific, and, as such, they are subjective. That means we need to pay attention to subjectivities like fear and anger, perceptions of safety and dignity, or feelings of alienation. However, we must also recognize hopes, dreams, purpose, empathy, compassion, or as the UN calls it, solidarity.

For each of us to live free from want, from fear and anxiety, and from indignity, the UNDP *Threats to Human Security* report recommends focusing on protection, empowerment, and solidarity, working together to advance human security. Central to these recommendations is agency. Agency is the ability to hold values and make commitments, regardless of whether they advance one's well-being, and to act accordingly in making one's own choices or in participating in collective decision-making.UNDP's enriched human security frame complements the protection and empowerment of individual agency and solidarity. A commitment to work together and collaborate to address the increasingly broad range of development and human security challenges solidarity, and successful collaboration requires inclusion and trust. In societies disrupted by underdevelopment and poverty, traumatized by violence and conflict, and disillusioned by empty promises of help and assistance, trust is severely lacking. The UNDP report confirms perceptions of human insecurity are associated with low impersonal trust independent of one's financial situation. People facing higher perceived human insecurity are three times less likely to find others trustworthy. To account for subjectivity, we need to capture both generalized trust—the trust placed in others, in general and not for a particular reason or interest—and impersonal trust that establishes a default way of interacting with strangers. Trust does not arise in isolation, it is a prerequisite for solidarity.

International development must protect security where people live in their communities and towns. In its 2022 Local Capacity Strengthening Policy, USAID recognized that "Sustainable development depends on local

actors leading efforts to improve their communities and working inclusively and collectively to see those efforts through." Local capacity strengthening also can address underlying factors of fragility, both the local humanitarian response systems and enhance resilience to shocks and stresses. Ultimately, USAID says, "The capacity of local actors is a key determinant of the success of USAID and its partners in achieving and sustaining humanitarian and development gains around the world." This focus on strengthening local capacity aligns with promoting agency through empowerment and trust and solidarity in and across communities. Gomez and Gaspar have emphasized the need to recognize that human security depends on what happens across communities that are connected. One group "can typically only be secure if the groups with whom it is significantly connected are secure." For this evolving human security frame to effectively protect human security, it also needs to address the shortfalls of international development. I'll briefly describe some of those shortfalls and then introduce our ongoing Hope for a better Future Program that seems to capture this evolving sense of what human security means.

Let me first turn to some of those development challenges. Most generally, "international development" can be described as the pursuit of creating a better world through the elimination of poverty, discrimination, and injustice. The most comprehensive framework guiding international development today is found in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The SDGs are a collection of 17 different, but interlinked, objectives designed to serve as a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet now and into the future. Implementing the SDGs, as much as international development in general over the past 70+ years, suffers from a series of systemic challenges that undermine its intended purpose. These challenges include, but are not limited to, increased dependency, where the reliance on external aid may make less developed countries more, instead of less, dependent on donor countries. The risk of corruption—most foreign financial support does not reach the intended recipients. In 2020, the World Bank issued a report that found that as much as 15% of foreign aid intended for the world's poorest countries flowed into bank accounts in tax havens owned by elites. Bribes and extortion are rampant. Empirical studies have

shown that the poor pay the highest percentage of their income in bribes. The Center for Global Development reports that an average of five percent of development aid is lost to corruption, amounting to eight billion dollars in 2017.

Economic and political pressure—donors may place economic or political pressure on the receiving country, creating further dependencies. Under-representation of local needs—foreign aid primarily benefits external actors, international NGOs, and donor-driven economy of scale projects. In 2020. the Center for Global Development reported that about a third of total aid goes to partner governments or local organizations. International development oftentimes creates a secondary economy where international NGO pay scales inflate local prices and distort local employment structures.

What to do about those? How to address those challenges? These challenges don't just hinder sustainable development; they also threaten human security. Addressing these challenges through locally led and adaptive peacebuilding and development projects can reduce external dependencies by strengthening local capacity. Strengthening local capacity begins by imagining better futures, building trust, creating shared visions so communities can find local solutions to local problems. Important here is to invest local partners in the process and sustain locally led development through co-creation of visions and actions between donors, NGOs, local partner organizations, and local populations. This also means transferring responsibility and ownership to local actors as quickly as possible. Incidentally, localization also means that more foreign aid can actually reach those most in need. Locally led development can be sustained only with participation through a co-creation of visions and actions between donors, NGOs, and partner organizations. Sustainability is dependent on transfer of responsibilities and ownership to local actors. How? I'll briefly describe the adaptive peacebuilding and trauma response research and capacity building program that a number of colleagues and I are currently implementing in Liberia. My colleague, Dr. Eric Wolterstorff, who sits back here, will provide more detail on the interventions on the ground and some initial findings during the next panel.

Let me tell you a little bit about the Hope for a better Future (HOPE) Program that we started in Liberia in July of 2022. It's a five-year project that is going to run until 2027. HOPE captures this enriched human security conception, and, although it is too early to present results yet, by its design, the program offers hope, builds resilient communities, and promotes locally designed and led solutions to local problems, based on common understanding, empathy, inclusion, and trust.

Although Liberia's civil war ended twenty years ago this year, the scars remain. The trauma of the war still affects the country and its society today. The Carter Center estimates that 40% of Liberians suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder due to their experiences in civil wars. Many were exploited as child soldiers and suffered as perpetrators, or victims of, or bystanders to extreme violence, abandonment, disruptions in families, and unsafe communities. How do we usually address PTSD? Typically, we go to counseling. However, in societies that are traumatized by years or even generations of conflict and violence, healing and recovery through one-on-one counseling is unavailable and impractical. We cannot send tens of thousands of psychotherapists across countries to do one-on-one counseling sessions. Community trauma response, on the other hand, presents an effective alternative.

The HOPE Program is implemented in three counties and nine towns in Liberia. It's designed to strengthen the resilience of individuals and their families, as well as the resilience of social and faith-based groups and of whole communities to address what we call prolonged social trauma and for them to imagine and then create a better future. HOPE starts by assessing hopes, fears, interests, and perceptions through a representative survey in each target community. And I can tell you doing a representative survey in Liberia is somewhat different from doing a representative survey in Dahlonega or Atlanta. The results of the survey help us to tailor our interventions to local needs in each of those towns and to local circumstances.

HOPE has three distinct priorities. First, it's a peacebuilding project. Community residents and stakeholders create an environment in which conflict resolution initiatives can flourish. Second, it's a conflict resolution program. Youth work together to address problems that they face. And

third, it's a psychosocial health program, and I think that's the unique aspect of what we're doing—to bring peacebuilding, conflict resolution and psychosocial health together under one umbrella. Individuals learn how to build emotional control, create dreams for their lives, map the psychosocial challenges facing their communities, and, ideally, they then share those skills with others in their community and the capacity strengthening can spread.

HOPE has four distinct interventions: rebuilding psychosocial skills through safe spaces, training in emotional and self-awareness skills that fosters trauma healing—Dr. Wolterstorff will talk specifically about that as part of the next panel, so I'll leave that. Second, we engage youth in facilitated Youth Dialogues to strengthen common understanding, empathy, and collaborative conflict and problem-solving skills. Third, addressing prolonged social trauma through *tents,* where individuals learn to address mental and emotional triggers, habits, and beliefs. And, finally, Solution Accelerators. Those are at the county level. They create an enabling environment that supports and hopefully also sustains local collaborative conflict resolution processes and practices. By creating community group healing processes that provide psychosocial support to hundreds, even thousands of individuals. If the Program spreads the way we think it could, we could reach 20-30,000 people in five years. There's a big "if," a capitalized "IF." HOPE addresses those local needs, local interests, local preferences, and strengthens local conflict resolution and trauma healing practices if it spreads the way we're envisioning it.

Locally-generated solutions build resilient communities where individuals find common ground, build hope, actively create a better future, and promote human security. President Woodrow Wilson reminded us of our civic duty to those around us. He said, "You are not here merely to make a living. You are here in order to enable the world to live more amply, with greater vision, with a finer spirit of hope and achievement. You are here to enrich the world." Resilient communities offer a stronger foundation for the future—inclusive, with more common understanding and trust, empowered by agency and solidarity.

A century after President Wilson, Liberian Nobel Peace Laureate Leymah Gbowee echoed the same sentiment when she said, "There's

something in this world that every individual can do. God has created all of us with something unique to contribute." The ultimate goal of our HOPE Program is to help participants figure out what their unique contributions are and to utilize those talents and contributions to create a better future for themselves, their families, and their communities. As individuals work together to shape their own future and the future of their community, they rally around a vision and a series of common goals. As they now can slowly heal from the effects of prolonged social trauma, they strengthen empathy and emotional control, build trust in others, learn how to work together, and, in doing so, improve human security. This way, hope becomes a catalyst for human security.

DR. MIENIE

I don't quite know how to formulate my question, so I'm going to throw a few things at you if I may. One is you reference "planetary processes." Can you just tell us what that is?

DR. FRANKE

Yes, I can. Climate change would be a planetary process. The pandemic—what we saw with COVID is a planetary process. Those are planetary processes that are changing how we live together in the future. These challenges cannot be addressed by a single institution, by a single country. They need to be addressed collaboratively. That's new to human security. I think when we look at the whole genesis of human security, almost thirty years, the focus has typically been on what states can do in their relations to individuals, and if states cannot ensure the safety of their residents, of the population, then the international community has a responsibility to protect. But now, we're looking at problems in addition that are much broader based.

DR. MIENIE

If I may just focus a little bit on a country on the southern point of Africa—South Africa. If this country fails, sub-Saharan Africa is in trouble, and so is the West because of the humanitarian catastrophe that will ensue

from such a failed state. You touched on these beacons, these factors that feed into human security—fear, anxiety, despair—this is rampant in South Africa today. We all know the history of South Africa—the apartheid system and human rights that was missing in South Africa. We had a democratic government elected the first ever in '94. Relatively speaking, the economy was functional. Yes, it was limping along, but the world was interested in doing business with South Africa. So, foreign direct investment ensued. Mandela—everybody loved him. He was a uniter at that stage. Today, South Africa is, may I say, not even a shadow of what we envisioned in '94 and what Mandela envisioned. Let me ask you—the intersection between the respect for the rule of law, corruption, which is rampant—these are undermining human security issues in South Africa. What do you propose? How do you see us addressing the situation in South Africa where we have human insecurity? We have an economy that is completely dysfunctional. We have load-shedding of up to ten hours per day where you do not have electricity. An economy cannot function this way. So, we had this dream. We had the best constitution compiled out of twenty-seven of the best constitutions in the world, the South African Constitution today. But it's not really worth the paper it's written on if human insecurity is so rampant. So, I'm just trying to figure out how to go about ensuring human security in the specific case of South Africa. I know I jumped around a bit, but I threw a bunch of things at you, and I just want to know how you see this.

DR. FRANKE

Well, South Africa is only one country. The problems you describe, Eddie, you find in every country. Clearly, there's a specific interest for you to talk about South Africa, but the response to your question, I think, covers all countries with the similar human security challenges. I think what we have found both in an earlier project in Afghanistan that unfortunately ended when the Taliban took over, and the U.S. government issued a stop work order, and what we're doing in Liberia now is we're not looking at the government, the national government. That's where most development projects start, right? They cooperate somehow with the national government. That's where the corruption is in a lot of ways. That's where a lot of money is

siphoned off at that level and doesn't trickle down. So, HOPE is all based on a community peace-building approach. Any time you target development or security at the national level, it becomes a top-down approach. When we're talking about human beings that should have the capacity to ensure their own security, we can't do that at the national level. So, we're looking at where people live. That's, I think, the key here. Instead of having the ability to go in Liberia now, go to Monrovia. Every single NGO and international organization sits in Monrovia. So, even if you go to South Africa, you would go to Johannesburg; you would go to Pretoria; you go to Cape Town; you go to the big cities in South Africa. What about the rural areas? If we want to achieve human security, we need to actually target humans where they live.

There is, I think, an overemphasis in development on the capital cities, where most people are, at the detriment of rural populations, and when you look at even development statistics, you can't find any statistics that are below the country level that are meaningful in any way. So, the differences between urban and rural areas we can't even measure; we don't have the statistics for that. But we do know that that's where we need to go. So, a true human security approach, in my view, needs to grow from the bottom up, not from the top down. If we do development at a national level, state-to-state, it's going to be a top-down approach. And then we can talk more about the specifics of what we're doing in Liberia, because a lot of that would be applicable to any country when we bring in key stakeholders.

The difference is that in the Solution Accelerator we're actually looking at the systems level. In Liberia, this is at the county level. The three interventions happen in towns at the community level. This one intervention is actually a level up because the county provides the rules, regulations, ensures that it's possible to actually have these local initiatives grow. So, that's what we're targeting here. We're now talking to key stakeholders, which we call prime actors, to figure out what their interests, hopes, fears are, and how they can help to create an enabling environment. The difference in the project that we're running is, typically, we have our list of key stakeholders that we're always talking with. And why are we talking with them? Because somebody's who's sitting in a climatized office has decided that these are the key actors in this country or in this town or in this community. What we're doing is we're

starting right there with those actors. Then we conduct repeated rounds of interviews and dialogue sessions with these actors, and every single time, we ask who are other important actors that are influential and committed to your community or to the county or to the country depending on what level you're addressing. That's different, because typically we stew in our same pot all the time with the same types of people. It's not important who *we* think is important in a community; it's important who the community thinks is important. So, for us, for the United States, it was a mistake not to negotiate with the Taliban in Afghanistan, because they are a key actor. We don't like them; that doesn't make them less important. Who the United States likes and doesn't like is really unimportant to people on the ground, and as long as we do not somehow take account of the situation on the ground, how it's felt by the people who live there, we won't really be able to ensure human security. That's a long-winded answer to your long-winded question, Eddie.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Thank you very much for your absolutely inspiring and containing a very positive message presentation. I have a question which actually corresponds very well with my case study. I have a question how I absolutely agree this top-down, bottom-up process should be in focus, but there are countries that recently in past years proposed and adopted the bills about foreign agents, So, the authorities in those countries, like Russia, like even Israel or Georgia, recently are trying to prevent the external actors to communicate with the civil society. This seems to be a real challenge. How can we, or how should we, maybe cope with this kind of problem—preventing by the state government or the central authorities to communicate with their societies and isolating the societies and their needs?

DR. FRANKE

That's a really good question and that's a real problem. Localization. If we go in as external actors, and we just do our thing, then the intervention will be external. The way we work both in Afghanistan and Liberia is we're working closely with local partner organizations, with whom we share

similar values, that have experience in conflict resolution, peace building, and psychosocial services. That's the intersection that we're working on. They can operate in their communities. This is the difference, right? In Monrovia or in the capital cities, people—the population, the organizations—they're all used to external actors. In rural areas, they're not. So, working with organizations that are already established in these local communities is very helpful. They have seconded staff to us. So, because what we're doing works with the value statement of these organizations, their staff can work with us; they're paid through our program, but we're working with local staff instead of bringing in externals that do it. That's one way of doing it. Now, that doesn't address the issue of what permissions do you need to get and so on and so forth, right? Again, working with local organizations will make that easier, too.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

So, the base question that I wanted to ask is at least in my shallow understanding of it, I understand that substance abuse is a huge response to trauma in this region of the world. Moonshining, alcoholism, drug abuse. So, how is that being tackled if it's a major problem and how is that going to play into your future operations?

DR. FRANKE

It is a major problem. Both in Afghanistan and Liberia, it has been identified as a major problem. Now, we don't tackle any of these problems ourselves. This is the old way of doing international development, right? We have identified a problem; we go in, and we solve the problem for everybody else. That is not working. What are we doing instead? We're going to talk with people. We're talking with people in the communities, asking them what they think the most important problems are in their community. Then we ask them to pick one and discuss how they would tackle it. Now, if, in that conversation, substance abuse comes up as the key problem to solve, then that's what they're working on solving. In Afghanistan, one of the key problems that we saw there was underage marriages. That comes from the community. If we really want to do locally

led development, and if we really want to address human security where it matters, meaning where people live, then we can't tell them what the problems are that they need to solve. That has been the problem, the big problem, for the last 70 years with international development. That also means you can't go in with a blueprint to cover the entire country, because problems and what's important varies from region to region, from community to community. Even within the same town you can have pockets, subcommunities, that have different problems that are important. So, the key here, and this goes back to the question of localization, how do you do this? The key is to listen first; what is going on on the ground, not what do we think is going on on the ground. And, oh, we need to build a school first. No, we don't. We need to figure out what is the biggest problem. And—some of you who are a little more seasoned, this is the last thing, but it's probably my favorite and a big recommendation for all of you—if you want to read about peacebuilding and how peace-building should work, and how human security should work, read John Hersey's *A Bell for Adano.* It was written in 1946. It tells the story of an Italian-American major in Italy right after the Italians surrendered. The story revolves around how to rebuild a town after war. That's international development; that's human security development the way we need to do it. The Major is someone who, because of his Italian heritage, understood what the local need was. We're going in, and we're telling everybody how everything is great where we're coming from and if you just be like us, you will be a success. No, you won't, because it has to grow from inside, from the local—from the ground up. Top-down approaches cannot tackle real development.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentation.]

2

The Role of the National Guard in Human Security

Major General Joseph Jarrard

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

I promise not to make this a recruiting pitch for the National Guard, but I do want to explain a little about the U.S. National Guard and what we do, because so much of it ties to human security both within the U.S. and around the world. The U.S. Joint Force consists of 1.3 million uniformed service members. Out of that, 453,000 are guardsmen. We make up 20% of the U.S. military. The National Guard is the primary combat reserve of the Army and Air Force, with both a state and federal mission. We're organized, trained, and equipped for the war fight, and the readiness we build for war enables us to defend the homeland, fight our nation's wars, build strategic partnerships, and do a few other things on a big scale that many people are not aware of. And, significantly, Guard members live in almost every zip code in the United States.

This list is not all inclusive, but it gives you a snapshot of the impact of the Guard contributions to U.S. security. During the year 2022, National Guardsmen did the following: just over two million days of COVID-19 support; over 1.5 million days of supporting operations on the Southwest border; 143,000 days supporting wildfire missions; 97,000 days supporting severe weather response; and almost 50,000 days supporting migrant operations. So, the National Guard is invested in human security. We live where we work, and we see the impact, for example, of drugs on our local

communities. And one of the programs that makes the Guard unique from other services is our Counterdrug Program. This program conducts an enduring campaign that bridges the gap between the Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense institutions in the fight against illicit drugs and transnational threats to the homeland. Our Guardsmen use military unique skills and resources to collaborate with civilian law enforcement. Last year, the Guard trained almost 10,000 law enforcement personnel and supported 2,769 missions that seized $74 million in property; 95,000 kilograms of marijuana; 139,000 kilograms of cocaine; 111,000 kilograms of methamphetamines; 2,000 kilograms of heroin; and 28,000 kilograms of synthetic opioids.

Another unique capability provided by the National Guard is our support to civil authorities during events which include the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack, and release of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, or toxic and poisonous chemicals. We have fifty-seven Civil Support teams providing this support, and all are Hazmat Tech-certified and on alert twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. Recently, they were involved with mitigating the train derailment in Ohio and supporting the Super Bowl in Arizona.

In addition to Civil Support teams, we also have ten Homeland Response Force units and seventeen chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear enhanced Response Force Packages, all to support SBRN response. These units were critical to the nation's response to COVID. They collected over 502,000 COVID-19 samples and performed 120,000 clinical diagnostic tests. So, speaking of COVID, the Guard protected communities in numerous ways—testing and screening, disinfecting nursing homes, fabricating and distributing masks, staffing testing centers, and delivering personal protective equipment.

At its peak in 2022, the National Guard employed 20,154 personnel in support of the response to COVID. The National Guard's involvement in the fight against COVID started on March the 5th, 2020 even before COVID was declared a national disaster. The *Grand Princess* cruise ship was off the coast of California in desperate need of coronavirus test kits. They could not come ashore if there were any questions about being infected. The

California Air National Guard 129th Rescue Wing airlifted coronavirus test kits out to the ship and then transported the tests to the California Department of Public Health lab for analysis.

While everything I've mentioned thus far has been about Guardsmen supporting activities within the United States, where we have arguably our most strategic impact is through the State Partnership Program. After the USSR fell apart in 1991, the decision was made to link up state National Guards with the armed forces of nations that were members of the former Warsaw Pact. These partners trained together and have even deployed together, all while maturing relationships that strengthen every year. This program is one of the most significant security cooperation initiatives within the Department of Defense. The program has expanded over the years, and, today, there are 101 countries around the world that are partnered with National Guards. In the past two weeks, Arizona established a partnership with Oman, and New Jersey established a partnership with Cyprus. In July of this year, we will hold a 30th anniversary of the program in D.C. and expect many dignitaries from around the world to participate.

There are many attributes of this program that make it impactful, starting with trust. Young Guard members meet members of their partnered countries early in their careers and grow and develop these relationships for twenty years or more. A great example of this is Georgia's current Adjutant General, the person who replaced me in that job, Major General Tom Carden. In 1996, twenty-seven years ago, Captain Carden at the time trained at the National Training Center, and with him was Lieutenant Nick Jonzghava who rode in his vehicle with him throughout the duration of the exercise. Captain Carden, as I explained, is now Major General Carden, Adjutant General of Georgia, and Nick is Brigadier General Jonzghava, one of the Deputy Chiefs of Defense in the country of Georgia, and they are good friends and have maintained that relationship and a lot of contact over the last twenty-five years. Those are the types of relationships this program develops. Additionally, most states support their partnerships with a Whole-of-Government approach that might include student exchange programs, economic development opportunities, etc., and the benefits go both ways, and I'll provide a few examples.

During COVID, Poland who has partnered with Illinois in the program, sent medical teams to Chicago to help out. The Polish Chief of Defense said he felt obligated to help because of Poland's long-standing relationship with Illinois and their experiences together in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two of the upcoming events New Mexico has planned with Costa Rica are Human Rights, Women, Peace and Security Conference and a Humanitarian and Disaster Response Exchange.

Last year, West Virginia's partnership with Qatar enabled the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security's Emergency Management Division and the West Virginia National Guard to hold an international expertise exchange with the Qatari military in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Additionally, three officers from West Virginia National Guard served as liaisons in Qatar during the World Cup and liaised between the Department of State, FBI, the Qatar Armed Forces, Qatar Ministry of Interior, and the U.K., French, Turkish, and Italian military representatives. Their efforts enabled a seamless integration of U.S. capabilities into a complex civilian security event and enhanced U.S. influence with the government of Qatar. In 2021, the city of Marietta just north of Atlanta sent members of their fire department to the country of Georgia to partner with and train the Georgian Emergency Management Services in swiftwater techniques. And one final example—in July of this year, through Montana's partnership with Kurdistan and Turkmenistan, they are facilitating a Central Asia Region Border Security conference with Army Central Command that will include the five Central and South Asian region countries, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, and the participants will engage on ideas on how to develop cross-border communications and operations and collaborate on how to conduct border operations in remote mountainous terrain.

To provide some scale for the State Partnership Program, just last week, one week out of the year, there were forty-one State Partnership events with twenty-eight countries involving 259 National Guardsmen. So, the State Partnership Program is beneficial during peacetime. It also rolls over into wartime. The National Guard also provides some unique capabilities during conflict. One of our former secretaries of defense, Robert Gates, once stated,

"One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win. Economic development, institution-building, and the rule of law promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.

In that vein, in early 2008, the U.S. Army, in conjunction with the Army National Guard, developed and began employing agriculture development teams, or ADTS, in Afghanistan. These teams were comprised of twelve soldiers who also had other skills from their civilian jobs. They were experts in their fields, such as geoscience, agronomy, veterinary science, engineering, and pest management. These team members work directly with regional and local Afghan government officials and farmers to support their agriculture needs and provide education and training, as well as U.S-funded sustainable projects. There are many examples of teaching Afghans how to store critical water runoff or store grain in suitable bins, how to increase the yields of their crops, how to incorporate wind and solar-powered infrastructure, and to increase the health of their livestock. These soldiers were able to put their expert civilian skills to use to improve the conditions of the people trying to provide a peaceful and secure life for their families. So, our National Guard is unique in the way it's designated within the military structure of our Department of Defense, as well as our state governments. Due to this unique construct and the exceptional civilian skills of our citizen soldiers, it plays a critical role in numerous areas of securing our country and assisting in that effort in areas of peace and conflict around the world. So, thank you for your time today, and I look forward to an informative conference.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Sir, with the National Guard often being called to perform multiple duties throughout their time in the states, do you think that puts them in a unique position to do various and unique tasks overseas with the State Partnership Program?

GEN. JARRARD

I'm not sure I understand your question, but I think that it does put us in a unique position. The State Partnership Program just enables us to develop some relationships with countries around the world. The U.S. Military rotates for exercises and so forth and does a lot around the world, but they don't have the ability to develop the relationships with the military leaders and the military soldiers or airmen and Navy personnel of those other countries like the National Guard does, because the same people are going back up time and time again, and so, those unique relationships enable us to do things that the active component necessarily can't sometimes. There are examples of the active component trying to go into some countries and, because of these relationships, the CHOD or whoever will say well, when you bring the adjutant general with you, or when you bring some of the members of my State Partnership team with you, then you can come and talk to me kind of thing. I'll use Lithuania for an example. When I went to U.S. Army Europe and Africa in 2019, one of my first trips was up to Lithuania, and it just happened to be that the Adjutant General from Pennsylvania, who is their State Partner, was also there, and we had dinner with the CHOD. About two months later, I had the opportunity to go back to Lithuania for some work, and I was eating dinner with the CHOD, and he looked at me and said, "Hey, the Pennsylvania Adjutant General said you're a good guy, and I can talk to you if I need to and call you if I need to." And so, just the ability to develop relationships or let those relationships benefit you, if you're not part of that program, are very good. So, I could go on and on about the State Partnership Program.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

What do you think are the weaknesses in the program, and what would you do to enhance the program and take it into a meaningful relationship with the other departments of the U.S. government to help these people in a multi-faceted way?

GEN. JARRARD

The party line on the weakness is we need more money. So, everybody needs more money, and at the end of the day, funding is an issue for

everybody. I mean, you only have so much of it, so to do exercises and those types of things, an increase in funding would be beneficial to allow countries to do stuff. You know, a lot of people think the National Guard is the Army National Guard, but every state has an Air National Guard, as well, and so states that have refueling wings or lift wings such as C-130 C-17s can get pretty creative with how they interact with their State Partners, meaning they'll fly a C-17 or a KC-135 over to their country with a hundred soldiers in the back of it, and so, travel is free, and so, we do things like that. So, that's one thing. I think that as the program grows, and, really, it's a State Department-designed program because the authority to establish the relationships comes from the State Department through the State department. So, there's a lot of goodness there, as well, and they understand the goodness of the program, and as I've mentioned, we just went over a hundred countries that are partnered. We're continuing to grow with two or three a year, and so, I think the State Department understands the goodness of having influence in those countries, especially countries that don't have a lot of exercises, etc.—Africa, for instance, South America, Central America—those places. The SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM commanders truly appreciate this program because the primary engagement opportunities they have in their AORs is through this State Partnership Program. So, that's a good question that I haven't put a lot of thought into past the money piece because we're always at the Guard Bureau looking for more funding to allow us to do more and to do it more often, but I think where you're going with that question is the ability to engage the whole of U.S. government in some of those things. I will tell you, we started the partnership with Argentina when I was the Adjutant General of Georgia, and so, what happens is that the request goes from the country to the State Department. The State Department notifies DOD, and then, the National Guard Bureau asks for any states that are interested. I will tell you that I went to the governor and said I'm not interested in doing a military-to-military relationship with Argentina. I want the State of Georgia to be engaged if we start this program, and so, on my first trip to Argentina, I took somebody from Economic Development from the State of Georgia. We took some somebody from the State Department of Education down with us, and so forth, and so, I think it's personality dependent. Whoever is

running the National Guard in a state can put more emphasis on that type of thing, and so, I think it's really relying on those leaders sometimes. But I think everybody does understand the benefit of getting their governors and their state leaders involved just as with Ukraine. California is partnered with Ukraine, and the Adjutant General of Ukraine was facilitating conversations between the military leadership in Ukraine and leaders of our military here back at the Pentagon when that initially started mainly because he had such a close relationship there. So anyway, I'm not sure I'm getting after your question necessarily, but I think that as the program continues to grow and evolve, I think it will gain more substance like I think you're talking about.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Sir, this will be kind of a two-parter question. You talked about how the National Guard has unique capabilities that are used globally for strategic effect, so, for the first part, could you talk about are there any areas where you would like to see the National Guard get involved or do something but it isn't right now, and then, the second part is could you talk a little bit about National Guard authorities and how they impact the kinds of things you can do and whether you think they're adequate to fully optimize what the National Guard can contribute?

GEN. JARRARD

So, let me start with the second one. The authorities piece is a tough one and mainly because of the different statuses that we are under. I think I'm going to mess the number up because I get frustrated every time I hear it, but it's about thirty something different statuses that Guardsmen can be activated in, and even between the Army and the Air Guard it's different. And it pains me to mobilize an Army Guardsman. You go out to a mob station for thirty days and get finished doing some training, and finally, you get mobilized, and you become mobilized on Title 10. The 165th Air Wing can come to work at Savannah and two days later flip a switch and be on Title 10 orders, and it just frustrates me that the Army can't get closer to that. But I will tell you what we're going through right now. We have about 4,000 Guardsmen on the Southwest border on Title 10 orders that has gone from

Title 10 initially, with active duty soldiers. Then it was Title 32 Guardsmen, and what Title 32 means is the governor gets a vote, and politics is what it is in the U.S. And so, when the previous president came to power, Democrat governors decided to pull their forces from that mission, and so, then, DOD decided to flip the switch and mobilize all those Guardsmen. So, now, they're Title 10, they're under a current Declaration of National Emergency that expires in May, and DHS just sent the request for assistance for the next FY to Department of Defense, and same numbers, same level of support down there. But the Department of Defense and the administration have got to come up with another Declaration of National Emergency to authorize the activation of Guardsmen on Title 10 for that mission, or it'll revert to active-duty soldiers pulling that mission. So, there's a lot of convoluted issues with the authorities, and so forth. There are numerous groups that are trying to get after that and trying to improve that. There are studies that have been done. Unfortunately, nobody is really behind effecting change, I don't think, and so, we'll see. I do know that the Reserve Policy Board was just tasked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to study the Total Force Policy. We haven't had a Total Force Policy updated in numerous years, and so, hopefully, that will start looking at those discrepancies and try to facilitate some change. But there needs to be change. I don't know that there's going to be change anytime soon. With respect to new areas, we are the combat reserve of the Army and the Air Force, and I think people are starting to look at the homeland a little bit differently, and we're having discussions about how do we defend the homeland, and are we certified to defend the homeland? So, I am adamant with the people I speak to in the Department of Defense that we don't train to defend the homeland, necessarily, or to do law enforcement type activities. We train for the war fight that enables us to do anything we need to do. There's never been a discussion in the governor's office where the governor looks at the adjunct general and says, "How many soldiers do you have trained to go guard the capital it?" It just doesn't happen, and so, the governor assumes that you are trained to do whatever he asks you to do, and we are by virtue of the wartime training. Now, if there is some "stomp and drag" types of riot control things that we need to do, we may do Just-In-Time training for some of the individuals

that go do that, but there's also some unique differences in all the states. I think in Massachusetts, the number is approximately 90% of their Guard are members of law enforcement, and so, they never want to mobilize their Guardsmen without authorizing them to carry a weapon. Here in Georgia, if you're an MP, I don't mind you carrying a weapon, but other than that, I don't want you carrying a weapon in the state of Georgia for domestic response if I can help it. S0 anyway, different states react in different ways. And then, with respect to the additional missions and so forth, it will be interesting. We think that we're about to get the administration—I say "we—the Secretary of Defense has asked the administration to authorize him to do some 12304 authorizations that would allow the services to POM, which means to program in their budget to activate so many Guardsmen each year to use for exercises or whatever. So, hopefully, that will help, and it will alleviate some of the constraints with respect to mobilizing Guardsmen. And it will cost them, I guess you could say, unforecasted cost to the services. So, hopefully, we'll be able to do that. But, with respect to what you were alluding to, there's not a unique mission that I think that we need to grow into. I think we need to continue doing the same things we've been doing, but maybe on a grander scale.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

With the active Army's new regionally aligned modernization plan, do you think there's lessons for them to learn from the National Guard Partnership Program? Do you think there's enough communication? I know on the Special Forces side because we were assigned a specific AOR like Central and South America, we worked closely with those Guard units who had responsibility or had units down there. As we look at what the active duty can do repetitively, if they're able to regionally align, are they coming to you as a National Guard to look for lessons learned and things?

GEN. JARRARD

So, not necessarily the National Guard Bureau, but the Army is working with Army Guard on that. The Air Guard has a different fourth generation model, so it doesn't necessarily correlate as well. But with respect to the

Army Guard, there are regional alignments taking place, and they're marrying up just like the Army is with their new Force Generation model, so there are units that are going to be focused in Europe. There's some that are going to be focused in the Pacific, mainly for training and exercises along with their active duty counterparts, but also to get those reps and sets with respect to simulation exercises at the corps and division level and that type thing so that they get used to working with each other and looking at the same map sheets and that type thing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

You talked about training and exercises and preparing for war rather than defending the homeland, so I'm just wondering how do you plan for future threat scenarios, and can you discuss the role with Homeland Security and Northcom in relation to future activities?

GEN. JARRARD

That's a really good question, and I think it's something, well, I know it's something that everybody is starting to think about a lot more, mainly with cyber and space domain. And it can happen today, and we may not know what's happening et cetera, et cetera. But also, General Van Hurk has been adamant about defending the homeland. China is our facing threat, and so, when we talk about the Pacific, we talk about Guam and Hawaii. That's the homeland, so we've got to figure out how we're going to defend that, and that's a very complicated problem because we're not necessarily where we should be. We haven't thought about Guam, or we've quit thinking about Guam, and now we're thinking about it again, and there's a lot of work to do there and in Hawaii, but as we talk about the homeland, and we talk about force projection, we've got to talk about ports and infrastructure, etc. So, I will tell you I don't think that we have thought about that enough, but we are thinking about it now, and we're trying to drive the conversations with respect to how's that going to work, because the conversation is a governor thinks he's going to send some National Guardsmen down to the port. Well, he may not have that ability if they're all mobilized on Title 10, and so, who is doing what, and who's guarding

what? And that infrastructure is going to be a significant issue, and so, I will tell you that we are taking that in consideration more and more and looking at it in a better venue than we have in the past. I don't think we're there yet, but we are thinking about it more.

DR. EDWARD MIENIE

Just for the benefit of the cadets in the room, both north Georgia and maybe the internationals, looking back on your career and your time here at North Georgia, do you have any advice for the cadets in the room as they're getting ready to jump into their military careers?

GEN. JARRARD

I got a lot of advice for them. I'm going to speak to them and do a little brown bag lunch here at lunchtime and spend some time with them. I tried to keep up with them doing some PT this morning, as well. It's always fun to be around cadets; they keep us young. But just know your job and know it better than everybody else and then just work hard and learn. I could go on and on, so I'm not going to elaborate on it, but you're going to show up to your first duty station, and you're going to have an NCO that works for you that's been around a lot longer than you have, and so, you need to listen to them and learn from them. But also really, really know your job and learn it and then start learning your boss's job and doing your job to the point that they can focus on theirs, and they don't have to look over your shoulder all the time and do your job, too. I'll stop there, but they've got a bright future ahead. They're a lot smarter than we were when we were that age.

3

The Role of the Security Sector

Sarah Dawn Petrin

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

It's an honor to be talking about one of my favorite topics today: human security. I'm happy to be speaking with you after hearing such a distinguished panel and keynote, and, as Heath mentioned, I recently served as an analyst at the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College. I also served as a senior civilian advisor to NATO on the protection of civilians in conflicts.

My remarks today are going to focus the role of the security sector. Why does human security matter to the military and police and others in uniform? We already went over the seven securities that make up the United Nations concept of human security this morning. I'm not going to talk about food security, because, as we know, food includes water and agricultural ecosystems and deserves an entire presentation on its own. But what I am going to talk about is what are the global data indicators that we can look at for economic, health, political and environmental conditions that can help us analyze human security within a country a community context. One thing we heard in the earlier panel that I firmly agree with is that none of the data that we have on human security really matters until we contextualize it to the area of operations where we're functioning, whether that's in a homeland environment, such as for the National Guard, or whether that's for an overseas mission or in our research as academics and analysts.

I was invited to speak at the conference today is because I am the author of a white paper that offers a definition of human security for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Coming up with a definition was a challenge. What was intended to be a short white paper was reviewed by over a hundred offices throughout the DoD. The draft paper received significant feedback, and the paper was an attempt to find consensus on why human security matters to national defense. The definition I suggested in the paper was to consider "all the risks and threats that make people vulnerable in a specific area of operations, including the infrastructure and the environment that they depend on for life."

It's important to note that I added infrastructure and the environment because, as we look at the future threat scenarios considered by the interagency, those are two areas where we less prepared for the challenges that we're facing. The concept of human security evolved after it was first developed in the UN Development Report. There are various UN Security Council resolutions that made human security more applicable to military forces. The relevant UN resolutions are specifically for the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations.

There are various UN resolutions that changed the mandate of international peacekeeping operations. There are resolutions that explain a mission to protect civilians, a mission to address children in armed conflict, to address women's peace and security, conflict-related sexual violence, sexual exploitation, and cultural property protection. And, within the Department of Defense now, there are training curricula and programs to see the evolution of all these different requirements for peacekeeping. Even though the U.S. only sends about a hundred or so senior officers into UN missions as observers each year, our NATO allies and partners commit a significant number of their personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. NATO officers kept wondering what to do with the different cross-cutting topics that consider the human population, and those topics were not just concepts that came out of thin air. They reflected the challenges that they were having in operations.

For example, in the Balkans, human trafficking was a significant problem. Conflict-related sexual violence was a significant dynamic to the

conflict that didn't concern one unit or two units, but had to be addressed at senior levels of command. They were confronted with significant challenges impacting the population. In Afghanistan, the protection of civilians who were impacted by targeted violence, the issue of the protection of children within the national Armed Forces of Afghanistan, was a huge challenge, and it came up over and over again at a strategic level for the command. In Libya, even though NATO didn't have any ground forces in that mission, the targeting of areas in Libya was caught up in challenges around culture because NATO officers did not understand nomadic culture. In the after-action reviews, you see units accidentally targeting camels and other livestock that analysts thought were armed units moving weapons around the country. Given these different cross-cutting challenges, NATO wanted to streamline the amount of advice that senior commanders were receiving from civilian experts. Commanders didn't want to have a gender advisor and a child advisor and a cultural advisor. They asked, can we streamline all these new mandates to protect the population by having one human security advisor?

Today, we see this change reflected within the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD). They have human security units that have combined expertise on the protection of civilians and gender and cultural considerations, and at NATO headquarters, there is a Human Security unit that looks at all these cross-cutting topics together. This is why the U.S. Department of Defense realized we need to think about this. What does it mean for the U.S. as our allies work to address human security?

When I was teaching at the Army War College, every time I had a class on human security or the protection of civilians in conflict, it was disrupted by someone who asked, why should we care about human beings? Like, you know, "we're here to kill and break things," as someone reminded me yesterday at the welcoming dinner. I think this is a debate that is worthy of further academic research. Are human beings a strategic consideration in military operations?

Someone like myself, who is a civilian humanitarian with a background of working with the UN and Red Cross and with refugees, says yes, individuals and communities have rights. They have protections, and those

are based in the rule of law, which is the foundation for how we govern societies. We also have the law of armed conflict which imposes certain limits on military operations, in order to ensure that fundamental human rights are respected. Human rights is something that the military considers in coordination with civilian authorities.

Ensuring the protection of human rights is not a lead role for the security sector, but there is an important coordination element with other civilian authorities. Yet, over and over again, both in the classroom and at policy level discussions within the department, officers told me no, we don't want to focus on humans and human security. People are in our way, and they are replaceable. So, if we kill them, there will be more people, and sometimes people are legitimate targets. Military personnel would tell me sometimes civilians are legitimate targets. That's not what the law of war says, but there are some people who believe that civilians are guilty by association until they are proven innocent. They think, let the after-action review work out whether the targeting was correct or not.. I'm here to accomplish my mission, and my mission is to take out the enemy.

I think we do have to recognize that there's different schools of thought around these concepts within the military community, and we should take the time within our academic institutions to try to understand the resistance to protecting civilians in operations. We're not going to fix that today, but I welcome your comments in the discussion. Another reason why human beings are strategic is because of transnational threats, and this was brought up earlier today in the discussion around planetary considerations and global threats.

When it comes to mitigating transnational threats it's not only that one nation can't handle it alone, or that we should expect international cooperation to fix things. There are going to be times when the population itself, will need to be mobilized for their own safety and security. There will be times when no intervention is going to work in the right amount of time with the right amount of resources. We need to be thinking how we can prepare people to understand the threats they face that are beyond the capability of some of the structures we have in place now. Near the end of my talk, I'll tell you about some of the future threat scenarios that I worry about.

In this middle part of my presentation, I'm going to address the human security indicators that I have used and that you'll find in my white paper about how we distill human security concepts down into data we can analyze for a specific region or community or context. This is not comprehensive; it doesn't include everything, but it offers examples of how to analyze human security using specific data.

There are dozens of political indicators for measuring security. Today, I'm going to mention two indicators; the number of fatalities in armed conflict and conflict-related sexual violence. This chart in my presentation comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in Sweden. It summarizes the fatalities from conflict over the last thirty-two years. In the chart, you will see upticks in fatalities from the first Gulf War, the war in the Balkans, the conflict in Afghanistan, and, more recently, in Ukraine. When we look at the last thirty-two years, there are nearly three million deaths globally from armed conflict.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program does not distinguish between combatants and civilian deaths. If you want to better understand civilian fatalities, I think the best data is by country and by operation. However, some academics have stated that for every one combatant death, you have at least nine civilian deaths in conflict, and this ratio is widely debated.

I want to bring up conflict-related sexual violence, because what happens when we look at fatalities or civilian casualty mitigation as an indicator of the impact of armed conflict, the second and third-order effects of conflict are often overlooked. This includes damage to homes and civilian infrastructure. Injuries to the population and other forms of physical human rights violations, such as conflict-related sexual violence are underreported. Every year, the UN produces a report for the Security Council on Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), and the results are jarring when you look at the trends. In the past year, forty-nine state and non-state groups used sexual violence as a deliberate tactic of war.

When I'm teaching or training military officers, many of them think this is just like a one-off thing, that sexual violence is about interpersonal violence, but 70 percent of those armed groups have been using sexual violence as a tactic for five years or more with the strategic intent to

intimidate female leaders, and to intimidate dissidents as a whole. Men and boys are also affected by sexual violence when they are detained and put in prison, and so, it's a significantly under-recognized challenge.

The next set of factors to consider is health indicators. When it comes to health at the country level, normally we would look at life expectancy data. However, I want to bring up a picture of COVID deaths by country as an example of the way that our world is changing and the way we think about security risks. Globally, in three years there have been six million deaths from COVID. So, think about that number: in three years, six million people have died globally. And in thirty-two years of armed conflict, we have just shy of three million deaths.

Think about the preparedness posture of security forces to respond to conflict in the world. Were we prepared for the health crisis that we encountered from the threat of COVID? Per capita, the U.S. has the highest death rate from COVID, which is the only country that had over a million deaths.

It's incredible to think about what we've been through as a nation. How should health threats shape our definition of security and our definition of preparedness? Normally, to analyze health indicators, we would also consider life expectancy. One could assume that the biggest health challenges are for countries that do not have a highly functioning health institutions, such as within parts of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. But, when we think about COVID and pandemics and epidemics, we see that this life expectancy chart doesn't tell us a complete story about human security.

We have to start thinking differently about this by going beyond tranditional country indicators of security. Also, when it comes to economic indicators, you can go into many different government assessments and fact books and find all kinds of data about country-level income, gross domestic product as an indicator of development. But, if you are going into a specific military operation, you need to look at household-level economic data to see how family units are doing and within the community, whether there is cash flow and liquidity to provide for the local welfare.

In this slide, you see a map of the world by income, again indicating that parts of Africa and Asia are more challenged. Does that show the economic

challenges that people face today? I'm not sure, but if we look at household income, here is a chart that shows several countries with below $700 in annual income for their household. Uzbekistan is the only country outside of the continent of Africa that has that low household income.

What are we looking for when we think about household income? We're also thinking about whether people are functioning on a barter and exchange economy. We're also looking to see whether there's black-market activity in that country that also governs how people live their lives. In many conflict-affected countries, families and communities will go into excessive indebtedness and loaning in order to survive. Sometimes, they become indebted to armed groups and to negative actors, and this impacts their decision-making about how to survive each day.

Environmental indicators—again just trying to go through the different human security indicators—there's lots of different assessments of climate risk by country. A lot of those leave the U.S. picture completely out, so I want to share a little bit about U.S. climate risks and then talk about displacement figures. One of the best climate indexes by country is coming from Notre Dame, where they do a list of climate readiness and climate vulnerability. So, here you see that they feel that Europe is ahead of the curve in terms of readiness for climate mitigation and adaptation, and that the countries that are less prepared are more concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa where there area of high vulnerability. However, look at what has happened in the United States in the past year. Over eighteen climate-related extreme weather events have resulted in over a billion dollars in damages to the economy. The increase in natural disasters in the United States is causing significant harm to our communities, and this vulnerability is often overlooked when in global data sets on climate. However, globally, there's been $275 Billion dollars in losses to disasters, and I wanted to bring this map up because human security isn't just a framework that we can use for foreign policy or national security decision-making. We should also be looking at it as a tool for the United States to address our own vulnerabilities, to look at our own places and communities where we live, and to try to identify how we can be prepared for unexpected events and displacement.

In U.S. national intelligence estimates, when you look at anticipated future threat scenarios, one of the biggest issues that comes up with climate is the potential for high levels of displacement. This includes displacement within the United States, and significant levels of migration to the United States due to climate-related events. Here's more data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees which shows over a hundred and three million people are forcibly displaced worldwide. What isn't shown on the slides is new data coming out of the recent U.S. Census, which indicates that there's also a percentage of the U.S. population that has now been internally displaced—anywhere from one to three percent. The Center for Disaster Philanthropy, we're still trying to look at that data and discern it, but again, these global phenomena that are impacting human security are not only for foreign policy trends; they can also help us better analyze and prepare for domestic crises in the U.S.

That's a lot of data and a lot of indicators to analyze what human security means in a country context. There is no comprehensive list of indicators. My presentation outlines some of the measurements and indicators that can be analyzed when we try to make decisions about human security in a particular place or about a particular population.

I would be remiss if I didn't also mention two multiple indicator tools that are important to the U.S. Government. One factor is the risk of atrocities and mass killing, and the other one is the Global Fragility index that is looking at state fragility. I'm not going to go into these in too much depth, but this is the most recent data set from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum for their Early Warning Project for atrocity prevention. The U.S. now has a law that puts into place what used to be the Atrocity Prevention Board, where, as part of our foreign policy analysis, every country is analyzed for the risk of potential genocide, and this is an interagency process that involves the Department of State and Department of Defense as well as intelligence agencies. This slide refers to the top ten countries at risk for this current year. And I just wanted to give you a list of some indicators of the types of atrocity risks and you can look up more details about their methodology and their analysis.

Once a country is placed in a high risk category, that triggers U.S. policy and action to protect the population at-risk of atrocities. I wanted

to mention this because the last panel also talked about failures with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework and I think it depends what level of data you're looking at, because, in all of these high-risk countries, there are interventions going on to try to mitigate the threat and risk of violence. They're not always happening at the national level for obvious reasons, depending on whether the government is permissive or not permissive of those interventions.

In addition, the Fund for Peace has a Global Fragility index that measures state capacity based on indicators for state fragility. These are mostly governance indicators. In 2022, the index pinpointed five countries that are at the highest risks of state collapse. This index is considered by the State Department and other government agencies. There are a lot of indicators that make up the overall rating for each country.

These measurements are not the only indicators of human security, but I think they help us see some of the global trends based on available data, to give us a better picture of what's going on in any particular country.

Now, I want to go back to the question of what is the concept of human security good for? Other speakers have mentioned that it's a broad concept and that any analysis needs to provide context to make it useful. For those of you who've already read my DoD white paper, you know that my conclusion states that human security is a planning tool. The military and the security sector can use these indicators to better understand the operational environment. It helps to identify the risks and threats to the population. Those threats can be identified based on social factors within the population, because we know that people are made up of different age, gender, ethnicity, linguistic, race, religious groups, and not all groups face the same threats the same way.

And what this analysis will show us—is that the types of threats are not only from armed groups, which are traditionally the enemy that is the target. Individuals can face threats from other people because of their social status. Threats can come from places and from the environment. Threats can also come from things, such as weaknesses in critical infrastructure, like water, electricity, and telecommunications break downs can cause a significant loss of life and damage to society.

In conclusion, I want to share a few scenarios that concern me.

Here are the types of scenarios that I worry about, having looked at future threat scenario assessments. When it comes to political threats, I find the large number of targeted killings against dissidents and human rights activists—these people, who are leaders in their communities, who would be great allies and partners for democratic reform, are being taken out of the equation.

The other thing that I think about from a public health perspective is biological weapons. The U.S. thinks a lot about chemical and nuclear weapons. However, I don't think the public has awareness of what to do if there were a biological agent that did spread, and there were a limited chance of survival for anyone who came into contact with it. How would we respond to a virus more deadly than COVID that resulted in mass casualties globally?. We're not prepared for this kind of thing at all.

Also, a cyber-attack on the financial system that makes not banking and ATMs inoperable would be a challenge. What if we wake up tomorrow, and all of our personal financial accounts are zeroed out, and no one has liquidity? I mean, this could affect highly industrialized societies much more than lower developed economies that already work through cash and barter systems of exchange. But for the U.S. and Europe, I think we're not prepared for what would happen if this type of attack occurred.

And then for environmental risks, I still think we're underprepared for migration even though it's already here at the U.S. southern border like we talked about this morning, and in Europe with the situation in Ukraine. Europe faced the same situation with Syria in the last ten years, and regulating migration continues to be a great challenge for all regions of the world. I'm happy to take any questions about what more can be done.

These potential threats indicate that we need more emphasis on preparedness. I don't want to make it seem like all these things are inevitable, or that we can't do anything about them. I want to suggest a few things that we can do with all these indicators and the analysis when there are high levels of risk.

Assessing the situation by country or community conditions is a good first step, and then developing a course of action to mitigate the threat is something that civilian and military planners can work on together.

Then, trying to adapt to the challenges is an area where we could do better particularly within the U.S. government. Adaptation should include making information available to the public so they have the tools available to adapt to risks within their environment. Then, we need to build capabilities within the population to endure a crisis and to build resiliency.

So, I think these steps are feasible ways to address human security in the present and the future. So, again, what indicators matter the most? We didn't have time today to go through a case study analysis of a particular country context. I think the last panel did a great job of talking about Afghanistan and some other places, but the indicators that matter the most are the indicators where you are.

If you are working in the U.S. on homeland security, I hope that these indicators and conditions are part of your operational analysis. If you are supporting another mission, even if you're assignment is not to analyze the human domain, it's good to have these threats in mind. What could happen? What might happen? Is this mission prepared? Is this unit prepared? Then, after you assess those human conditions and make them part of your analysis to develop your courses of action, see what you can do to mitigate the risks and help the population adapt to the threats so that we can build for resiliency.

In conclusion, I don't think that we can build for resiliency for every threat or every challenge. Each security challenge is going to have its own circumstances, and we're going to have to be flexible in how we respond as these challenges occur. I wanted to leave time for discussion, but I want to mention that I have a book that is called *Bring Rain* that describes the humanitarian operations that I've been part of in the last twenty years and is written for a public audience. So, it's not an academic book. It's an easy read, and if you want to find out more about civil military relations and some of the work I've done, I encourage you to take a look at it. I'm happy to answer questions or take comments.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Which of the seven elements of human security do you think is most overlooked and why?

MS. PETRIN

I don't know if it's most overlooked, but I think the economic data is very interesting. I don't know how many of you look at World Bank data. They have a division on conflict and fragility, and a new unit on refugee response. The bank has solid analysis on whether a country is recovering or isn't recovering from conflict. They have a snapshot on Iraq that's just phenomenal. I think that sometimes we underplay the fact that people or countries that have a lot of resources will recover better from a conflict, and people who have the least resources will take a longer time to recover.

When you consider economic indicators in conflict zones, you also need to look at who has the money and where those resources are located. How financial and humanitarian aid has been used tells an interesting story.

PANEL SPEAKER

I have a question that relates to the question I got this morning. How to measure human security? I agree with everything, but you're staying way up there at the state level. Any of the data that you cite is not data that's useful on the ground. It's useful maybe to get a first approximation of what's going on in the country, but even when we look at the United States by all economic development measures—the U.S. is in the top ten economies in the world, right? Yet, you drive from here five, six hours up to Kentucky and Tennessee to Appalachia, and the human security situation is not much different than it is in Liberia. So, how can we capture what is needed? The problem that I see is that we're looking always when we're making decisions top/down at aggregate national level data. It's helpful as a start, but what do you do then? That, alone, doesn't let you formulate implementation policies that work on the ground.

MS. PETRIN

Yes, I appreciate that comment a lot, and I believe that all these types of data indicators that we have reviewed on the country level can be found at a community level and a local level. I've done protection assessments in every country I've ever worked in, and you can find that data. If it doesn't exist through some formal mechanism, then you can survey the population,

using sample tools with population demographics, interviewing key leaders—you can find the local and regional information that you need. But again, it matters where you are.

If you're not physically present in the country, and you're not with the population in that rural area or in that community, it's going to be hard to get accurate information. But one of the benefits of the humanitarian community is that we go to remote areas, and we work with people who are vulnerable, and we're able to use these sampling tools and demographic analysis without having all the statistics available to us. So, I do think this information is available. You need to make sure that someone on your team has that skill set to do that analysis, or to work with local partners who can do the analysis.

I want to make one other comment about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) failures, and one of the things that I often looked at the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is that, at the national level, the data around ceasefire agreements is less encouraging than if you look at regional or localized groups that negotiate for their own safety. There are community-level ceasefire agreements, and regional-level agreements that have been negotiated within peace missions where it's not a total peace; it's a partial peace. So, I do think we need to shrink the size of the measurement of change—one of our earlier speakers asked, what is the smallest level unit of organization and structure that you can work with? I think negotiating agreements with armed groups at the local level has helped to reduce violence.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentation.]

4

Human Security and Ukraine

Dr. Tony Pfaff

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

The joy of taking the last slot is you get to spend the whole day listening to people saying things that you were going to say, so I've had to adjust for that. Worse than that, though, is people saying things that demonstrate the thing you would have said is going to be wrong. So, you have to change that and then saying things that you really should have said. So, it gives you an idea of how to change your presentation, so that you end up trying to reorganize it on the fly during the fifteen-minute breaks. So, let's just see how this goes. All right. I'm going to talk about human security and Ukraine. These days, having a conversation about Ukraine can feel a little gratuitous, and I don't mean to diminish the tragedy that's going on there, but a lot of us try to shoehorn it into different kinds of conversations. And I'm not saying that here, because I really think if you want to have a conversation about human security, Ukraine really provides some really good food for thought, particularly in what I'm going to do today, which is sort of compare and contrast how what I'll call a national security framework would handle and recommend policy solutions for Ukraine and how a human security framework would do that. And then, as we expose the kind of tensions that might arise, figure out what a way ahead might be. So, I am treating human security as an alternative to national security as a security framework.

As we've mentioned before, where national security privileges the state's rights, the sovereignty, and territory, human security privileges the

individual rights to freedom from want and fear. Now, the thing I want to point out here is that by anchoring in a theory of rights this way, both frameworks provide practical and ethical guidance. They're practical by how they conceive of threats and how that conception shapes effective responses. They're ethical in that they specify the responsibilities actors have in determining which responses are going to be obligatory, prohibited, or permitted. Now, as we'll see, there's going to be a lot of overlap between the two because certainly the national security framework makes room for violating state sovereignty over humanitarian concerns, for example, by permitting interventions should a government become a threat to its own people. And a human security framework is certainly going to value or respect the role sovereignty plays as a pillar to avoid suffering and could possibly justify an armed response similar to one when that's violated similar to a national security framework. But there are differences. Each approach, I think, identifies different relevant factors they take into consideration. As a result, they'll come up with different priorities and offer in some cases different responses to the same problem. And, like I said, I like the Ukraine example because it illustrates how these two frameworks can come into tension as well as complement each other. But, for example, Putin, using the language of national security, poses his demands in terms of territorial gains and extension of sovereignty. Zelensky, for his part, has used the language of human security when posing his demands. Now, certainly restoring sovereignty is featured prominently, but he's integrated, as I'll talk about a little later, concerns regarding environmental, food, and economic security that not only place demands on Russia, but on the international community, as well. Now, to test these two frameworks, we've got to solve the same problem. So, the way I'm framing the problem for the purposes of this discussion is the problem for Ukraine—and Russia, for that matter—is that neither seems to have the military capability to achieve their stated objectives. Thus, both are going to have to determine under what conditions short of victory they should stop fighting. So, the way I'm going to pose the question and structure the discussion is looking at what sort of things should Ukraine and its partners do that could incentivize Russia to change its demands and cooperate to the extent we can find an

acceptable solution to both sides. Now, to illustrate the ethical implications of national security, I'm going to draw on largely the "just war" tradition and how it is expressed in the law of armed conflict. Now, human security, as far as I know, doesn't really have that corresponding tradition, but one may be forming as Jaroslaw talked about earlier with doctrines involving conceptions of responsibility to protect and other humanitarian issues. The point here not to get confused on is both frameworks are going to have different conceptions of the justice of going to war or *jus ad bellum,* the justice of in war, *jus bello,* the justice of getting out of a war, *jus ex bello,* and so on. But I'm using "*jus*" war language when I'm talking about national security and human security language when I'm talking about human security.

Now, there's lots of ways to think about national security, whether as an anarchic system of great power competitors, where stability depends generally on maintaining a balance of power, or as a norm-based system, where the core task is to ensure other actors play by the rules, and when they don't, they're somehow held accountable. Either way, national security emphasizes an actor's coercive capabilities, and coercion, as Thomas Schelling famously observed, comes in two forms—compellence and deterrence—where compellence is convincing another actor to do what you want, and deterrence, the other side of the coin, is about convincing another actor to not do what you don't want. Now, normatively, national security places in emphasis, as I said, on the rights of states, specifically sovereignty and territory. Violating those rights constitutes an act of aggression that justifies an armed response. Not only does this justify an armed response on the part of the victim of that aggression, but it also permits others who would defend to come to his defense, as well. Now, human security, at least as I'm going to argue it here, I realize as we learned today, has been around for quite a while. It is a big field. Like national security, there's lots of ways of conceiving it. I'm beginning with the articulation from the United Nations Development Program, UNDPs *1994 Human Development Report*, which described it as a two-fold concept comprising both positive and negative duties that can be summed up as freedom from want and freedom from fear. This conception not only places an obligation on governments not to

harm their own people, but also to take active and preventive measures to ensure populations are protected from a variety of other harms they might face. While this expanded concept of security includes protection from external threats, it also entails that governments have the obligation to ensure the safety of their people from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily lives, whatever that source may be. Now, when considered in context with emerging norms associated with responsibility to protect, these obligations can even extend beyond borders, permitting, if not obligating, intervention by external actors. As Mary Kaldor points out, violence and resentment, poverty and illness travel across the world through terrorism, transnational crime, or pandemics. So, in this way, human security connects. Also, thus external actors may not just have an obligation to intervene to alleviate human suffering, but they may even also have an interest, and, in this way, human security connects the effects of war to its second and third order effects and consequences that national security framework may not always do. Now, human security is broader than R2P. R2P emphasizes protection from massive human rights violations and humanitarian disasters. Human security has a broader focus, shifts from the state to the individual, from security of the borders to the security environment, including access to food, water, health care, and other necessities. It requires governments to address conditions associated with the rule of law, unemployment, criminality, environmental conditions, extremist ideology, and anything else that might prevent individuals and communities from obtaining basic needs and leading relatively healthy and free lives. In doing so, it encourages cooperation. However, that cooperation not forthcoming arguably may permit some coercive measures and even intervention to include the use of military force. Moreover, the norms for addressing human security concerns are a little different from those associated with national security and the law of armed conflict. Where national security treats sovereignty as a limit on action, human security sees it as a responsibility that motivates action. Where national security emphasizes reaction, human security emphasizes prevention. Finally, where national security focuses its attention on limiting harm, human security

focuses its attention on promoting the good, not just for people within one's borders, but anywhere there are distressed populations.

So, what's the challenge? I already kind of framed it as neither side could realize its objectives. I'm obviously assuming the Russian objectives are unjust from either perspective, but to kind of get at what's really separating the two, it helps to look at what the different demands are. Putin originally described Russia's military goals as preventing further NATO expansion, as well as demilitarizing and de-Nazfiying Ukraine. More recently, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that Ukraine must also accept Russia's annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhie. These goals are somewhat scaled down from the ultimate of Moscow issued before hostilities commenced, which essentially demanded that NATO return to its 1997 boundaries. Now, what would they really accept? I think given the current situation on the ground, Russia would probably accept international recognition for the territory he has already annexed in exchange for cessation of hostilities.

Now, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, for his part, has given ten conditions for ending the war, which not only reject Russian demands, but also impose additional costs on Russia. To summarize, these demands call for the cessation of hostilities, full restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty, including Crimea. He also added an exchange of prisoners, as well as the return of Ukrainians, which include I don't know the exact number, but I know it's more than 11,000 children who've been forcibly deported to Russia, as well as punitive measures, which include accountability for war crimes, as well as compensation for damage to Ukraine's environment and infrastructure. Finally, he's asked for a public, signed confirmation of the end of hostilities endorsed by the United Nations. Interestingly, he's also integrated some human security concerns, as well. For example, concerned the Russians would use potential radiation leakage from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant as leverage, he's asked that all of Ukraine's nuclear power plants come under IAEA control. He also linked peace to ensuring that Ukraine could export its grain globally, avoiding further food insecurity, that its energy infrastructure be rebuilt, and that its environment is restored from the damage caused by the Russian invasion. What's interesting is the

way he frames the demands is that they don't simply impose obligations on the Russians, because they may not be able to do all that, but on the international community, as well, to help. Now, there's a tension, obviously, in the way these demands are phrased. Restoration of sovereignty will likely require combat in major urban areas, which threatens to displace more people. As we talked about earlier today, there are almost six million internally displaced persons and eight million refugees in neighboring countries. Adding to that misery would apparently seem to work against the goals of a human security framework. Now, unfortunately, given how far apart the belligerents are, there seems to be a little room for compromise, and given their relative military capabilities, there also seems little chance of either side defeating the other and settling the conflict that way. So, what follows is, I'm going to examine how both frameworks might resolve the dilemma. But, before I do that, we have to talk about what form that a settlement might take, so I'm going to offer that any settlement that's going to be plausible, if sub-optimal, is Russia is better off for stopping fighting, but we're soft for starting it. The former condition is necessary to incentivize Russian cooperation; the second is to vindicate Ukraine's rights and set conditions for a better state of peace, the importance of these I will talk about. Also, the first, regardless of framework, getting to that answer and figuring out how to fill out what that form is, we have to answer three questions. First one is obviously, should Ukraine revise its demands to make settlement more likely? The next one is for Ukraine's partners, because they can have an influence on what counts as a settlement or what Ukraine can reasonably expect. So, we have to ask first are there conditions where Ukraine's partners should reduce assistance, and then, conversely, on the third point, or should they encourage Ukraine to escalate the conflict to try to bring it to a quicker end? Now, in considering what to do, one first must establish what will happen if one does nothing. At current levels of assistance on Ukrainian military capability, I think the conflict will likely freeze absent a Russian change in leadership or collapse from internal pressures. Such a freeze favors the Russians, who will be able to continue to exert pressure on Ukraine, as they did before during the Minsk Accords, by continuing to interfere with grain shipments, other exports, greater ecological damage,

and so on. Moreover, it'll give them time to enact military reforms and renew hostilities when conditions and capabilities are more favorable. So, we'll call this the worst outcome.

So, how would national security there answer the question? For the most part, Ukraine fits well into the national security framework. Russia violated Ukraine's sovereignty and territory in what could only be called a classic act of aggression. So, from the perspective of national security, the conflict in Ukraine poses a few more dilemmas. Ukraine has the right to defend itself, and NATO and the United States and its partners have permission to support it. Problem is "just war theory" in the national security framework doesn't tell us much about how to stop the war, particularly when full realization of a just cause is not possible. Now, the appropriate end of any just war is a better state of peace. *Post bellum*, which is that feature of the just war tradition that governs just settlements, would insist that such a peace would vindicate Ukraine's rights, which requires, at a minimum, a public end of hostilities, exchange of prisoners of war, a Russian apology, demilitarization, at least to the point Russia cannot renew its hostilities, and be held for accountable war crimes. These line up pretty closely to the first set of Zelenskyy's demands. The reason they're important is, without meeting these minimum conditions, grievances will fester, while the capability to renew violence will be preserved, if not strengthened. But, like I said, unfortunately there doesn't seem to be a way to achieve this, so, what else can we say about stopping the war? Well, when it comes to the idea of going to war in the first place, in addition to having a just cause, even the side with the just cause is required to have for waging the war to be proportional, and there'd be a reasonable chance of success. That's to justify getting the war started in the first place. But, once the war started, it's hard to apply those criteria. At least doing so is going to be less obvious. First, the fact that Ukraine will not likely liberate all of its eastern provinces, much less Crimea, does not entail that it shouldn't try to liberate what it can. The difficulty here is determining when they've reached that point. From the theoretical perspective, you could simply say you scope your ends to what you could reasonably do. But try telling that to Churchill or Zelenskyy, who's kind of held up as his modern-day embodiment.

History often rewards the leader who continues the fight even when it doesn't seem reasonable. This point is especially forceful when seizing hostilities leaves meaning parts of your population under occupation, especially when that occupation involves the kind of forced deportation and other atrocities Russia is currently reportedly committing. In fact, in this context, enduring that suffering to restore national sovereignty becomes part of a narrative of sacrifice, which further encourages subordinating human welfare to that of the sovereignty and, unfortunately, calculating proportionality isn't any easier. One can certainly argue that where continued fighting is disproportionate to any exceeded gains, one should cease hostilities. The problem with this approach, as Thomas Hurka has pointed out, is the commensurability of gains and harms. How many Ukrainian and Russian lives is it worth to achieve full restoration? It doesn't matter that the Ukrainians, at least, seem to be willing to pay their share. Second, unrealistic isn't the same as unreasonable. There's more at stake than retaking Ukrainian territory. Ending the war on any terms that make Russia better off for having started it would likely incentivize future such aggression and set the stage for renewed hostilities when Russians believe they are sufficiently recovered. If nothing else, Russia will be in a position to continue provoking Ukraine and the West, leading to further instability. Now, even if we could get to that point and get an agreement on what's possible and what's proportional, it's not clear even then that the national security framework would justify termination. Under the doctrine of supreme emergency, when the just side is facing imminent and grave defeat, it may be permitted to loosen or even ignore some of the rules in order to continue the fight. The paradigmatic example argued by Michael Waltzer on unjust wars is the British bombing of civilian centers in Germany during that part of World War II prior to U.S. entry when Britain was alone facing the Nazi threat with only air power, an imprecise means to defend itself. Now, whether this doctrine actually applies to Ukraine is going to be up to interpretation, especially since Ukraine isn't losing. But, while Ukraine may not be facing imminent defeat, the people in the eastern provinces may be facing what Waltzer would refer to as a grave and imminent threat, which permits invoking supreme emergency. So, I could

see Ukrainians, especially those in the eastern provinces, making a case to argue that concerns regarding reasonable chance of success because of the consequences of ceasing resistance allows them to loosen these other restrictions even if we could get agreement on them. A human security framework is probably a little bit better providing guidance on when to exit a war, but only because it didn't really want you to start one in the first place. While it does make room for the use of force, its ideal that Shannon Beebe and Mary Calder point out in *The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon at All* is, as the title suggests, no weapon at all. Given the widespread suffering caused by war, as well as the risk of escalation, which, in this case, could include nuclear weapons, in addition, as we've already seen a greater conventional force used against civilian targets, it could be hard to justify continued fighting if it meant just adding to the pile of misery. Of course, Russian atrocities might make us rethink that judgment, but to the extent those atrocities are a function of resistance and not an enduring aspect of Russian annexation, a human security framework might determine that secession of hostilities is morally obligated, especially to make life in the newly annexed territories look a little bit more humane. Not exactly the democratic ideal, but perhaps not as bad as a war zone. Now, on the surface, that might seem like a plausible outcome from the application of a human security framework. I don't know that it's the only one, and I don't know that it's the best one. Avishai Margalit, in his critique of the Munich Agreement, where Britain and France agreed to German annexation of parts of then Yugoslavia, called it a rotten compromise, but what made it rotten wasn't that Hitler didn't keep it, but, rather, even if he had, the compromise tolerated an inhuman regime, a regime of cruelty and humiliation, i.e., a regime that does not treat humans as humans. This critique aligns more with the language of human security than national security, which are the operative principles encouraging the agreement. So, while it might be a stretch to characterize life in Russia as something that would trigger a response on human security terms, Russia's disregard for Ukrainian sovereignty and its numerous war crimes suggests that it's willing to treat its neighbors that way to keep them in line. And it's certainly reasonable for Ukraine to see the Russians that way. So, we might

argue that as long as any fear and want imposed by continued fighting is less than that imposed by surrender or cessation of hostilities in this case, then it is justified.

Now, we're back to proportionality that we talked about before. At least this time, we're measuring goods and harms commensurately. Now, here, of course, is where cause matters. To the extent fighting is a remedy to the fear and want imposed by an adversary, then it is morally preferable to the fear and want imposed by peace. As Cecile Fabre puts it in "War's Exit," if ceasing fighting entails termination costs that wrongfully undermine the fundamental rights of those on whose behalf it fights, then continued resistance is permissible. This suggests that any offer by the just side to cease hostilities should be conditioned on humane conditions for those who may remain under occupation. This point also represents an opportunity, if not obligation, for the international community who can provide third-party monitoring as well as humanitarian assistance as conditions for peace. Another way to make this point is to point out that, to the extent hunger, disease, crime, or oppression and disruption to civil life would be endured under Russian occupations, and those same conditions would gradually be alleviated as territory would be liberated. then one can plausibly argue that no one is worse off by continuing the fight, and, as Isak Applbaum points out in *Ethics for Adversaries*, under such conditions one may be said to be acting for the sake of the other even if that outcome is not exactly something that other would prefer if they could avoid it. Of course, there'll be some suffering resulting from fighting that may not have resulted from peace. However, to the extent fighting lowers everyone's chance equally of suffering, then one may make the case one has met the standard of justice by continuing.

Interestingly, also, human security would require us to consider effects of resistance and loss on Russia. If a Russian loss leads to a collapse of the Russian government, for example, there could be widespread instability imposing significant human costs in the Russian population. Human security may also ask us to consider particularly the plight of Russian conscripted soldiers, who are, as we all know, being put in a meat grinder in Ukraine. That's a source of misery that should come up under this framework. Now, that doesn't mean that it would require Ukraine to stop

fighting as a result of that, even short of sovereignty, but it's required to take those considerations into account, and, depending on options available, it would at a minimum require Ukrainian partners to take measures to prevent any second and third effects as a result. Now, one concern that this might raise is that human security would tolerate certain injustices if it avoided certain kinds of humanitarian disasters. I'm not sure that's a fair point because it's not so much that it tolerates it. It just tries to find other ways to address it. The problem for human security is what kinds of means do we have at our disposal? Are they up to the task? [refers to slide] So, that table just kind of shows how that comparison fleshes out, but now I'll let you look at that to answer the three questions.

So, the first question revising demands. I think from a national security perspective the answer would be no unless there was a consensus that further fighting was futile. A security perspective would prioritize, I think, individual warfare, but there would be room for revision if doing so ended attacks on civilians, mediated effects of Russian occupation, or enhanced global human security concerns. Having said that, doing so must avoid the rotten compromise [garbled] tolerate an inherently cruel and inhumane regime would be permitted. But to the extent continued fighting poses more suffering without the promise of alleviating what already exists, then Ukraine's partners would probably be required to pursue other non-military measures to address those concerns and achieve its ends. So, a human security frame would also condition any settlement on improvements. So, something else that the security framework would ask us to take into account, and I think this was Volker's point earlier today, is what conditions can Ukraine and its partners offer Russia that Russia could accept that would establish a better, if not optimal, state of peace? This might sound like appeasement, but I don't think it has to be. As mentioned earlier, absent victory, the best sub-optimal solution would leave Russia better off for ceasing hostilities but worse off for having started them in the first place. One thing that I can think of to make the Russians better off if they stop fighting, the United States and NATO should consider addressing their security concerns, especially regarding NATO expansion. In the past, NATO has refused, for example, to guarantee no more native expansion on

the principle of respecting state sovereignty. Given the cost, however, that we see of sticking to that and the cost of the fighting, the urgency to resolve the conflict, compromise on this principle seems reasonable. Moreover, to make the Russians worse off for starting the conflict, the United States and NATO should provide Ukraine, or it could provide Ukraine, with security guarantees should hostilities renew. And we are, I think, already making the Russians worse off for having started the conflict, not just through sanctions, but recently Finland became a member of NATO, something which makes the Russian war somewhat self-defeating.

Regarding the second question on reducing and ending assistance until Russia is ready to negotiate a more just settlement, both perspectives have their own contingencies. However, from a national security perspective, if continued assistance undermines global deterrence, reducing or even ending that assistance might be permissible, might even be obligatory. On the other side, if there was a way to gain guarantees for or otherwise ensure individual welfare in occupied territories, the security framework might prioritize non-military means.

Now, regarding question three on escalation, the concern here, of course, is increasing the chances of a direct conflict between Russia and NATO, which not only will, if it's unilateral escalation on the part of NATO, play into Putin's narrative on NATO as a security threat, which will strengthen his hand domestically and make it more difficult to isolate them intentionally, it also brings into question concerns of escalation to nuclear war. I'm going to set aside that just for a second and just point out that as Russia escalates, as it has done repeatedly with attacks on civilians, a national security framework might discourage escalation if in doing so jeopardizes other national security interests that have a higher priority. A human security perspective on the other hand, I think, would encourage Ukraine and its partners to find ways to increase assistance to undermine the effects of that escalation and otherwise impose costs on Russia. So, here, while both would find escalation not a preferred outcome, I think they would weigh it differently with possibly the national security framework seeing it as a worst outcome, human security not as much. But I think it would argue, as I will do so in a second, for a very focused kind of escalation.

So, what would that look like if we took all those considerations together and what could be a way ahead? And before I offer this, I appreciated the point made earlier that applying either framework really is very contextual. So, this is one answer. It may not be the best answer. There's a lot of things to take into consideration. So, when it comes to the first question on revision, I think where the national security ideal is a defeated Russia and restored sovereignty, I think human security makes room for some compromises. For example, if life in Crimea doesn't trigger human security concerns, then setting its liberation aside through military efforts might be a viable option. I don't know about the other areas given what's going on there, but this doesn't mean giving it up. It just means finding alternate ways to pursue. When it comes to assistance here, I think the human security concerns can override the national security ones. Ukrainian resilience created space for Western assistance. That Western assistance, however, has enabled continued resistance, Ukraine staying in the fight, and prolonging the war. Withdrawing that resistance would effectively leave Ukraine out to dry with all the human security concerns that entails. So, I think the West is obligated to take risks with his other priorities, even higher ones, and continue what it can.

And then, finally, here I think, again, human security might tolerate taking more risk when it comes to escalation but probably argue that it's better off if it's focused on addressing those Russian capabilities that are creating a lot of the human security concerns, e.g., the rocket attacks on civilian areas, damage to the environment, and so on. So, I think that might be how it's put together. I am open to your questions.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

So, the recent engagement from China with Russia. How does that affect the three outcomes that you were talking about?

DR. PFAFF

So, that's one thing that keeps Russia in the fight, right? Our efforts to isolate them both politically and economically. So, they've got India buying oil from them; they've got China obviously supporting them, and we're

worried about China supporting it with military measures. So, I don't know if it would help me settle where I would weight national security versus human security concerns where they come into tension. I don't know that it would actually change how I might view how they would complement each other, but if the Chinese were thinking of lethal assistance to Russia, it might give me some more urgency to find a solution and put some more effort behind that because that's the concern. Time is on Russia's side. If the conflict freezes, they, if not win, are still better off. If China [garbled] somehow lets that happen or enables that, then if we can get find a solution before that, I think we're better off. Something more stable.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Of course, the war is far from over, and the Ukrainians are now preparing probably their counteroffensive. So, we cannot predict what we'll have, but as you said, at the moment, the war seems to be a stalemate, and it is quite probable that it will stay like this for a longer period of time. My question is, how do you think may we expect a kind of solution similar to the Korean or Kashmiri one, with no settlement but a temporary line of control that will become a permanent line of control for decades?

DR. PFAFF

That's a great question and when that gets brought up, often the concern is this: what we don't want to have is what we have with the Minsk Accords. we had something similar, right? There was a little bit of a military zone, but what happened? The Russians still used it and were able to conduct provocative action there. They and the separatists obviously continued to agitate. There is just about as much fighting under the Minsk Accords as there was without them. So, that would only work if the Russians and the Ukrainians actually permit such a third-party observer, whether it's a UN peacekeeping force to effectively operate there—I would say if you could get that, great. I don't think you can. So, what I wouldn't want to see is something that looked like that on paper but was not effective and basically was just another way of freezing the conflict, validating Russians territorial gains, and allowing them to actually continue to provoke Ukraine, because

whatever force is in the middle is just not up to controlling them. But if you could overcome that or [garbled] those doubts, that would be one way to do it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

So, third-party actors. So, for instance, the international criminal court's indictment of Putin for war crimes. That's like it increases the complexity of this factor. I mean, what is the probability of more third-party foreign complexity to this problem, and does that just continue to take options off the table, or is there any way to get out of this with another sub-optimal solution?

DR. PFAFF

That's another great question. I don't know if it's a paradox or a dilemma, but the demands of justice, if not the international order, suggest that if you can't hold accountability from leaders for their direct involvement in gross war crimes, what good is that order? On the other hand, when you charge them, you incentivize them to keep fighting, and you limit the room for compromise. And that's not necessarily bad, because that is a kind of leverage. What we don't have is a mechanism, as far as I know, where someone can kind of look at all the different kinds of things that all the different kinds of parties can do, put it together in some sort of complete coordinated package, and then use that as a comprehensive platform for negotiating with Russia. Now, whether that would mean taking away the indictment, dropping the indictment, or just not acting on it, I don't know, but when it happens in isolation, you just pile up incentives for the continued resistance to cooperate. So, the other thing you can do is up your game and win. If you can't do that, but there's obviously a risk in this case, and right now we don't want to take them, so, absent that, I think I would engage in a program of trying to figure out how to coordinate all these different efforts to maximize leverage, and, failing that, just prepare for a frozen conflict.

5

Strategic Intelligence as a Mitigator to Human Security

Eeben Barlow

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I need to just preface everything by saying this wasn't an easy topic because Africa is not a homogeneous continent. We're 54-55 states, depending on who you ask—3,000 different tribes, 2,000 different languages, and multiple customs, religions, traditions, etc. So, we can't really look at it as a template for anything because each country or state is unique. However, in order to prepare myself for this, I spoke to friends of mine mainly from West, East, Central, and Southern Africa in order to get different inputs so that it's not purely my input. I was asked to speak on strategic intelligence as a mitigator to human security or "HS" and the challenges in Africa. I think everyone knows that strategic intelligence is the critical fuel that drives all strategies and counterstrategies, and, eventually, it trickles down to, or impacts on, our operational levels and even the tactical levels. So, just some thoughts on human security.

I find these two very important because they indicate a certain desire for, and a lack of, intelligence. The first is by Frederick Douglass. "Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob, and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe." And the other is by James Francis Burns. "The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front, where victory spells

freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front, where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace." I think that in both these thoughts that I've put down there, there is a very definite trend to telling us what we need Intelligence to do, and without Intelligence, we are going to fail.

So, as my introduction, I'd like to start off by saying that Africa is associated with numerous security deficits, but we cannot view this through a European lens because we have such diverse cultures, traditions, languages, ethnic groups, religions, etc. But all of the challenges, threats, and problems that the continent faced or faces can be directly linked to dysfunctional or problematic national strategies coupled with disconnected leadership and a lack of good governance. But governance or governments are not solely to blame, for what's happening in Africa is that both the East and the West tend to interfere at times and to misadvise to suit their interests. However, actionable, credible, focused, preemptive, and predictive, strategic and operational Intelligence deficits remain across multiple domains. In modern times, the increased use of collection technology can be a force multiplier, but often, it's not exploited on the continent for numerous reasons, such as infrastructure costs, etc. However, it remains critical for governments and especially the Intelligence services to locate, identify, negate, or exploit the threats to the state, its territoriality, and ultimately human security.

I'm not going to really go into the Treaty of Westphalia except to say that it's focused primarily on territorial integrity, political instability, military and defense arrangements, and such, and the people were not really considered in this, although they were believed to be part of, or protected by, the elements of the treaty. I also won't discuss the decolonization of African impacts and consequences on the continent. However, I've liked everyone's talking about the responsibility to protect, which seeks to mitigate ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity. However, had there been Intelligence, governments would be able to preempt many of these problems, and it would actually make the responsibility to protect that which it ought to be, the responsibility of the government. The United Nations Development Program in 1994 report on human development argued that the general concept of security is related

more to nation states than to people, and they divided the threats to human security into seven primary threat areas, the first being economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. But these seven elements are really focused more toward First World countries and not really directly applicable to Africa. And Africa has numerous security threats, many of them interlinked with these seven thread packages which the UNDP identified. Some of them stand independently from that. So, if we look at what we consider to be human security threats to the continent, and I must just add that every threat has a cause that ultimately results in the threat, but that cause presents us with numerous Intelligence indicators and, therefore, human Intelligence becomes critical in actually identifying the indicators of what's ultimately going to be the result of the cause. The first is armed conflict, including political militancy and religious fundamentalism. We've seen a huge growth in that currently across the continent, and, interestingly enough, [garbled] happen, and they can almost be predicted because there is a trend that they follow.

Just thinking about it, I didn't add border and land disputes for whatever reason. Probably thinking of the Cairo conference that ratified the colonial borders and the cyber threats in emerging off-the-shelf technologies, which was mentioned by a previous speaker. We have climate change caused by deforestation, the extraction of precious woods, the contamination of rivers, etc., and all of these have a huge impact on climate change. Obviously, organized crime, whether it be domestic or transnational, nefarious interest-driven advisors, unfortunately, of which there are many on this continent, natural and man-made disasters, infectious diseases. And one just looks at the chaos that the COVID-19 pandemic created across Africa and how it damaged economies and really impoverished people and nations. Water scarcity and grazing rights, and these aren't all. I can just keep on listing them—land resource theft, infrastructure control, genocide and tribalism, state capture, erosion, and failure of governance, mainstream and social media platforms, foreign governments, interests, and organizations. But, as I said earlier, every threat has its own causes, and if we have a look at a threat, and we start analyzing the threat, we can actually determine what the

causes are, and if we understand what the causes are, we can rectify them. But oftentimes those causes are hidden and not very obvious, and there, again, human intelligence becomes a critical factor in gathering Intelligence information, feeding it into the Intelligence system, and having it converted into Intelligence, guidance which the policy makers and strategists of the state need to use in either redirecting a national trajectory or reassessing their own national security strategy.

The reality is that Africa has very few true democracies, and many of these are really pseudo-democracies. They have all the trappings of a state; they appear to look like a state, a democratic state, but they don't always function as a democratic state. And added to this reality that we're experiencing at the moment, we are witnessing a shift in global alliances posed primarily by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Many African states claimed they were neutral and are now actually becoming more and more positively disposed towards Russia, which is a very interesting and almost, I wouldn't say, sentimental, but an historical tie they feel with Russia, as the Soviet Union supported them during their so-called liberation struggles. However, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, but they do not view it as such. They view it as Russia and so, have this shift towards Russia and China, China in particular, because of its investment in infrastructure. But generally speaking, if we look at what's unfolding on the continent, the East is really intent on building empires in Africa, and within those empires, they are going to take control of strategic resources, which is going to disadvantage the other side of the coin. The West, alternatively, is viewed as working at militarizing states or collapsing non-compliant governments, and these current and predicted impacts have a massive impact on human security in Africa. Not only do they create collateral damage and erode fragile governments resulting from anti-government sentiments, militancy, riots, and protests, it opens the door to Russia, China, North Korea, and others, who all, by the way, are active on this continent.

The U.N. went one step further and defined certain principles of human security, five of them which are very important. It should be people-centered, obviously. It ought to be comprehensive. It ought to be context-specific. It should be prevention-oriented, and it should afford protection

and empowerment. But it neglects to state that it also, as a principle, requires strategic Intelligence, because, if it doesn't have strategic Intelligence, it cannot actually align with the principles which the U.N. set forth—focused leadership. And often we find that leadership is not focused, because they're dealing with many problems domestically and externally and, therefore, we have this almost disconnect with leadership, at times, as to what's going on. Good governance ought to be a principle of human security, because without good governance, and that includes law enforcement, development of infrastructure, health facilities, medical communication, cyber whatever, we are going to end up with problems. Transparency, political will, and then probably from the point of view many of us hold is popular perceptions, because the perceptions that the local populace have is what drives their reality, and if that drives their reality, and they staff all of the government departments, we are going to find that we are going to have a serious problem when it comes to human security, especially when, oftentimes, we find that majority tribes dominate the security forces and certain important government positions.

So, humanity as a contributor is obviously critical and adds immense value to counterinsurgency operations and counterterrorism operations, especially when they are in the embryonic phases. None of these things happen spontaneously. So, there's always a lead up to what's going to happen, and certain trends and actions can be predicted in advance, and the lack of strategic Intelligence, usually from human sources, ought to actually indicate that these things are happening. It's all good and well to have cyber intelligence, to have UAVs flying around, and, although they do pick up many, many aspects of strategic Intelligence, they do not get to the heart of the enemy, where actions are actually discussed and planned on the ground. So, oftentimes, critical strategic Intelligence gets discarded in favor of a specific narrative or in favor of someone's agenda, and it has a huge impact ultimately on the populace within that area where these happenings take place. In other words, human security now becomes degraded.

I'm just listing a few examples of human Intelligence warnings that were discarded. First was the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in the year 2000. That warning was issued approximately three, four weeks before it

happened, and nothing was done to try and counter it or to verify whether it was true or not. It was actually just discarded. The coup against President Ravalomanana of Madagascar in 2009—again, the warning signs were there; the Intelligence was there, but the Intelligence was ignored. The attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi in 2012—that intelligence was available and was discarded. The attack on the Westgate Shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013—Intelligence was presented to the Kenyan defense attache, and he was told that they'd been told to ignore any such Intelligence. The resurgence of the Allied Democratic Front, an Islamic-driven rebel movement in eastern DRC in 2013—that was discarded, and ultimately, the ADF have become quite a nuisance in eastern DRC along with a group known as M23. The invasion of the Central African Republic by the Islamist group, Seleka—that warning was issued approximately a month and a half before the invasion took place. Again, that was ignored. The end result was the country collapsed, the president waved goodbye, got in his jet, flew out the country, and, currently, we have the Russian private military contractors of Wagner basically dominating the political and economic environment within Central African Republic. The resurgence of Boko Haram in 2015—again the warnings were issued. The warnings were neglected because they did not match a narrative. The Cabo Delgado insurgency of 2017—that was warned about the ousting of the Lesotho prime minister in 2020 and the South African unrest and anarchy in the country where I live experienced in 2021. So, all of these examples, the Intelligence was there, and it was strategic Intelligence. Had that Intelligence been accepted, had it trickled down to the operational and tactical levels, a lot of preemptive actions could have taken place to prevent the loss of life and ultimately the degrading of human security within those areas. And we all know what's happening in countries such as Madagascar and Kenya and in DRC, etc., so I'm not going to really go in to discuss all of this. I do, however, think, in conclusion, we disregard human Intelligence at our peril. All too often, we think that if we are running agents, and they're just sort of on the periphery of a society, we're going to get what we want. We will never get what we want. We need to have agents within the heart of an organization or federal group or whatever in order to get the intelligence we require, because we need to know what they are planning.

Obviously, this neglect has a huge negative impact on human security, where, instead, it ought to have a very positive impact. I think time will tell if Africa will renew its stance on human Intelligence and rely less on nefarious friends with agendas that are disconnected from the continent and the people.

DR. MIENIE

You had mentioned perception driving the narrative. Can you speak to how we can address that? How can we change that for the positive for Africa and for the West?

MR. BARLOW

Quite frankly, I think what we see more and more in Africa at the moment is countries starting to choose sides resulting from the conflict that we're having. Just a few days ago, a Kenyan minister actually said, and bear in mind that his audience is the people of the country, that the greatest violators of democracy, human rights, freedom etc. is the West, and he mentioned the U.S. and the UK and France. I think what we find is that comments such as that create a perception amongst the audience that actually get this message and that drives the reality that turns them against what ought to be a power block that's going to work in their interests. It makes them [garbled] to a different power block that's going to apply imperialism on them. So, I think winning and maintaining control over the information environment is critically important. However, I also think that when intelligence is ignored, and bad things happen, and people know that that intelligence was there, but it was discarded, or governments were advised to discard it, it actually builds up a huge amount of resentment. So, I think, in particular, the West needs to start looking at how does it drive Intelligence operations. How does it use the informational domain to alter or shift or manipulate or change perceptions to become more favorable to the West and almost drown out the counternarratives that are occurring?

AUDIENCE MEMBER DR. DELAN WILLIAMS

One of my questions is about those narratives that are shared in the west regarding Africa and China's presence in Africa. So, one of those common

narratives is that the Chinese influence is incredibly exploitative in African countries, and we frame that Chinese influence in that way. My question for you is, in your experience in dealing with African countries, do they share the West perception or the U.S. perception of this exploitation, or do they see Chinese actions, in general, as helpful and assisting economic development?

MR. BARLOW

I think, as I mentioned earlier, the general perception is that if governments are not in agreement with the West, they face sanction in one way or the other, possibly even regime change, which already puts them almost in a state of defensiveness. On the other hand, they look at China as a block that is developing the infrastructure, and that infrastructure has a positive impact on the peoples around that infrastructure. The fact that China is exploiting for its own purposes is often missed, although, ultimately, all governments exploit African countries that are rich in resources. So, I think there's a mismatch between the two narratives. The one from the East and the one from the West, and, as I said earlier, their perception is the West is militarizing, and the East is actually contributing towards economies and infrastructure development, etc. I think one needs to try and balance those to find almost a golden thread in order to try and do a certain amount of damage control.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

So, as the West increases its interests in Africa and as well as the East, it looks like conflict might be inevitable. But with these perceptions being the way they are, what steps could the West take to reduce the odds of a conflict in Africa?

MR. BARLOW

I think there's no quick fix answer to that. In my experience, and often I'm attacked for saying it, but I'm being as honest as I can be, the training given by the West to African Security forces is irrelevant. It's often substandard, and militaries that are being trained by the West find themselves at a disadvantage against a lesser-trained, theoretically less well-equipped anti-government

force. So, that already creates a certain amount of distrust and concern, and African people are very conservative in the way that they are. They're not people who sort of cling to extreme leftism or liberalism or whatever. They have tribal traditions; they have tribal beliefs, and those are very important to them, and as soon as we start putting them in a position where they start doubting that which has been afforded to them, be it training or be it the development of a project or whatever, and it doesn't succeed, it creates a large amount of concern, and it also results in people losing respect for the people who presented this to them. So, I think, once again, one has to look at what are the agendas. What is the West's agenda? What is the East's agenda? You have to try and find a golden route between the two. But what is for certain is that the West has to re-establish a lot of trust and respect with many African States, and don't think I'm saying that because I'm anti one or pro the other. I'm pro-Africa, so what I'm saying is based on what not only I feel, but many of my colleagues up north of my border or my country's border have exactly the same view about it. And there are people who are going to ultimately end up in positions of power one day, so those perceptions they harbor right now need to be altered and modified and changed for the better of the perception creator as well as for Africa.

DR. JALLOH

I'm actually an African, too. I'm originally from Sierra Leone. I grew up there, and I spent my entire life, but, of course, right now, I'm in the United States. But I just want to echo what you just said. Everything you just said about the whole competition between the East and West, you are right on point. The narrative in Africa is not that China is there to manipulate, but they're there to build and help. They're actually doing the hands work, but the narrative coming from the West—I don't want to repeat what you just said, but I just want to echo exactly what you said is right. It's correct. I think the West has to really rethink its relationship with Africa instead of always looking at, criticizing what we do, because Africa, like I said, again, is a very multi-diverse society. We have tribes. We have culture. So, when you come in and you keep telling us, well, what you're doing is wrong or don't follow the Chinese, then it's sort of like you are not part of the solution. Instead,

you just criticize it. So, the West has to be very careful when it comes to their perception of Africa, itself, and I even think, for example, the Ebola outbreak as West African. One of the reasons why the Ebola response was very terrible and it lasted the way it did in West Africa was because the global health response came in with a western perspective of the traditional epidemiological response, where you isolate, you contain, and then you control. And that was devastating. It was only after they recognized the socio-cultural context, underground communities came together and then respect was built between public health respondents and African leaders and communities. That was the time we started seeing the effective approach to the Ebola outbreak. So, just in conclusion, like you said, again, I think the narrative in the West has to change, and the West has to start looking at the new approach in terms of how they can strategically engage with Africans, and the human intelligence becomes very critical, as opposed to the so-called Western ideological way of advancing democracy in other parts of the world. And I think this is where China has been very successful. They come in and say, hey, we'll build you bridges. Tell us what's the problem. Tell us what you want. We'll build that for you. But, of course, we do know also they have their own strategic interest, but they are on the ground working with locals. I think that's where the West has to be very careful, because if you continue this path, you will find yourself in a place where they are always going to be on the defensive side when it comes to Africa.

MR. BARLOW

Thank you for that comment, sir, and if you go back to the conflict that was in your country, it's no great secret that the RUF had offices, for want of a better word, outside of Sierra Leone based in European and other countries, while the West was actually saying it's supporting the government, and it's trying to stop the conflict that was spreading over there. So, thank you for that input. I fully endorse that.

DR. JALLOH

I just have a quick question for you. You mentioned political will and good governance, and I think, as an African, also one of our biggest

challenges that we have on the continent is a lack of political will and good governance. So, some other strategic human intelligence that you mentioned from your perspective, how do you think we can address some, because I think if we can address the good governance piece and the political will, I think Africa will be in a much better shape even in terms of dealing with the Chinese and the Americans and putting Africa first. How do you think we can tackle that in terms of enhancing good governance and political will within the continent?

MR. BARLOW

I think, from our point of view, good governance can only really flourish if there's peace and stability throughout a specific country. And, oftentimes, governments lack the political will or apparently lack the political will because they are hesitant and afraid of what reaction they are going to evoke internationally. If you have a look at and just use it as a simple—and it's not simple; it was very complex—conflict that that was running in Angola, it's very difficult for a government to extend its reach into areas that are contested, because whatever they try and do, they get sabotaged or destroyed or actually used against them. So, they cannot apply good governance in these areas because they don't have the reach, but they're also hesitant to deploy forces into those areas because of the potential fallout that they're going to have internationally, and that could be the type of fallout that puts them under diplomatic sanction or economic sanction or possibly even results in governments starting to support their opposition. And that's what happened in Angola. So, I think governments lack the political will, but I think we need to preface it by also saying that oftentimes they're just very hesitant, too, and the good governance can only be applied once there's peace and stability. While the conflicts go on, it's virtually impossible to do that.

DR. MIENIE

I have one last question. Yesterday, I made the point that should South Africa fail, it will impact sub-Saharan Africa. It becomes a headache for sub-Saharan Africa as well as for the West. Any comments about where

South Africa is today? And I'm not asking you to make a prognosis, but can you just share some input from your side about where South Africa stands in Africa?

MR. BARLOW

I think it's a pretty difficult question to answer. As the Symposium is on the go, there's a South African government delegation in Russia trying solidarity with Russia, and I mentioned it because ever since we became part of BRICS, and our lobbying for the enlargement of BRICS to include a multitude of other countries, what we are seeing is South Africa's attempt to try and leverage its relationship with BRICS in order not to fail. We all know that, currently, South Africa is in a state of fragility. We all know that there's been masses of corruption and laws trying to prevent the exposure of corruption. I do, however, think that we will prevail. We are a hardy, tough people, and also, a huge percentage of the populace have become tired of this constant moaning about why there are problems, and there's never money for problems, yet there's always money for other things. And I think what we are seeing is a rise in popular anger that's going to be manifested at the elections. And I also think the ruling party is going to lose a huge amount of ground, but that's not only going to impact South Africa, but it's going to impact Africa, because African countries are starting to look askew at South Africa, which they once held in high esteem and now no longer do. Our foreign policy has often been based on flip-flopping around where there's been no decided and determined policy, *per se*, and I'm giving you my opinion on South Africa. If you have a look when the invasion of Ukraine started, and the South African Department of Foreign Affairs immediately condemned it and, a few hours later, was told to withdraw that statement. So, when your foreign policy and your national direction or national strategy are unsynchronized, I think you're going to have problems. And, I think domestically, we're finding that the domestic situation is not aligned and synchronized with what the government's plans are. So, I think, yes, we're still going to have some problems, but I do believe that we are resilient enough to see them through, and I think, ultimately, we are going to find that the militant populist, which I might just add is

foreign-funded—the rise of militant populist groups—I think we are going to actually see the slow erosion of those groups as more and more people realize that we can only succeed if we work together, because the examples where people haven't worked together abound in Africa, and none of us here want to end up looking like Libya or Somalia or wherever. So, that's my take on it, Eddie, but it's a very difficult and complex situation, and, sadly, as I say, we have this militant rise in populism and that is foreign-funded, and I think that funding has to be stopped, and the government has to change its trajectory.

6

Scholars at Risk: The Impact of the War in Ukraine on Higher Education

Dr. Igor Chirikov

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

I'm truly delighted to present at this important symposium. The theme of human security could not be more timely and relevant, especially considering the ongoing war in Ukraine and, of course, other global conflicts. I genuinely wish I could be there with you all in person in beautiful Dahlonega, but, unfortunately, I got sick right before my flight to Atlanta, and I'm sorry. I'm grateful to the organizers for giving me the opportunity to present online and join you all from the distance, but, on the bright side, I now have an excellent excuse to plan a visit to Georgia some other time.

I caught a few sessions online yesterday, and I learned a lot about broader challenges of human security, and I appreciated many speakers mentioning Ukraine in that context, because these conversations help us understand the broader consequences of this war. I also would like to take a moment to extend my gratitude to the U.S. military community for its steadfast support and assistance to Ukraine in their fight for freedom. U.S. contributions have played a crucial role in Ukraine's effort to resist Russian aggression and strive for victory. So, thank you for that.

So, before we get into the presentation, let me give you a brief idea of my background and positionality which will provide some context for my

perspective. My family on my father's side comes from Cherkasy, which is in central Ukraine far from the front line. This is where my father grew up, my grandmother lived where I hold fond memories of my childhood years. Our family also called the city of Melitopol, further south, home for a time, and this is where my brother was born. The city is now unfortunately suffering under Russian occupation, and hopefully, we'll be liberated by Ukraine. I then lived in Russia, where I studied and worked at HSE University in Moscow for quite some time before moving to the United States five years ago to work at UC Berkeley. So, when the full-scale invasion began, I felt compelled to volunteer for several non-profit organizations that help Ukrainian refugees in the U.S., particularly those coming from the Tijuana Mexican border as well as volunteering for organizations helping Ukrainian academics and students. So, this personal connection to this region and my experiences have informed my understanding of the current war and the impact on higher education.

My presentation today comes in four parts. I will first share with you some personal stories of Ukrainian academics during this war just to illustrate the profound effect that this war had on higher education in the country, and I then will provide some more information and delve into a remarkable resilience of Ukrainian universities as they face the challenges during the war. Following that, I will say a few words about the tightening ideological control and weaponization of Russian universities and try to highlight the repressions of anti-war academics and the university's role in the state propaganda right now. Finally, I will explore some meaningful ways in which we all can support scholars and students at risk but also how to help Ukrainian higher education to grow and develop during the recovery period.

So, let's start with the personal stories of Ukrainian faculty and students during this war. The first story is about Fedir Shandor, a sociology professor at Uzhhorod University. He's in the picture. He did not have any military experience as he admits in one of his interviews. He even didn't think that the full-scale invasion would actually happen, but once it did last year, he couldn't sit back and do nothing. He joined up with the territorial defense forces to protect his family and his homeland. This is the picture of him in the trenches, and what's amazing is that he's actually teaching a class. He

joined the territorial defense forces on the first day of the full-scale invasion, but his students and colleagues didn't even know until this photo went viral on social media, and they didn't know because he just continued teaching online as most Ukrainian faculty do. He's been giving lectures from his dugout thanks for good internet connection, and sometimes, yes, students hear explosions during the class. But the admiration for him just only grew stronger, and even students admit that even those who would skip the classes before turned up to every lecture and many became volunteers, themselves. So, the bottom line of the story is that it shows the incredible resilience of Ukrainian academics. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Education, about 900 teachers in Ukraine joined the armed forces and most of them without any military experience, and they are not only fighting for their country's freedom but are finding the ways to stay connected with their students and keep teaching, which is, I think, truly inspiring.

This is a story of Yulia Zdanovska, a brilliant twenty-one-year-old mathematician. She was tragically killed by Russian shelling on March 3, 2022, just the second week of the war. She was a rising star gifted in both computer science and mathematics. She was an active volunteer. She began participating in mathematical competitions at a very young age, and she won very prestigious awards at European girls' Mathematical Olympiad in 2017. She then graduated with honors from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, and she was very well loved and respected by her peers and teachers. She even founded a math and programming club for middle schoolers which actually turned into a very successful national programming competition. She had a lot of opportunities to move abroad for her studies, but her dream was to become Ukraine's Minister of Education, and she wanted to ensure high quality education for every child in the country. Thus, she joined a program called Teach for Ukraine. It made a very significant impact on her students and colleagues, but despite her generosity and potential, her life was cut short because of the war. The loss of Yulia and other talented scholars like her is devastating for the Ukraine higher education system because these brilliant individuals could have mentored future generations of scientists and educators, and their deaths represent the tremendous loss of knowledge and potential for Ukraine's universities.

So, finally it's a story of Inesa Kostenko. She's a Ukrainian law professor. She was forced to flee her home country with her young family due to a Russian invasion, and, after seeking refuge in Poland, Lithuania, and Germany, she has now secured a job lecturing at the University of Leicester in the UK. Inesa and her children had to shelter in their basement due to the dangers of missile attacks, and the family eventually left Kharkiv, which was heavily shelled, by train, and she joined thousands of other refugees in a thirty-hour-long journey. Over the next five months after that, she sought refuge and employment. She obtained a temporary role at a university in Lithuania and then successfully applied for a position in Leicester. There is a UK-based program that helps academics facing danger to find jobs. And so, she's now safe in the UK, and she settled for a new career and new thriving role as a professor in space law. But while it's wonderful that talented academics like her can find safety in new academic communities abroad, their departure also represents a loss to the Ukrainian higher education system, because this exodus of scholars could have significant impact on the country's future academic landscape and highlights the challenges that Ukraine faces in retaining the intellectual capital amidst this war.

I tried to give a personal glimpse into the effects of the war on Ukraine's higher education system, and, with that in mind, let's now shift to a broader conversation about the consequence and challenges that Ukrainian universities face as a result of this conflict.

The invasion of Ukraine brought devastating consequences to the lives of countless civilians. This is the data from the United Nations. Over 21,000 civilian casualties have been reported, including over 8,000 deaths, with almost more than 500 of those being kids. The actual figures are likely to be significantly higher, unfortunately, because these are only verified casualties because it's very hard to obtain information from the area where there's intense hostility still going on, and there are numerous other reports awaiting confirmation. So, in addition to that, the invasion displaced more than five million people as refugees, left eight million internally displaced, and there's an estimated 17.6 million people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. This crisis is particularly severe in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, especially near the front lines, where millions

are lacking basic services, such as water, electricity, heating, food. And it was a relatively mild winter, but during the winter, access to winterized shelter became increasingly critical. Civilians face numerous protection challenges, including shelling, violence, mines, family separation, looting, eviction, human trafficking. The mental health has been severely impacted. As we go into discussing the impact of the war in higher education, it's important to remember the immense cost of this invasion and the urgent need for humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering.

As of March 2023, according to Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science, twenty-four colleges and universities have been completely destroyed, and 143 have suffered significant damage. In certain regions, especially in Kharkiv, almost half of the universities were damaged or destroyed. Historically, Kharkiv has been a university city with a lot of colleges. The images on the slide are just from one affected university. It's not several universities; it's just one from Karazin Kharkiv National University, and this university experience is one of the best universities in the Ukraine, and it experienced heavy shelling during the first month of the invasion, and there are extensive damages to its facilities and infrastructure, as you can see.

Here's another example, comparing conditions at Mariupol State University before and during the invasion, and as you can see from this image, the main building suffered extensive damage. These numbers and visuals underscore the profound ramifications of the continuing conflict, and not just on the lives of people, but also on Ukraine's educational research prospects. The destruction of universities will unfortunately leave a lasting imprint on the nation's higher education system and will affect the lives of thousands of students, faculty, and staff members.

In addition to that, many Ukrainian universities are currently under Russian occupation, and they have been forced to relocate. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science, twenty-nine higher education institutions and over sixty branches or division units were moved from the territories occupied by Russia. [refers to map] This is a map that illustrates that the majority of those institutions were relocated to Central Ukraine, with some of them moving further west. Relocation typically involves

changing the legal address, partially moving faculty and management, but, in almost all cases, the equipment remains in the occupied areas, so, it's not like they're moving with the labs. And in the new locations, these higher education institutions are provided with some offices, classrooms, and some general office equipment, and most of the relocated institutions implemented processes to organize distance learning, complete the academic year, and carry out the admissions campaign. So, they try to continue their operations but on a much smaller scale. The Russian invasion had significant impact on faculty members and their priorities, and I want to share some of the insights based on the survey data collected from several studies conducted during the first year of the invasion.

The challenges faced by faculty members include work disruptions, transition to remote instruction, inability to access campuses or labs, displacement and evacuation, occupation and shelling, difficulties focusing due to mental health issues, and, despite those challenges, faculty members have identified that their top priorities are supporting students and colleagues, continuing teaching remotely (as we see from the first story), supporting the army and territorial defense forces, ensuring survival and security, and supporting their universities.

There was a very revealing survey that was conducted by the National Research Foundation of Ukraine in April 2022, and, as you see on the chart on the right side of the slide, a staggering 73 percent responded "no" when asked if they could engage in research activities to the same extent as in pre-war times. The main reason that was cited for this inability was that a lot of scholars felt unsafe. They had work that required their presence in the specific locations that were currently unavailable. They had technical issues, constant interruptions of the internet or electricity, or they had apathy or lack of interest, which are well-documented responses to stress and trauma.

Not only has this invasion affected the priorities and challenges of faculty members, but also highlighted the critical needs during this difficult time. And in the same survey, faculty members expressed several critical needs, including financial support for both personnel and research purposes, stable and uninterrupted access to the internet, access to literature, information data, more opportunities for research, and increased

opportunities for international collaborations, and I will talk about that towards the end of the presentation. I would like to highlight that financial support is a particular pressing issue because Ukrainian universities have been struggling with insufficient funding for years, and the war has only worsened the scarcity of resources. As a result, providing adequate financial support is essential to ensure that faculty members can continue their work, and by addressing these needs, we can help Ukrainian faculty members to overcome these challenges of the war and continue with their teaching and research, which most of them would like to do despite the war.

I'd like to focus now on the effects of the war on Ukrainian students, and I also draw from several surveys and the studies conducted during the war so we can gain insights into the challenges faced by students. First and foremost, the shocking fact is that more than one-third of students have fled their homes during the invasion, and they either flee abroad, the smaller part, or become internally displaced within the country. This is the larger part. This displacement obviously led to a number of challenges. Safety concerns are understandably paramount for students in the midst of this war. Many students are living in constant fear, unsure that they or their loved ones will be safe if the war continues.

Access to stable internet connection is another significant challenge, especially since universities shifted to remote learning, and having reliable internet connection is important. Unfortunately, the war also has disrupted a lot of networks, and it's quite difficult for many students to have good access.

Financial stress is also a significant burden for students because it affects the ability to pay for education-related expenses, and, obviously, this is also exacerbated by the inflation and current currency depreciation caused by the war.

Finally, mental health concerns are also widespread, with many students experiencing anxiety and depression and other issues as a result of this crisis.

So, just in concluding this part, it's crucial that we understand and address these challenges faced by Ukrainian academics and students so that we try to help the system survive.

In this section I'll try to very briefly discuss the impact of this invasion on higher education in Russia, focusing on weaponization of Russian Universities. First, what we see is an increase in ideological control within Russian universities, including the introduction of required ideologically-charged courses in the curricula—universities assisting the military in taking control of institutions in occupied territories, the increased engagement in military research—so, basically, universities are turning into weapons in the war against Ukraine and the West, and they should be considered as such.

Second, there are currently large-scale repressions of anti-war faculty and students, and I will show the reason for that at the next slide. So, university leadership is centrally appointed by the government, providing a kind of institutional support for the war and simultaneously repressing faculty and students who engage in anti-war statements and initiatives. This weaponization of repression tactics stifles dissent and promotes a pro-war stance.

Another emerging trend is the role of universities in developing and promoting pro-war ideologies. Certain departments and groups within Russian universities are actively promoting kinds of colonial ideologies that justify the war against Ukraine and further territorial expansion of Russia. These ideologies also act as weapons, and they legitimize the ongoing conflict. Also, Russian higher education is becoming increasingly isolated due to pressures from both within Russia and from the international community, affecting the capacity for global influence that was traditionally used as soft power within Russia. This new legislature aims to ban anyone who has been exposed to foreign influence from teaching at schools and universities, and the definition of foreign influence is incredibly broad, which causes academics to self-censor, to reduce their engagement with scholars from other countries.

On the other hand, we have external forces in play. Foreign universities, governments, and foundations are cutting ties with the Russian institutions in order to support Ukraine and also minimize reputational risks. As a result, we see that collaboration with the Russian universities has become increasingly toxic. So, this dynamic is pushing the Russian higher education system into isolation, and there are significant implications for the future

of research and international collaboration, and part of this process is accelerating brain drain.

The conflict has led to the departure of international Russian academics, and Russia has put significant efforts into attracting foreign scholars in the previous years, so universities will face challenges in hiring internationally and retaining talent and will also struggle with budget cuts because of prioritization of military spending in Russia.

The slide highlights the key reason behind the governmental crackdown on the universities and the tightening of ideological control. There is a relatively low level of support for the war among students and academics. We need to obviously exercise caution when we look at any survey data from Russia because of the way its surveys are organized and the way people respond, because people fear to respond honestly. But even considering that, both government and private pollsters indicate that university communities show less support for the war than any other sectors of the economy. You see on the left-hand side there are what students respond and on the right-hand side what faculty respond. The charts illustrate the level of support of the war. Officially in Russia it's called the "Special Military Operation." You can actually go to jail for calling it a war. It's categorized by the type and sector of employment, and we see that less than 50 percent of students support the operation, and this is compared with over 80 percent among retired individuals. For students, one reason for this difference is that the media consumption habits are very different from their parents. They tend not to watch TV, and they're much less exposed to heavy state propaganda. That's at least for now. Similarly, the level of support for the war among those who work in research is the lowest among all other sectors, and this unique perspective that is held by university communities has contributed to the government efforts to crack down on the universities and tighten ideological control.

And just a few words about the impact of the war on faculty members in Russia, which is illustrated in this chart on the slide. This is the chart that shows the top twenty Russian scholars in economics and political science categorized by their position on the war in Ukraine and expressed on the social media as either supportive, opposed, or silent. And there

are three key points to note. First, academics who are publicly outspoken against the war tend to publish in journals with high impact factors, but their work is also cited in higher impact journals. Scholars who openly support the war tend to publish in less impactful journals, and, finally, those who remain silent about the world fall somewhere in-between and their publications and citations and journals have kind of a moderate impact. Overall, the war has left many Russian faculty members demotivated and perplexed, particularly those who are young and internationally connected. Additionally, social sciences, humanities, and law are at a higher risk of experiencing ideologization and nepotism, and there's also an exodus of both international and domestic faculty taking place.

In conclusion, the 2022 Russian invasion has had far-reaching consequences for Russian higher education, with universities basically being weaponized in various ways to support the war against Ukraine.. This weaponization manifests as kind of a repression, developing pro-war ideologies, diminished autonomy, and re-Sovietization, all of which contributes to a very dangerous environment within a higher education system. the re-Sovietization aspect of it is very important because, when Russia decided to break with the Western model, this prompted a search for a national model, and there is still a big temptation to just reintroduce the Soviet model of higher education, because a lot of people are just familiar with that, and that model also serves to promote a more centralized, ideologically-driven system and to support war efforts in taking control over universities.

Finally, let's discuss how we all can support Ukrainian scholars and students at risk. I will quote here, Inna Sovsun, a friend of mine, who's a member of the Parliament in Ukraine, often highlights this crucial point. She says that the most effective way to protect civilians and alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine is to support the Ukrainian army and provide military assistance. The United States is already heavily involved in this area, and this falls outside of my expertise, but aside from that, there are numerous ways in which American universities can help. They can support Ukrainian universities both during the war and continue contributing to their development once the recovery process gets underway.

There are numerous initiatives out there to support individual scholars and students at risk. For example, there is a project called "Science for Ukraine" that gathers opportunities for Ukrainian researchers in one place. There's "Scholars at Risk," a well-known project that helps to protect scholars and find employment opportunities for them abroad, among many other things they do. I am personally supporting an initiative called "Universities for Ukraine," offering non-residential fellowships to academics who remain in Ukraine, and I will provide some details about that particular initiative in a few moments. But since many of you here represent military colleges and universities, I'd like to focus on three crucial ways in which these particular institutions can help. I'm aware that there are efforts that are already underway at many schools, but the more support we can provide now, the sooner the war can end, and the recovery process can begin.

There are three ways to consider for universities. First, I think, and this is very important, is to establish more academic partnerships with Ukrainian higher education institutions, and these partnerships can include, for example, joint research projects, academic exchange programs, sharing educational resources, just to make sure that the learning and research continues despite the war and other challenging circumstances.

Second is remote learning and training. Military universities and colleges can provide support in developing and implementing some remote learning and training programs for Ukrainian students and faculty. This can include offering online courses, providing access to digital resources, sharing expertise in distance education, which, during the pandemic, I think everybody became an expert in.

It's also important to contribute to capacity-building efforts in Ukrainian higher education by offering specialized training programs and workshops, e.g., such areas as emergency management, cyber security, crisis communication. This can help Ukrainian universities develop skills and expertise to better navigate these challenges posed by the war.

And finally, humanitarian aid and support. Military universities can work with associations and international organizations to provide humanitarian aid to support Ukrainian higher education institutions, and this can include financial assistance, equipment, other resources that

can help rebuild and maintain essential infrastructure that was severely damaged. And again, there are other ways to help, too. Please don't hesitate to reach out. I'm happy to connect you with universities in Ukraine. I'm pretty sure that they will be very interested in exploring those collaborations with you.

Speaking of other ways, I'd like to mention another initiative "Universities for Ukraine Fellowship Program." As I mentioned earlier, I emphasized that universities in Ukraine are facing a financial crisis due to their reliance on tuition revenue and state funding, and many domestic and international students have left the country, joined the military, or government funding has been reduced because of the war effort. In addition, Ukrainian faculty and scholars are dealing with a lot of personal kinds of crises, and they question their ability to stay in academia, so there is a way to help.

Here's how this program works. It enables sponsors—it could be colleges, universities, research institutions, even private companies—to directly support Ukrainian researchers who remain in the country, those who did not leave the country, and sponsors can select the research area and specific fellows. The program selects the fellows, but if there are others you'd like to support, that's totally fine. So, each fellow receives a one-time unconditional payment of $5,000, which may not seem like a large amount of money, but this actually can go a long way in Ukraine. And there is a way to directly sponsor, or there is a non-profit partner that can help with that. And again, this support can make a huge difference for hundreds of Ukrainian researchers in various fields. Since the program was launched, it has matched over seventy researchers to individual and organizational sponsors, and they would like to scale the impact of the program and are looking for more partners. So, please don't hesitate to contact me if you'd like to join. Here's my email. Thank you for your attention. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have or discuss ideas how to support scholars at risk.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I wanted to thank you for the presentation; it was really good information we don't have in Argentina. My question is, you mentioned

the Russian educational system exposes their students to pro-war and to Russian ideologies and that Ukrainian students don't have that much approval for the war based on the chart we saw based on the different sectors of the population. So, do you think it is important for the students to have some more exposure at least from the educational system based on that the nation is on a thread. And maybe now, it is not a problem because they don't make the decisions for the country, but in fifteen, twenty years, they are going to be the ones who make the decisions, and having only 48 percent of approval, it may seem not that much, and, yes, that's my question that how would you approach this long-term issue?

DR. CHIRIKOV

Yes, that's a very good question. It's important to note that the percentage of students supporting the war based on surveys is really arbitrary because it's very difficult in Russia to conduct any kind of surveys, and people just are afraid to talk honestly with the posters. But comparatively, we see that the numbers are lower for students compared to other groups. I think the best way is for the West, in particular, to help raise awareness is to continue to cover honestly what's going on and to support Russian language media abroad that exist and that try to provide more or less objective information. It's very hard to understand what else to do in addition to that because, for a lot of the students, it's challenging to leave the country considering that international mobility obviously is limited compared to pre-war times.. But hopefully, yes, the new generation will take a very different direction, but for that to happen, important changes should happen at the country's leadership level, too.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

My name is Danna Beca from Romania from the Land First Academy, and I also want to thank you for the information you gave us. My question is, from your point of view, I really want to know how does the future look like for Ukraine after the war will be ended, and what percentage of the population do you think will return to Ukraine, and how long do you think it will take them to rebuild everything that Russia destroyed. Do you think

that this generation of children who felt the terror of the world will be permanently affected, or is there hope for restoration?

DR. CHIRIKOV

That's an amazing question, and a lot of people try to figure out the answer to that. A lot will depend on how long this war will happen. I'm unfortunately on the pessimistic side. I don't think it will end anytime soon unless, again, Putin will die, or something else will happen to him. So, depending on when the war ends, it will determine how fast the recovery will start. Hopefully, there will be some sort of a Marshall Plan for Ukraine to rebuild Ukraine and to invest resources into Ukraine's development. As for the higher education, I think it could play a crucial role in Ukraine's recovery, especially if there will be funding for higher education as part of that plan.

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Logistics and Supply Chain Management through the Lens of Human Security

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I've spent most of my adult life working in the field of logistics and supply chain management for the purpose of U.S. national security. When asked to speak here, I had to expand my understanding and consideration of many other factors to see that role through the larger lens of human security. To further my understanding, I actually read Sarah Petron's tremendous paper on human security and U.S. military operations and found it an excellent source, and I told her so. Yesterday, I learned that the United Nations bases its approach to human security on President Franklin Roosevelt's 1941 speech to Congress justifying U.S. intervention in World War II. In that speech, he personally developed this. He outlined four freedoms of human beings. The first he listed was freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world. The second is freedom for every person to worship in his or their own way. The third is freedom from want, which he described as economic understanding which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants. The fourth is freedom from fear, which he described as a worldwide reduction in armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation would be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor.

With so many factors affecting human security, why are we talking about supply chains at the symposium? Well, it's not just because April is National Supply Chain Integrity month; it's because supply chains play significant roles in human security, particularly as globalization has shifted production of consumable and non-consumable products throughout the world. We rely on a global supply chain to provide many of our needs and desires. So, throughout the month of April, the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center will team up with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, allies, partners, and the private sector to increase awareness of supply chain threats, to share best practices in risk management, and to strengthen collaboration on key supply chain security issues. President Roosevelt believed that human security could be achieved in his lifetime, and while it arguably exists in more areas of the world than in 1941, we still have a long way to go and a lot of work to do. The war in Ukraine is the most prominent example where we see daily instances of insecurity, specific targeting of civilians, infrastructure, and supply chains causing the migration of refugees who leave so much behind for their very existence. They no longer have safe access to basic needs and services, the ability to purchase necessities, access financial resources, earn an income, go to work, go to school—the things that we consider normal daily activities in a safe environment. Even absent the effects of war, supply chains have been severely tested in the COVID era. Most of us have experienced interruptions in supply chains we rely on due to factory closures, transport restrictions, port and border delays, delays in drug testing and approvals—so many instances to cite in just the past three years and, again, starting with toilet paper and expanding many even more important products. Ultimately, a supply chain is all about getting customers what they need at the right place, time, and price. Supply chain interruptions can have serious effects on defense and national and human security as it becomes harder for organizations and nations to meet basic needs, food, health, shelter, and overall quality of life. Resulting shortages result in increased competition for scarce resources, which can lead to class conflict, the haves and have-nots, regional imbalances, and increased aggression between nation states. A *New York Times* article last week addressed challenges the

Pentagon currently faces in supplying military aid to Ukraine due to a lack of production capacity in the United States, which has been shrinking since the end of the Cold War from the early 1990s through today. Many factors come into play, including extensive consolidation of the U.S. industrial base, a reliance on economies gained from offshore production, and a reduction of inventories as we adopted Just-In-Time deliveries. There were great reasons for pursuing these business decisions at the time, but the world has changed, and some supply chains are now at very tenuous points. The Pentagon is responding with new approaches, the paper said—actions like multi-year procurement contracts so that companies can invest and will invest in more manufacturing capacity and also expanding the supplier base both here at home and abroad with allies. As a little background, just some fun facts, the Defense Supply System is organized by classes of supply. Class 1 includes food rations and water. Class 2, clothing and individual equipment like your uniforms. Class 3 are fuels, petroleums, oils, and lubricants. Class 4 are all the construction materials needed to build camps. Class 5, ammunition. Class 6 are personal items. Class 7 are major end items, like trucks and tanks and planes and helicopters. Class 8 is all the medical supplies, including blood and plasma. Class 9, where I spent much of my life, is in repair parts management. And Class 10 is the class of supplies used to support non-military programs, such as agricultural development in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Each class of supply has defined staff, processes, distribution, and management criteria.

About Midway through my career, I adopted the processes of "Lean and Six Sigma" to better understand and optimize army and defense supply chains. In simplest terms, "Lean" is a methodology for removing waste from processes, and "Six Sigma" is for removing variation within processes. I think if you really want to understand a supply chain, you should map out its elements using the acronym SIPOC (Suppliers Inputs Processes Outputs and Customers) to assist you. Pick the product you want to understand, whether that's a food item like pizza, a specific car like a Tesla, or an intercontinental ballistic missile, and then determine who are all the suppliers for the components of the product. What resource inputs does the supplier need to produce the end product? The processes—what are the

series of steps needed for production? What are the outputs? Who are the customers, and how is the product delivered to them? Then think about where the components are made. Are they domestic or foreign producers? Where are they stored, sold, and consumed? Do any of the components have a single producer, a single point of failure? Is that producer a viable long-term business? Do any of the inputs create vulnerabilities you should be aware of? Examples might be malicious code or non-conforming parts. Who assembles the final product, and where is this done? How are the products transported to the end customers—by boat, train, plane, truck, other conveyance? Is the cargo transported in containers? Some of my more interesting challenges in military transport actually involve container management, those twenty- and forty-foot containers used to move. Somebody recommended investing in microelectronics or something earlier. I'm telling you, invest in containers. And then, where are the routes? We always refer to the most challenging part of the supply distribution as the last tactical mile getting the goods into the hands of the troops, but, believe me, there can be challenges in all parts of the distribution chain.

So, some personal examples. In 2000, I was assigned as the Chief of Support for the multinational force and observers in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. Colonel Antonio actually served there years before me. The MFO has been in place since April of 1982 as a result of the Camp David Accords following Arab-Israeli conflicts in 1967 and 1973. The MFO's mission is to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and employ best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. Currently, eighteen nations contribute troops to the force. Alphabetically, they are Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. There are two main base camps on the east side of the Sinai Peninsula. There's North Camp at El Gorah, about twenty kilometers south of the Mediterranean Sea, and South Camp near Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, with thirty smaller outposts down the length of the peninsula, all requiring life support. Our supply chains were a unique combination of country-specific requirements, such as receiving beef from

Uruguay and specific cultural items for Samoan troops, Italian, French, and U.S. soldiers, for example, and then we balanced local provisions between Israeli and Egyptian providers. Getting supplies within Egypt was relatively simple; they came by truck. Provisions from Israel, food, fuel, some repair parts, and other items, were also trucked, but they had to travel through a border crossing at Rafah near the Gaza area in the northern part of the peninsula. Shortly after my arrival, due to increased violence associated with the Palestinian Intifada, Egypt closed the border crossing in Rafah. This resulted in supply chain disruptions until an alternate border crossing in the middle of the peninsula was established. This educated me on the importance of understanding distribution routes and the impact border crossings can have on supply chains, a lesson that helped me six years later dealing with the exponentially more complicated routes and border crossings for supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the U.S. Air Force and commercial airlines flew the most critical items into Iraq and Afghanistan, the main supply routes were by sea. During my assignment in the Army Central Command area for support to Iraq, most U.S. transport ships would dock at Al Shuaiba, Kuwait, be offloaded, and then equipment would be transported by truck from Kuwait across a military-specific border into Iraq. Dr. Path, if he's here, might recognize that. There is also a northern border crossing for non-military items, where trucks could stack up for days or weeks waiting to cross into Iraq.

Afghanistan routes were even more complicated routes from Pakistan—from the ports of Karachi and Qasim, then by commercial truck these ornately decorated trucks that we call jingle trucks came up through the Torkem border into Afghanistan. No U.S. personnel were permitted in Pakistan to provide convoy escorts, so challenges with this route included the high cost of significant pilferage and constant threat of ambush to those truck drivers. It was estimated at one point that up to 15% of the supplies shipped on this route never arrived in Afghanistan or, at least, to their intended recipients. To improve deliveries, the U.S. developed the northern distribution network. This was a variety of routes from Europe across Central Asia and into Afghanistan from the north. This network involved many countries, with some cargo traversing Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania; some came through Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan, and then the KKTR (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan at Tajikistan Route). Pretty intense.

We go back to suppliers. Suppliers are the first node in the supply chain, but what happens when they don't produce what you need? In this example, I'm going to reflect on the challenges we experience in procuring microelectronics. Although the U.S. and Europe are leaders in developing semiconductor technology, the chips that power everything from smartphones to military vehicles to advanced weapon systems are manufactured in Asia and assembled in China before they are shipped around the world. When an electronic part is no longer economical to produce, original manufacturers stop producing it. In many cases, the military demand is not enough to keep a manufacturing line up and running. In cases where the military needs the spare electronic part to fix a ten- or twenty-year-old system, there's a good chance that part is obsolete. So, we need to go to the open market to find the replacement part. The problem was the open market has significant instances of counterfeit electronic items, meaning either a fake part or a previously used part made to look new and sold as new. We found many instances of counterfeit electronics within our supply chains. On the way down here from Virginia yesterday or the day before yesterday, I saw a *New York Times* article that talked about the historian Chris Miller, an associate professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts. He's just recently written a new book called *Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology*. It says, "Chips are the foundation of modern economic prosperity, military strength, and geopolitical power. Chips have become to the geopolitics of the 21st century, what oil was to the geopolitics of the 20th century." So, as Dr. Gupta mentioned, in February this year, the U.S. launched its first "Chips for America" funding, and that's fifty billion dollars for manufacturing incentives to restore U.S. leadership in semiconductor manufacturing to advance U.S. economic and national security.

You can't always predict what you'll need. An interesting example of this happened a few weeks after 9/11. On October 19th of 2001, soldiers with the fifth Special Forces groups were inserted into an area in Afghanistan to liberate the region from the Taliban. They did not have tanks or trucks; they

had horses. They had to procure saddles and food for the horses, and most of the team did not know how to ride, but they were able to do this relatively quickly by working with local supporters on the ground, and maybe some of those soldiers benefited from central training that they got just down the road at Dahlonega. More often, new requirements take a longer response time. As U.S. forces faced the devastating effects of improvised explosive devices, and about 75% of casualties in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were attributed to IEDs, industry developed the MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protection) vehicle. The Secretary of Defense declared it the highest priority program and implemented a Defense Act to get enough steel allocation to produce them. There were ultimately five different manufacturers from South Africa to Canada to the U.S. to produce them in sufficient quantities in the timeline needed. The vehicles were intended for army, navy, air force, marines and special forces in theater. The Marine Corps actually led the program and did a phenomenal job of orchestrating all the complexities involved.

Transporting the MRAPs to theater was a challenge. These were huge vehicles. Most MRAPs went by sea, but that could take up to a month for Iraq and longer for Afghanistan, and the only commercial plane at the time that could handle the weight and cube was a Russian AN-124 transport plane. Each could carry four MRAPs in a load. So, we used Russian planes. They were commercial Russian planes, but they had been developed for the Russian military. This allowed our air force to use its own C-17 and C5 aircraft for other critical missions.

Commonality of parts and repair procedures was not optimal, so we would have to initially rely on contractors to field, train, and repair them in theater shortly after they were fielded. I was assigned to a command responsible for procuring many of the repair parts needed for the system. My boss told me we were six weeks away from potential disaster, but we were committed to finding solutions, and, although it took a tremendous amount of work by everyone involved, we ensured that disaster never happened. In many respects, the MRAP program was a model for rapid acquisition, but it had a lot of challenges that needed to be worked out all along the way. I do consider it a testament to what we can accomplish with

clear intent, direction, and cooperation, and I will say those vehicles saved a lot of lives.

I also learned from my experiences to consider the end state for operations even as part of the initial planning. How much is enough? How much is too much? When should we start reducing demand signals? What's the disposition of serviceable and non-serviceable excess? Can we make trades on speed of delivery versus cost?

Try to temper requirements with a better understanding of all that it takes to provide them. Listen to your logisticians when they raise issues for equipment. Consider who's going to support it, soldiers or civilians. If civilians, will they be government civilians or contractors? Who will provide to them life support and security? Every additional person in theater puts another burden on the infrastructure. Is the requirement a vital necessity and important augmentation for quality of life, or maybe just a "nice to have" item?

Everything competes for delivery space, resupply and support in an operating area. So, give some thought early on and throughout an operation as to how you will dispose of everything you bring into an operating area. Some things you can dispose of in your operating area, but many things you will bring home. There's a process for that, as well. A big learning point for me was the agricultural standard we had to meet to send tanks, trucks, and other equipment home. The standard was no pinchable dirt, so wash racks in a desert environment and theater became a hugely important part of the reverse supply chain.

Another critical lesson was to always consider the human element of operation—the troops, of course, but also the government civilians, the contractors, and their subcontractors, and local populations. It's critical that all the contracts we put into place explicitly affirm the U.S. government's Zero Tolerance policy against human trafficking, guaranteed passport access, fair pay and time off, safe and hospitable living conditions, medical care and insurance, regular contact with home and family, and the right of return to their homes. We must prevent deceptive labor recruiting, forced labor, and workplace abuses, and wherever possible, we should implement programs that buy local, hire local, and train local. The military does attempt to use these practices in its operations.

One example of buying local—it was actually a great relief on our supply chains when we were able to develop locally-run water purification and bottling facilities in Iraq, as it severely reduced the number of 505,000-gallon tankers we needed to put on the road from Kuwait to Iraq. And we implemented many hiring and training programs for both locals in Iraq and Afghanistan to try and help make them self-sufficient.

I could go on with so many examples, but my time's up, and, to sum this all up, I'd ask you to remember two things: supply chains are critical to human security, and interruptions to supply chains for any of a multitude of reasons can result in increased tensions and hostilities if not properly managed. Don't take them for granted. Understanding how they work will help ensure success in any endeavor.

A final thought going back to President Roosevelt's desire to accomplish human security within his lifetime—we're not there yet, but it's important to keep trying. It can be difficult to understand, to accept human nature, but we must not lose faith or hope in ourselves and others. We each have the power within ourselves to change the world, which is one of the most beautiful attributes of humanity. Martin Luther King Jr told us, "Make a career of humanity, commit yourself to the noble struggle for human rights. You will make a better person of yourself, a greater nation of your country, and a finer world to live in."

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Thank you so much for a very insightful and interesting presentation on logistics, which I think doesn't get the credit it deserves in our professional military education. What I'd like to ask is that—actually it's an insight I've picked up actually from your presentation—it looks like we have a convergence, a very dangerous convergence, an inadequate production base. You highlighted that, and, at the same time, we've got definite threats to homeland defense, the homeland, itself, cyber and sabotage, which creates vulnerabilities. Broad brush, how should the U.S. approach this convergence, which actually is amplifying a vulnerability. The production base becomes even more vulnerable given these other threats that can now reach out and touch our homeland. Would just be interesting for your view.

General Jarrard touched on it, but he was a little bit opaque, and I understand he's an actively serving General, but what would be your thoughts? How should we approach this increasingly vulnerable state?

GEN. MCQUISTION

I think the recognition of the vulnerabilities is key to it, and I think a realization of the interworkings that you have to have, the trust and commitment that you have to build with your industry partners for national security within the defense industrial base, and really taking advantage of the strengths of the defense industrial base and allowing them to expand where they need to expand. So, we were all trying to get the peace dividend after the Cold War, and so it made sense that there was a lot of shrinkage and consolidation, and I think now, at this period in our history, it's time to relook at all of the consolidation and look at new venues for manufacturing capacity. And again, that's both inside our country and with our allies around the world. So, the recognition of the problem is step one and then putting in place the economic advantages that you need to have in place for people to be willing to commit their resources. You have to understand that industry has shareholders to respond to, and you don't want them to make inordinate amount of profit off you, but profit motive is very important in willingness to invest in new technologies and new capacities and new capabilities and new partnerships for them. So, you don't want them to undertake all the risks, because you can't afford for them to fail, and they can't afford for you to fail, so you have to work together to find those happy intersections where it makes the most sense to do the right thing. That's my opinion.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

It's the first time I've ever heard the phrase "global supply chain issues" and "refugees" and, you know, "migrants" all in the same sentence. I've been doing migration work for thirty years as some of my colleagues here. Could you expand on what you're concerned with—what you're seeing from a large-scale forced human displacement type of perspective and linkages to push factors from supply chain challenges?

GEN. MCQUISTION

It's really not what I'm seeing so much, because I'm not as tuned in as I used to be. But certainly, from considerations throughout my career as we thought about where we might have to go in the world that had very congested and contested supply lines, and how we would be competing against human migration when hostilities were occurring, you have to know that humans are going to seek safety, and they are going to use the same routes that you are planning to use for moving your supplies to the front lines while they are moving themselves and their families on those same routes to safety. And so, it is always a consideration, I think, that refugees have to be a consideration in military planning, and, I think, the military does take that into account. They don't always have all the solutions at the onset, but they know that they have to consider that.

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Human Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Societies

Moderator:

- Dan Papp, PhD.

Panelists:

- Nilofar Sakhi, PhD.
- Eric Wolterstorff, PhD.
- Jaroslaw Jarzabek, PhD.
- Cristina Matiuta, PhD.
- Raluca Viman-Miller, PhD.
- Volker C. Franke, PhD.

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DR. SAKHI

It's a pleasure to be among this team of panelists discussing the human security challenges of today's world, particularly the work that I have been doing on Afghanistan and trying to figure out what human security means for Afghanistan for the last many years in different time. I don't have a PowerPoint, but I have a presentation to persons here, and I hope that will generate questions. We're talking about human security that has been tough and challenging, for me at least, for at least the nine years that I have been working on this. Why? Because it is very broad. It is ambiguous, and it is considered unachievable in many contexts. Second, because the whole concept of human security is very contextual. We cannot talk about human

security. We cannot generalize the concept of human security in different contexts. We have to specifically understand the dynamics, the causes of human insecurities in particular societies in order to provide prescriptions for human security implementation. So, it has been challenging for me. The reason I stepped in working on human security and trying to explore more the causes of human insecurities in Afghanistan is because I was a practitioner working on development programs for many years and for international development, local NGOs, and one of the questions I had in mind was why human security programming is not working in Afghanistan. What is the problem? When I was working on research and before that working with communities in the rural areas, remote areas and all over the country, there was a World Bank Program, National Solidarity Program, which was considered at that point the largest program for human security promotion in Afghanistan with the cooperation of the government. And they had the subcontractors; they had their local NGOs; they had the community elders who were supporting those particular programs. This started the local Community Development Centers and Council for the implementation. So, my questions were around why things were not happening, why people were unable to protect their human security, and why the level of empowerment, which has to happen in order for people to protect, is not successful. So, therefore, my model was contextualizing human security at the local level. In order to understand human insecurity, it's better to understand the history of the country and what leads to human insecurities, and that's where I started. From 1978 in Afghanistan until 2016, I looked at the political dynamics, the regime, political changes, and administrations, what they have done that impacted the people's life, survival, livelihood, and dignity, which are the important pillars of human security. So, I looked at all those and compiled a few points that I'm going to talk about and then move forward to the current human insecurities under the Taliban regime and what it means for the people.

So, looking at the recent history of Afghanistan, particularly since 1978, the country has been through political instability, civil war, religious extremism, armed conflict between and among various factions, and constant changes and political systems in governments, which has impacted

the lives of people at the community level, at all levels—socio-economic and political levels—and I explained in detail what that "all levels" means based on my interaction and interviews with people from all across the country's rural areas and urban areas. The ongoing war and instability have prevented economic development and created a culture of dependency. Again, based on the interviews I had, people were expecting outsiders to come and give them money. People were expecting donors to build a livable environment for them to protect the human security. That is becoming a belief in some communities that I interviewed with. Well, we cannot do it. The term "we cannot do it" I heard a lot from the interviewers across the country. The international development should come and do it. You should come and do it. The U.S. should come and do it. So, these were the terms that I used as a thematic analysis for my interviews, and these were the terms which came out again and again in the interviews. "We cannot do this." Outsiders, and then particularly named "the outsiders in international development" in particular countries should come and help. So, the culture of dependency has undermined the human agency, which is an important pillar and approach of human security. And I was looking for what empowers people at the community level, local level, level of civil society, political level, and that was the culture of dependency that I have seen—a lot of expectations from outside forces and actors to come and intervene rather than people taking the steps. The other element that I have noted from the interviews that I conducted throughout the country is that their culture of dependency did not only undermine human agency, but this culture of dependency undermines human capability of production, human capability of control, the concept of being a consumer. When a nation becomes a consumer rather than producer, I have seen, in the interviews that it gives me, an image that all this process is what leads to people not believing in themselves, their power. And there is a culture of dependency that has undermined the productivity of individual communities at large, and that turned the communities into consumers rather than producers because of a lot of models of dependency that they had in their mind. So, overall, I was looking at the human agency and the ongoing political history of a country—ongoing war, constant changes in politics, administration, and regimes that had impacted the

human agency of people. So, that was one of the points which I highlighted a lot in my book. At the end, that is what led to that finding.

The other important aspect that I found out from those interviews—again the focus was on human agency and the overall aspect of human security—is the traditional nature of society. Lots of interviews across the country that I conducted there were the traditional nature, which is partly culture of course, and it derives from an ideological religious belief. So, people were referring to religion as a strength that empowers them to build their communities, to do different projects. I was looking at the beneficiaries of NSP (National Solidarity Program) and how they helped in developing those programs—the water program, agricultural program, [unintelligible] product program, electricity program, and all those programs. And then the traditional nature of society was another element which people highlighted that boxes them in and doesn't allow them to move further because of certain norms and values that become the heading guideline for their society. And, again, I elaborated that further through the exact text that interviewers were using, that traditional nature of society undermines the power of productivity and creativity which leads to empowerment, which leads to human agency. So, these were the other programs and the other aspect of it. Now, overall, the people highlighted—as I mentioned in the very beginning that contextualization of humans' insecurities are important—people highlighted protection of life and property, absence of fear and threat, and economic opportunities are means of human security for them. So, they were the points that they highlighted. I stopped at what happened in the past. This was before the Taliban takeover. Now with the Taliban takeover, I also conducted a couple of surveys, not really in-depth researcher's surveys, which I wrote a paper on for different outlets here, and I found out the other aspect of human insecurity. Of course, the major point right now is humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Poverty is the highlight. According to a WFP report in January 2023, nearly twenty million people are projected to be acutely food insecure between November 2022 and March 2023, and 28.3 million people will require multi-sectoral humanitarian assistant in 2023. So, right now, the major human insecurity is food insecurity and health insecurity. According to the PRO Report, definitely multi-sectoral assistance is required to tackle that. Human food insecurity

was there before the Taliban takeover. It just escalated and intensified during the Taliban takeover. There are other kinds of insecurities which we see since the Taliban takeover, and that's, again, going to the political system there. So, identity and human rights crises have been prominent as well as other human insecurities that undermine the dignity of people, undermine the freedom of people, and increase and intensify the grievances among the population. The Taliban is an authoritative totalitarian system which undermines the freedom of citizens and individuals and particularly women's rights. Fifty percent of the population are banned from school and higher education. Fifty percent of the population are banned from work, and, yesterday, there was news that even UN female workers were not allowed to go to work. So, there was another ban, and it undermines the complete agency of 50 percent of the population, which, by itself, is considered a major human insecurity of the time. And this is exhibited during the Taliban regime. On the other hand, freedom, which is a strong pillar of human security, is undermined. The tactics and tools which are used by the current regime are detention, extrajudicial killings, and torture to undermine the freedom of speech and undermine the people to enjoy and exercise their power. I have two more minutes. So, again, the nature of the government currently in Afghanistan is suppressing human securities of people. In addition to whatever we had from the past, there are two other kinds of female security that I mentioned, and with that, there is, of course, relevance to the Iranian context if we see how authoritative systems are undermining the freedom and human dignity of people, especially in the case of Iran that is very similar to the tactics and tools that the Iranian governments are using in order to suppress the population at large which I mentioned—the detention, extrajudicially killing ,and torture to control the population. I would like to stop here. I had a lot else to cover about both Iran and Afghanistan, but I will open for the discussion when whenever the session ends.

DR. WOLTERSTORFF — "Approaching Zerebus Culture, Trauma, and Self-Government in Post-War Liberia"

What I want to do in my presentation is really show you something that I believe can be done rather than going into depth around it. So, I want

to talk a little bit about how we can operationalize working with this black box of culture, this thing that is supposed to be indescribable, undefinable, but it's the thing that that eats efforts at development and stability around the world. So, what I want to do is show we can chop that into some pieces, define it, measure it, operationalize it, and then show how we're applying that in Liberia. So, we're just going to do a flyby right here. So, what we're going to divide this up into is looking at psychosocial capacity and mass trauma and self-governance. Those are the three areas. And we're going to talk about that it's possible to define and measure and operationalize each.

So, psychosocial capacity means a whole cluster of different abilities. It means we're taking the concept of culture and pulling out of culture what is the ability or capacity to collaborate. So, that's the only aspect of culture that we're looking at, but there is a way to define that, because those abilities happen in self-reinforcing clusters at a number of psychosocial stages. So, this is coming out of the social psychology literature—some of you who are familiar with Eric Erickson's work, for example—this is somebody based heavily on the work of "Lloyd's Demos." These are people who have looked at how cultures learn how to master a set of challenges they have in front of them. So, we've got six right there, and, in a sense, like Maslow's, in that you've got to get really one solid before you can get the next one solid, and so, this is a way to look at these. So, we've got six possibilities right there, and different countries, different societies, different cultures are consumed with different ones of these stages. So, we had a definition, a way to measure it, and then there is a way to operationalize it. So, this begins to tell us if we know the psychosocial stage of the population that we're working with; it tells us how we can partner. What is the capacity to partner? What do those partnerships look like? What are the enforcement mechanisms that are possible? How much can they extend? How much will they spread organically? How limited will they be? So, this begins to tell us this. Then, if we're going to talk about development, then we're looking at what is the current dominant psychosocial challenge that is facing the community. If it's physical safety, then you're going to find most of the interest is around physical safety rather than something that has to do more with human rights. So, this is the first.

So, then the second we're going to look at is mass trauma. So, this is also going to divide into six measures. So, there's group response to trauma; there's individual response to trauma. And then there are three qualitatively different kinds of traumas in terms of the effect they have on people. You can have single events, and a single event trauma is something like 911. It hits, and it's gone. It's like a car wreck; it's like an assault. You've got your life before a terrible thing happened, you have your life after, and you can begin to work with it to integrate that event.

Then you have a different category called sustained traumas. These are traumas that go on for months or years, long enough that individuals begin to have the thought that this could last forever. And when that happens, our psyches reorganize around that. We begin to adapt to the situation. We remember life before, but we are now beginning to prepare our relationships and how we act as if this is going to go on forever. And then, finally, we have prolonged social trauma, and this is when a full generation of the population has no memory of what life was like before, in which case, we're not even really talking about a disruption anymore. For these people, this is just how the world is. So, you work with this completely differently. So, now we've got group and individual in three different types.

So, a second set of measures and then in terms of how to operationalize it. If it's around physical safety, that has to be done first. And then you begin to work with the sustained traumas before the individual traumas. There's a sequencing involved. Then the third piece is self-governance. If people are going to, at the group level, begin to organize themselves and heal from traumas or develop, they have to at least have some amount of self-governance. They have to be able to create agreements that can move forward. They have to be able to build little miniature social contracts and adapt those contracts. So, very simple thing here, like the bigger the polity, the more difficult it is. It's going to be a lot easier for Ghana to develop than it is for Nigeria. Nigeria just has problems of scale. So, the implication on that is—this is going back to Volker's talk—how do we say what is the smallest semi-functional, at least partially self-governing unit? Start here and go up. So, what you've seen so far is we've got roughly a half dozen measures of each, and if you run that out, we've got about 200 distinct scenarios. So, in

terms of creating an approach—what to do, where to put your resources, where the starting places are—this begins to lay out those scenarios. So, what's going to happen now as we go through a couple of the next slides is what happens when we take those 200 possibilities, and we narrow them down to what's happening right now.

What does it look like in our project in Liberia, where, out of those 200 permutations, what is the one that we're looking at, and what does that imply? So, in Liberia, we have to answer these three questions. We have to say what's the psychosocial stage, what type of trauma are we looking at, and what is the smallest self-governing unit larger than a family that we can enter with.

So, the psychosocial stage. You can look at this externally. You can interview people there. You can spend time there. It's overwhelmingly physical safety. There is so much rampant crime that even though the temperature is 80 or 90 degrees, and it's highly humid, people essentially sleep in hot boxes because they have to lock their doors, and they have to shutter their windows for physical safety. But there's this constant degradation on health because you're sleeping in these hot boxes every night. So, physical safety.

There are other forms of violence, but the one that is most dominant is there's just violent crime all through the country. A second one to the question that the cadet brought up at the end of the last one is in terms of, for example, the drug use. You've got over a tenth of the population living on the streets in criminal activity, and they're drug addicts. Over 800,000 was just released in the last month on this—that's not counting the drug addiction of people who are living with their families or who have jobs. So, this is one example of many, but that's a second-stage problem. Malaria is a second-stage problem. Mass trauma. Because the first psychosocial stage of physical safety hasn't been met, there's no point in doing any other kind of trauma work. You've got to build some basic capacities. There aren't things that have been disrupted. There aren't, in a sense, traumas to heal. There's a basic capacity. If you've got a house, and the house is terribly damaged, you repair your house. If your house has been leveled, there is no repair in your house. You've got to rebuild it. It's a rebuilding action, not a healing action.

Well, that's a very different set of interventions you're going to have based on that.

And then, what is the smallest unit? There, you've got the country, which is sort of like a state in the U.S. Then you've got a city with somewhere between 40,000 and 70,000 people. And then, you've got these neighborhoods, and they're quasi-self-governing, but that's where people who get trained can actually go out and create agreements that make a difference to increase their physical safety. So, some of these communities have managed to create agreements where they are safe; their community is safe. They've created night patrols where half the adult men in the community take the 10:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the morning shift. The others take the 1:00 to 5:00 o'clock, and every night, the men in the community walk the perimeter of the neighborhoods all through the night. But in that community, people can sleep with their doors and windows open. So, the community is where currently people connect, because the national government is weak and extractive and incompetent. So, that's an example of a specific intervention out of these 200 possibilities. This helps us to focus our efforts.

DR. JARZABEK — "Responsibility to Protect and Human Security. Is It a Failed Attempt to Secure Civilian Lives?"

I will start with answering the question I am asking in the title of my presentation because it is a simple one. Yes, it is a failed attempt. The responsibility to protect norm has, so far, not been able to significantly improve the protection or protect the lives of individuals during armed conflict. But more importantly is why it has failed, and what can be done to make it work better, and that's what I would like to focus on. But first, a very brief theoretical framework of the responsibility to protect.

So, the responsibility to protect is a norm of international law that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt these mass atrocities, crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It's not regulated by a single norm of international law, but it rests upon some other legal acts, such as the Geneva Conventions and these additional protocols—Geneva Convention against tortures and others. It rests upon three pillars: the responsibility of each state to protect

its own population, the responsibility of the international community to assist the states in protecting their population, and the responsibility of the international community to protect the population when the state is manifestly failing to do that. And it started at, or it took its shape in, 2005 on a high-level UN work summit, where the member states committed to the principle of responsibility to protect by including it in the outcome document of that meeting. So, this document is, let's say, the legal basis. What is important is that the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) Doctrine endorses the principle that state sovereignty carries with it the obligation of states to protect their own people, but it does not assert a basis to use force for this purpose other than standard human procedures of the force sanctioned by the UN Security Council resolutions. Therefore, the main responsibility of the states under the R2P Doctrine should be the use of non-military measures to protect the populations at risk. Maybe I will skip the arms trade treaties, one other norm of international law that has importance for the R2P Doctrine.

There is a center for responsibility to protect agents associated with the United Nations that is overviewing the situation in the world. Now, the R2P norm in practice, what is the core of the responsibility to protect? I have to admit that I had some methodological problems or challenges here. The first one is because I tried to figure out what actions are taken by the international community to protect those populations at risk during armed conflict, and we can, of course, enumerate those actions. They are the international and political and diplomatic pressures. There are economic sanctions and state embargoes, travel bans for the politicians or other people, identifying the perpetrators. There are international criminal court investigations and judgment, United Nations security Council resolutions and some others, but those two methodological challenges are first how to distinguish the actions that are significant—those that really matter and may change something on the ground—from the ones that are insignificant and are just an expression of political will or just voices of criticism but are not able to change anything. Why it is a challenge? Because it works differently in different cases. For some states, the political pressure and diplomatic pressure is enough. For some states, even the hardest embargoes and the

UN security Council resolutions are not the acts that can really change their position and their behavior. The second challenge is how to measure the success of a Responsibility to Protect. I mean, how can we measure that? What does it mean that it has succeeded? In most of the conflicts, we usually are able to find out what is the number of victims, how many people have been killed, wounded, what part of five billion population suffered, but we are not able to measure what was the influence of Responsibility to Protect actions on those numbers. We don't know it. If the embargo on arms sales, for example, has really changed something, did the diplomatic or political actions somehow influence the government, or didn't they? So, those are the challenges.

One more thing is, I've tried to divide those actions undertaken by the international community into two categories. The one I have named a heavyweight and the other lightweight. Those heavyweight actions are those that are undertaken or that really affect the states or non-state actors—the ones like the arms embargoes or economic embargoes, or sometimes even if the UN Security Council allows military interventions. Those that are lightweight are the travel bans, for example, for the politicians or government members or the diplomatic repercussions. I have enumerated here a number of cases and tried to figure out to what extent the responsibility to protect worked or did not work in those conflicts.

The biggest group of all of them, I think, are those conflicts in which Responsibility to Protect has been used. So, the international community tried to do something but failed. Nothing has happened. I mean, at least nothing significant has happened. The perpetrators, be they state or non-state actors, did not change their behavior, and the international community was not able to significantly lower the number of victims or really protect the civilian population.

We have some positive examples, however. They are here [refers to slide]. So, I have named Syria. I think, here, the international community was able to do something. Of course, we all know that the number of victims of this civil war in Syria is enormous and reaches like 600,000. Still, I would argue that the international community was able to prevent the even bigger atrocity, especially the more extensive use of chemical weapons.

The violence perpetrated by Islamist groups in Sahel, in Mozambique, in Yemen, and perhaps in Libya, but then here you cannot see all of them, but yes, this list continues. It's just displayed here. It's a very long list of those conflicts where the international community was not able to prevent these mass atrocities.

And the last group, the conflict in which the international community did not even try to do anything, where the responsibility to protect norm was not even used, is the persecution of Uyghurs and other majority Muslim ethnic groups in China. There are also widespread human right violations in Ethiopia and in Tigray and internal communal violence in Ethiopia. And now, just to conclude, the challenge is why the Responsibility to Protect is not able to really change the realities on the ground.

I have enumerated four of those challenges—the role of non-state actors and how those non-state actor challenges are to be. Those non-state actors are the vast variety of military groups, like partisans, like local militias, like terrorist groups, and such, but they are also, on many occasions, the transnational, international companies in many parts of the world which employ the violent or militarized non-state actors to, for example, protect their businesses, their interests, their mines. So, this is one of the fragile states which are the constant problem—the UN Security Council member states, China and Russia, for example, and the other states that enjoy the protection of the UN Security Council member states.

DR. CHRISTINA MATIUTA AND DR. RALUCA VIMAN-MILLER — "Human Security and War: a Case Study on Ukrainian Refugees in Romania"

DR. RALUCA VIMAN-MILLER

This presentation is part of a larger research project that we have going on, Christina and I. So, please allow us to start with my slide base with our basic research question, which is asking the role of the state and non-state actors in protecting war refugees with the hypothesis looking to answer what the state and non-state actors' role is as a fundamental one in assisting and protecting war refugees. We are implementing an international and

domestic legal framework, while NGOs assure the necessary volunteers to apply these arrangements. Our methodology is semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives and semi-structured interviews with governmental officials as well as an analysis of the governmental resources and policies. Next slide please.

So, how do we define human security? Obviously, this is one of the larger questions that we have to handle, but it is very possible to narrow it down to the protection of individuals and communities from harm threats and the well-being and physical security, the idea that the individual has a right to be protected from systemic violence related to inter- and intrastate conflicts.

Environmental Medical Crises. More recent understanding of security focuses on the humanitarian concern and the idea that individuals must be free of violent environmental concerns, health disasters, and more. But another security prohibition: it is a general practice of preventing or mitigating harm, providing assistance and resources in responsive situations of insecurities at the individual, state, or international levels. Here, it is the shift in the responsibility for human security from the state, alone, to a combination of states and outside actors, such as humanitarian agencies, foreign states, international organizations, NGOs. Next slide.

I think it is repetitive the fact that Russia's war in Ukraine has caused the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe since the Second World War. We have a million refugees from Ukraine across Europe—about five million estimated displaced inside Ukraine, about 17.6 million in need of immediate urgent humanitarian assistance inside Ukraine. We have an interactive map, but there is no time for that right now. But the link is to the fact that Ukrainians' western neighbors, as well as poorer countries like the Republic of Moldova, took in millions of these refugees, and they're also serving as conduits to the military and humanitarian aid flowing into Ukraine. Next slide, please.

This graph here is intended to present the sheer numbers of refugees. The data is across one year's worth of information. We have Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic leading the pack in the receiving end, with Romania and Poland [garbled]. There is a 2,000 people difference

there. So, 107 for Moldova versus Romania up until February 23rd. We all know the statistics are just going upwards. Next slide, please.

The importance of this map, which is quite familiar to all of us, is to show the sheer size and magnitude of this conflict. You can see Poland is huge. Germany is huge. The rest of the western nations are quite large in size. Romania is large in size, as well, but the connection with it is in the next slide, which tells us that much smaller countries in the region are bearing the brunt of a lot more than they can handle oftentimes. Look at Montenegro. For 100,000 people, we see 5,613 refugees. Estonia, so on and so forth. So, it is about the burden of these refugees on smaller countries, and again, these numbers are per 100,000 citizens. Next slide, please.

So, what is the international context? Nobody can act alone, especially in this crisis situation. We have the United Nations Refugee Response Plan, and we also have the European Union and its financial institutions, called "Team Europe," now approaching this situation. Clearly, they're making available billions of dollars of euros. It's for economic, social, and financial resilience. They're dealing in forms of macro assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response, etc. These are the frameworks into which a lot of these humanitarian aids must function in order to have some direction. Next slide, please.

Here are some of the statistics for the Romanian case—over three million arriving at the border again. This is for one in twelve months. These statistics are already expired. In one month, these numbers have increased. Over 107,000 refugees in the country. About 47,000 children in the country. Over 110,000 refugees in temporary protection, with over 4,000 seeking asylum. Next slide, please.

What is important about this slide must be discussed—two important factors. The Romanian government has organized a task force, and this force has two steps. First, emergency response, the first line at the top. The Department for Emergency Situations, etc. The third little box, quite invisible, is where we have international organizations, NGOs, and private actors linked to local authorities. These guys are the first emergency responders. And then, a second phase, the second protection response, which is basically helping individuals, in this case the Ukrainian refugees,

helping them adapt and adjust to their new situation, either as transitioning and/or staying within countries. The working groups, the ones that are really implementing [garbled] again health, education, labor, housing, and vulnerables and children's groups. Next slide, please.

A summary of what has been done in about one year by the Romanian government in order to be sure that there is some type of framework in dealing with this emergency situation. Six-sector working groups, twenty plus pieces of legislation passed, over 150 activities provided types of activities, over 300 NGOs that are involved, over 2.5 million beneficiaries reached at this point, and over a 565 million-euro amount budgeted for helping these refugees. Next slide, please.

All right. So, I'm just going to summarize very briefly some of the pieces of legislation that were adopted in order to meet these needs—implement mechanisms to support humanitarian assistance; establishing conditions for temporary protection; granting gratuities and facilities for transportation; reimbursement of accommodation and food; facilitating and encouraging donations for the benefit of these refugees and for international organization; enrollment of Ukrainian children in the educational institutions despite absence of supporting documentation. Next slide, please.

Again, the framework must be between state and non-state actors, but not without some sort of international arrangements. So, Romania's response to the refugee crisis hinges on partnerships across governments, humanitarianism towards civil society, and private entities. There is protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/, a great website put together by the governmental agencies where refugees can find support for everything they are looking for. It's multilingual, dealing with their health, transportation, legal, education—all of the above has been created and has been housed under protectukraine.com. There is the Suceava HUB, established right at the beginning of the war in March, a point which humanitarian assistance can be supplied to basically within time for Ukraine exactly. It extends the capacity of the European Union member states to provide assistance to storage, handling, redistribution. Sixty-two international missions are bound for Ukraine and have been received by the Suceava HUB as of January the 5th. The Bucharest forum is another initiative where we have twenty-three member

states, OECD, and UN agencies trying to organize and sustain and support these initiatives.

So, what are we looking at? Protection and inclusion, phase 2. We have the labor markets with the attempts of the administrative capacity to employ these individuals. The educational system trying to facilitate the enrollment of Ukrainian children into the Romanian educational system. No need to read those numbers. Next slide.

Then we have housing, health, and social services, obviously, programs of reimbursement, citizens hosting Ukrainian refugees, having Ukrainian refugees access the national public health programs, social services and local authorities providing and developing procedures and tools to meet with those that are limited, vulnerable groups.

In conclusion, the war in Ukraine obviously has triggered a great humanitarian crisis. The Romanian state authorities, together with EU member states, UN agencies, civil societies are really working hard to make sure that these refugees are absolutely supported and housed as fast as possible, but further research is needed with representatives and state authorities at the local level to see how these non-governmental organizations are involved in the protection and integration of refugees in order to evaluate their needs. In order to tease out these exact responses, we will continue with the aforementioned semi-structured interviews, and we will bring in further conclusions.

DR. VOLKER FRANKE

As you can see following on my remarks before the panel, human security has a very broad base. We can see it in the panelists' remarks. Human security addresses dignity, human rights, violent conflict in different ways. So, we have looked at community based peacebuilding and conflict resolution approaches. We're looking at state-based human security and conflict resolution approaches when we look at refugees and the receiving countries and what they're doing for the refugees. The idea here is there's an immediate need obviously for human security, but then there's also the long-term need of what is going to happen with these people. Are they going back? Conflicts need to be resolved first. So, we're

falling into a similar approach that we have used in the past where we come up with strategies to tackle a problem at different levels, and I think the *Threats to Human Security* report shows that the threats that we're facing are planetary in addition to what we faced in the past. I think that you've seen four different approaches that tackle the issue of human security differently. I think we have about fifteen minutes left. Rather than having me ramble, which you have had already, I would like to open the floor for questions and see if we can get the panelists involved in the conversation.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

It's just a general question for the entire panel, So, anyone can jump in and answer this question. So, my general question is, many of you have years and years of experience in looking at human security questions, problems, looking at migration, and how these things work. So, my question is, so far, in all of your research and the things you've examined, what are the tactics that you have found that have the highest level of sustainability in these societies? One of the things that I think is such a struggle is much, as you've been mentioning, of the funding is coming from states or NGOs, and they're based on projects, and these projects, of course, have a timeline, and the funding ends, and you've got to try to get the project refunded. So, I guess my question is, in all of your experience, what are the tactics that have been most successful that you've seen in sustainably answering some of these basic human security questions?

DR. SAKHI

Well, I looked at the tactics actually after the completion of my research, and I was looking for what helps people, too, because it's a bottom/top approach, as discussed before, and people have to be empowered in order to protect and empower their own human security. So, ownership was one of the major points that I have seen help communities contribute and empower and also help them move forward, rather than, at least in my context, in Afghanistan context, that I looked at. And by ownership what I meant was that the projects of international donors usually created, I mean in the context of Afghanistan, further dependency. There was a project by

World Bank that they asked the communities to contribute 10 percent of the total project's total budget. That 10 percent could be cash or kind. So, in some villages, people provided land or whatever tools they had. They provided that, and some, if they were a little bit well off, provided agriculture products or some appliances, well water. I mean, that actually helped, and, based on the interviews, I have seen that people were able to sustain human security programs in those communities better than the others because of that contribution of cash or kind contribution, the sense of ownership responsibility. That empowered them. That strengthened their abilities and capabilities to produce, to work, to take the project as their own rather than a donor-funded project that ends when the [garbled] ends. So, that worked at least in my context that I did highlight in my book, also.

DR. WOLTERSDORFF

I guess the one way I'd respond to that is that people who have discovered or created a sense of identity and purpose are going to carry on regardless of what outsiders do, and that could be to help themselves. It could be to help their family or extended family; it could be to help their country; it could be to help their faith community; or it could be this larger open society dream that I think is more prevalent.

PANEL MEMBER

As my scientific study is on the violent conflict and their effects on the human security, I will focus on that. From this perspective of the violent conflict, I think that the huge step forward was the Arms Trade Treaty from 2014, which enforces the international communities and all the states to stop any transfer of arms to the zones of conflict. And this has really changed a lot. Of course, it doesn't mean that this is enough. Even this Arms Trade Treaty has its pros and cons. So, we have already had numerous occasions when the site of the conflicts could not buy the weapons, or the deliveries were stopped by many states of the world to them because the international community found out that the weapons are used against the civilian population. This treaty has its costs. The most important one, in my opinion, is the fact that it focuses only on the arms, not on the ammunition.

We have numerous conflicts, especially in Africa and in the Middle East, where the site of the conflict with state or non-state actors are using old weapons from the times of the Cold War. But those weapons are still operational and efficient, and they can easily still buy the ammunition to use that. And that probably should be the next step to supplement the Arms Trade Treaty with the ban on the export of ammunition, as well. But from this perspective of the violent conflict, I would say that this is something that really mattered and changed the realities on the ground.

PANEL MEMBER

Sustainability. I will give you two terms, two answers. Vesting local populations in the project, and the second, willingness to give up control. It's not that different if you think about it from how we teach, where we need to invest the students in their learning; we need to invest people in their own security. And then, we need to give up control, because we need to let them do, and too often, we're coming in, and we're staying in control. We know what's best. We need to give that up, and we need to invest people in the ideas, make them their ideas, their dreams, their hopes, and then have them work on it and have more and more local ownership as we more and more withdraw and hand it over. That's easier said than done, but for as long as we, the donors, the funders, the researchers, stay in control, they're not going to take over the project, the plans, the approach, their own security. So, I think those are the two most important answers.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I have a question for Dr. Jarzabek**.** R2P has often been criticized as a tool of the powerful to intervene in the internal affairs of weak states. How do we change that perception, especially given this new international operational environment?

DR. JARZABEK

That is an issue, and honestly, I don't know. You know, my [garbled] focusing on the conflict in the Middle East, so I'm traveling to the Middle East, and that is the perception of numerous communities in the Middle

East. Last year, I've been to Jordan. I've talked to the people over there, and that was maybe not surprising but quite striking to me. It was in May. So, already the war in Ukraine was ongoing for three months. Their perspective was completely different, and when I talked to the people over there, even to the people at the University in Amman, they kept telling me, okay, maybe those Russians have attacked the Ukraine, but how does that differ from the U.S. intervention in Iraq? And I tried to explain to them that it is different. But you're right. Yes, the responsibility to protect is perceived in many parts of the world as a tool used by, let's say, generally, the West to intervene in the other part of the world and do their interest and extend the Western influences. I don't have any other answer but to try to simply educate, explain, meet the people, and try to explain to them that it is different. But other than that, I don't have any other answer. I'm not sure what else we could do at this time.

VIRTUAL ATTENDEE

I just want to find out if addressing human security challenges should be a national security strategy for any country.

DR. SAKHI

Well, that could be an integrated component of national security, and national security is a top/bottom approach. Human security is a bottom/top approach, and some of us have been arguing that they should go side by side. All national security strategies should have a component of human security in itself in order to work with the people and give them their the enabling environment. So, though there are different camps arguing about human security differently, one camp is saying that, well, human security is a bottom/top approach and only focusing on human security is enough, and that could help people have better survival, livelihood, and dignity. And there's another camp arguing in the literature—I'm talking about the literature—and the other camp and the literature arguing that well, by working on national security and investing in national security, well, the human security of people will be protected. So, it is better to focus more on national security. It's coming more from IR discipline because automatically

you will protect people by focusing on the national security component. That's another argument coming up in IR literature but then the human security argument, which I'm also pushing in my writing, human security should be a complementary component of the national security strategy, and they should go side by side. I remember in some of the meetings, I have argued that each national security strategy should have a strategy or component of human security in itself, and that is a top and bottom approach. They should go parallel, and they should work together in order to protect and empower people and provide enabling conditions for human security in those countries.

PANEL MEMBER

Yes, Rwanda under Paul Kagame—that's an example.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Since most of the problems we confront are based on attitudes, beliefs, and moral factors, how do you resolve the problem when you're trying to do as you're doing in Liberia? When you empower one sector, you actually create an insecurity on the part of another sector, and that happens in societies across the board. For example, we try to empower women, but, on the other hand, you have people whose attitudes, beliefs lead them to believe that in so doing, you undermine the nuclear family. Or you want to empower gender, self-gender identity, but people, on the other hand, believe that that undermines morals. How do you deal with that as you try to empower people and resolve these kinds of insecurities?

DR. WOLTERSTORFF

I'd like to respond, yes. So, I think that there's in our particular approach, and you heard Dr. Franke talk about the solution accelerator, I think that there's kind of two phases. Initially, by going in and building capacity, we're not hurting very many vested interests, at all. So, a lot of these places are so disrupted and disorganized by globalization and modernization that there's not really a Pareto optimum problem where when you strengthen one, you hurt another. So, in an initial phase, a lot of work can be done. But then,

the second phase is where are the trade-offs, where are the winners and losers? The way that we've approached this with the Solution Accelerator is like a market where we set up inclusion and common understanding and opportunities for negotiations so that they, the local actors, can say this is the place that's ready to give. We can afford to make this shift, right? Like, famously, England with the Corn Laws. When is the society ready to take another step towards development or inclusion, and we can't pick the winners from the outside. So, we set up a way where the internal pressures decide what is the next step that is possible.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentations.]

9

The Role of National Defense in Mitigating Human Security Challenges

Moderator:

- Kevin Stringer, PhD., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)

Panelists:

- Ieva Gajauskaite, PhD.
- Tiia-Triin Truusa, PhD.
- Lt. Colonel Karl Salum
- Steven Fleming, PhD., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

DR. TIIA-TRIIN TRUUSA

The premise of human security is to empower people to have agency and to have better capability for handling crises, any crises, including war. We've heard a lot about here today is mainly the global south and countries that have more difficulties, but when I was preparing for this presentation, I was looking through what are the human security narratives in the Nordic-Baltic region, and there, the human security issues really settle around the same things with a slight difference. All of these countries are in the Comprehensive Defense or Integrated Defense or Total Defense paradigm and they also have an emphasis on defense. In the Human Security paradigm, the role of the state is to support people's ability to act individually and collectively, and it implies that the state has to have, or

the society has to have, very dynamic and multifaceted networks in order to have agency or give agency to people and also to communities. So, in short, it requires that individuals are viewed as active agents, agents of security. In order to boost human security, societies need mostly three things. They need a state that communicates and stimulates self-reliance individually and collectively; people who understand and see themselves not only as consumers of security but also as producers of security; and a system that provides people with the ways and means of being active agents of security.

As you can see from the map, Estonia is NATO's frontline state, eastern flank. We employ the broad security concept which is in line and overlaps with Comprehensive Defense and Total Defense paradigms, and the implementation of these paradigms is carried out through the whole of government and whole of society approaches. The whole of society approach implies similarly to human security, an active role of citizens as producers of security and defense. And when you look at the geopolitical position of Estonia, then you can perhaps understand why we have today looked through all human security issues through a defense lens. So, for us, Russia has been and keeps being a dominant threat in the area.

Here we have the pillars of comprehensive national defense in Estonia. You can read about them, but I would like to just very shortly talk about the HEDGEHOG. Now, some of you will know the HEDGEHOG, which is a large-scale exercise where different defense actors participate together with the regular military units. You have the border guard; you have the municipalities; you have also the medical community taking part in this. I've been asked several times why the "hedgehog", why not something more threatening like "porcupine"? Well, we just do not have porcupines, but more to the point hedgehog in the Estonian mythology in addition to its prickly exterior, also represents wisdom. It was the hedgehog who gave advice to our mythical hero on how to fight better. It is somewhat symbolic that we are currently punching above our weight with giving advice on how to deal with Russia and how to help Ukraine. The slogan for the exercise HEDGHOG is "Every Needle Counts." It is interesting that this slogan has seeped into the different areas in civil society, also meaning every person

every individual is important. The underlying concept, the bedrock of the comprehensive defense paradigm is the will to defend.

The will to defend, like any academic concept, is a little bit difficult because it's very intuitive, and it's not well filled with data as of yet, meaning that it's not very well operationalized. Therefore what you see is a theoretical model. The pink area indicates the society around a person, and the will to defend is sort of stimulated through different societal institutions, institutions in the sociological sense, so, family has a bearing, educational system, etc. Our research group has placed the will to defend on an axis of intensity. One could be on the low end of intensity on this axis for example one might be active in their community, civic duty, etc., but it can build in intensity, depending on the contexts. So, at the very tip end, it would be the will to fight. So, we look at this as a continuum being constantly reinforced and people possibly finding themselves at different points at different times in their lives.

So, what do we know in academic literature about the will to defend? The will to defend really is more of a Nordic-Baltic concept. In the UK and America, you look more at the will to fight, but we are paradigmatically situated in the will to defend. I would like to concentrate only on the last two boxes because the first three are more self-explanatory. Threat perception has both negative and positive effect. Keyword here is defendability. You have to believe that the country is defendable, and you also have to believe that your part in the defense or taking care of your community is vital. One would think that having NATO in Estonia, for example, or enhanced forward presence is good for the will to defend, but data actually shows that it has a slight negative effect, because now we have other people here to take care of us, which goes to this dependability issue a little bit. In some ways political discourse messaging sometimes seems to be geared at keeping a healthy sense of insecurity, if you can say it like that. Gender, age, ethnic belonging—all of this is perhaps self-explanatory, but I'll go over it a little bit. So, gender-wise, since we don't teach women—I mean, those who go into conscription or into military will have more skills and knowledge to survive in any crisis—but, since we don't really teach women that much, they have a tendency to have a lower will to defend. Also, younger generations will have a lower will to defend and also, much older generations. And with ethnic

belonging, if you're not connected to the community, as sometimes might be the case with some of our Russian-speaking minority, they will have a lower will to defend.

One way to enhance the will to defend, or how it is dealt with within the Estonian society, is early socialization and normalization of the visibility of the military and of also stressing the importance of the individual within the crisis. Public discourse is only beginning to accept that inevitably the bigger the crisis, the further away the state is. Building resilient communities as a topic has risen in importance. We also have a National Defense elective in schools. We have programs for kindergartens, which in other states is sometimes seen as controversial. However, it is not kids running around with rifles, but it's a more patriotic sort of engagement, and we have a voluntary defense organization that has youth sub-organizations. There are multiple avenues how people are drawn into security and defense. What we don't have is something that the Finns have, a school where one can learn these skills without belonging to a unit or to an organization. Because you will have people who do not want to sign up and they don't have anywhere to learn these skills.

Here you can see all the different voluntary defense organizations, both interior defense and hard defense. For example, during COVID, they were drawn into handling crisis and also with the influx of Ukrainian refugees, members of these organizations were used for filling multiple tasks.

I have talked about threat perception, and now we're looking at some data to see how Estonia is doing with the system that we've tried to build and that we keep on building. As I said, women tend to believe that the future of Estonia, the security of Estonia, is in less secure hands than men, and also the same goes for the Russian-speaking minority.

Also, when you think back, there was a slide about what academia knows about the Will to Defend, and credibility or trust in institutions was a very important part there. Or data supports this self-efficacy, self-reliance, and also agency, but this is also lower for non-Estonians and women. Well, non-Estonians tend to trust all of the institutions less, but women tend to trust more political institutions rather than these more hands-on or power institutions, such as Voluntary Defense and Defense Forces.

"Willing to Participate in Defense Activities." So, if you remember, I stressed that there is this axis of intensity when we look at civic activism as a starting point for the Will to Defend, and it ends up with the Will to Fight. This slide touches upon the Will to Fight also, but also the question here is are you willing to participate in defense activities to the best of your knowledge and abilities and skills. From the point of the state it is important to understand: are you willing to stay, are you willing to do your job, continue your work in different crises, including war. I would say our will to defend in the Estonian-speaking majority is quite high. We would like to have it at one hundred percent, of course, but still working at it. But, even if we look at the non-Estonian and non-citizen, it's fairly high. It's around 40 percent, and this is higher than you would have usually in Central Europe, and that is the threat perception at work and also the historical and cultural background.

This is the last slide. When we look at human security, it is not a concept that Estonia uses or feels very easy about, but using Will to Defend does a lot of the same things that we need for human security. Arguably it can boost the ability and self-efficacy of people to manage themselves in crises.

LT. COLONEL KARL SALUM

The lecture aim is really to introduce the various examples of Russian pressure on the Baltic states and the countermeasures we have all taken against them. I will talk about four main themes. First, the generic overview of how and in what domains has Russia exerted pressure on us. Second, a little bit on the issue whether we are a target in itself, or we are just a conduit to attack the wider west for Russia. Third, I would like to emphasize that memberships in the European Union and especially in NATO have really boosted our comprehensive security and have enabled us to look more closely at human security, as well—not just the hard military security, because we have additional Big Brothers helping us, something that we didn't have before World War II. And the fourth point—I would like to emphasize that information and intelligence are really good weapons for the weak if you don't have enough men and metal.

This is my attempt at nifty graphics. I apologize. But going from the right towards the left—Russia conducts pressure on the Baltic states across

the whole PMESII spectrum, and if you can't read at the bottom under Information, it says "Infrastructure," and the focus on a particular Baltic state or a specific domain has been shifting throughout the decades, and this has been depending mostly on Russia's own interests and the dynamics of Russia's relations with the West as a whole. But the pressure, itself, as a fact has remained a constant.

So, how do we define that pressure? Is it irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, political warfare, as George Kennan may have suggested? My answer to this vocabulary issue or linguistics issue is very simple. It's in the eye of the beholder, because whoever is feeling that pressure, be it the Baltic states or in the wider West, they feel it differently. That's why they label it differently. But the pressure—why does Russia do it? Why pressure the Baltic states? First, it's the inherent insecurity that Russia has been feeling throughout the centuries of potential threats from the West. They see the Baltic states as a springboard or a beachhead for Western larger powers.

The second concern is the Baltic Sea. It's one of the key conduit's for Russian trade, and this has become especially worrisome since yesterday when Finland officially joined NATO. Now, what makes this a huge problem for the Baltic states is we are small, we have small capacity, and this results in a very small margin of error. If we misread Russian pressure and its potential rise of intensity, then we may be late to the blooming crisis. So, that's why we are very sensitive about Russian pressures in all domains, including economic, social, and so on.

So, what drives Russian behavior? Why do they exert such pressure on the Baltics and the West? In my view, it is the fault of two influential figures who have affected Russian conduct of foreign policy. First, Yevgeni Primakov, who was the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and later prime minister in the 1990s. He defined four main themes that Russian foreign policy has adhered to ever since.

First, it's the prevention of a creation of a unipolar world. Second, Russia is a regional center of influence and has to have a say in global policy, as well. Third, to prevent NATO enlargement. And fourth, partnership with China is essential. Those of you who have followed Russian affairs throughout the

decades may recognize those elements throughout those decades. And now let's shift to a more regional view.

Here is a map of ethnic composition of the Baltic states. I have borrowed these from two researchers—Douglas Mastriano, who has the excellent ethnic map, and Sarah Coolican, who has reflected on the changes in the Russian minority in the Baltic states. Just for reference, in 1939 before the onset of World War I, the percentage of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia was around five to seven percent, and the current percentage is really the result of post-world War II industrialization that brought in Russian industry and hundreds of thousands of workers. Why is it relevant? It's relevant because the second influential Russian foreign policy figure, Sergey Karaganov, has already in 1992 said that one of the purposes of Russian foreign policy should be to defend the rights of ethnic Russians living in Russia's neighboring states, and they have stuck to that, as well. This leads to two important factors for the Baltic states. The first important factor is that we have the proximity challenge with regards to Russia, and it has implications in several domains—in social domains because of ethnic connections and relatives; in the information domains because Russian media channels, TV, and radio reach the Baltic states with ease; the economic domain because the legacy of Soviet industrialization has left us with a significant chunk of Russian minority living in northeast Estonia and working in the heavy industry sector. And any economic challenges in that sector will likely result in a significant unemployment ratio and all the subsequent problems that relate from that key factor.

Number two is the sufficient numbers, as you can see. Today, we have nearly 25 to almost 30 percent of Russians in Estonia and Latvia, and they are concentrated in the border regions, as well as in the capitals. In light of the Karaganov doctrine, we can consider that Russia views the Russian minority as an attack vector or at least a significant factor to exploit. So, what should be done about this?

We have adopted a two-pronged approach. First, we look at societal resilience, as a whole, and second, we try to engage in amicable terms as much as possible with the Russian minority. In addition to hard security, which means boosting up our defense forces, we also pay attention to soft

security and try to address both the titular nations as well as the Russian minority here. We try to emphasize to them that their human security situation in independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is so much better than in the potentially occupied territories under Russian control, and the unfortunate case of Ukraine is one of the best examples we could advertise to the local Russians here.

Now, we have to be cognizant here of one factor. We have to make sure that the Russians living in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania don't feel that their identity is threatened or that the government wants to take away their identity and wants to turn them into Estonians, Latvians, or Lithuanians, because this is something we each, as a minority, experienced during Soviet times, and we fought very hard against this, and there is no need to retribute against the Russians with similar ways. So, the resilience as a line of effort has been codified in our national security-related documents with the subsequent specific taskings to the public sector and recommendations to the private sector how to make yourself more resilient. And secondly, we try to implement, by various measures briefed by Dr. Truusa, resilience at the organizational as well as individual level through media and education. Education is really the key here because we need to make sure that the Russians living in Estonia and Latvia know the local language and are thus exposed to our information sphere, as well, because, otherwise, they keep listening to Putin. And the third important factor contributing to resilience is Western support to the Baltic states, and this is twofold.

First, we are members of several international organizations, and second, we have good bilateral ties with key Western powers, because individual countries are able to make decisions faster than international organizations. This is our backup to potential multilateral policy making hurdles. The benefit of Allies to our national security is that they help to dilute Russian military pressure and provide the military insurance policy, allowing us in time of crisis to devote sufficient resources to internal security and stability. NATO and EU can provide direct institutional support in all domains and enable even small states an equal seat at the table in policy discussions.

In addition to the foreign policy, it is also important to maintain the engagement with local Russians. I have to say that there are three types of

local Russians. They are either Russian citizens; they are either Estonian or Latvian citizens; or they have the so-called gray passport which means that they have undefined citizenship, and they get to enjoy access to Russia and access to the West, as well, because that's how it has been agreed in the European Union. This is what we're trying to avoid in the Baltics. We try to avoid a significant opposition to the national government as we have seen that it may manifest into armed clashes and the Russian so-called peacekeepers presence, which will be quite a long-term presence as we can see in those Frozen Conflicts map.

And what is the forecast for the future? We see that Russia as a civilization continues to try to exert pressure, especially on the fault line between the Russian and the Western civilizations. And for various factors, especially the persistence of the current ruling regime, we don't see that this will change anytime soon because the current regime is hard bent on protecting their civilization at all costs against what they see as a massive invasion by non-kinetic means from the West. So, they're trying to protect their values against the incoming Western values, and they're trying to establish a buffer zone. And the buffer zone, especially those countries that have large Russian minorities, is viewed by Russia as an excellent conduit to continue exerting that pressure and fending off the perceived Western pressure.

DR. IEVA GAJAUSKAITE

I'm going to bring in everything that you talked before today, including deterrence,democratic resilience, positive peace and even the possibility of winning a hybrid war. This is one of the main topics of my research. Basically, after February 24th of last year when Russia launched a large-scale war against Ukraine, we actually entered in a completely new phase of hybrid war between Russia, China and NATO, the European Union. Essentially, Lithuania, my country, is being targeted by hybrid actors - authoritarian regimes Russia and China - on single day basis. For example, they are using tactics such as economic coercion, intervention into political system, intelligence, etc. So, the main question I'm asking myself is how to bring a peace not only to the Baltic states, but at the same time how to transform our neighborhood into realm of positive peace. This would

essentially eliminate the possibility of a conflict because communities won't be no longer willing to engage in any kind of war or conflict.

The main problem is when we discuss resilience and defense systems, most of the time, our focus return to the Seven baseline requirements for national resilience, which, as you well aware, originate from NATO. One of the main issues that we're dealing with is that these baselines largely neglect social resilience. So, that's raises another question: How we are dealing with a comprehensive form of a total defense if mostly we are talking about infrastructure or the capacity to effectively manage and control movement of people, etc? Now, we are in the process of reevaluating ar these baselines, but for us still, the main priority is the same—how to save human lives and at the same time continue military operation as planned? This is what the baselines actually mean for us. But, if we would like to build a comprehensive defense system, we must still consider deterrence by denial and by punishment, among other aspects.

However, when it comes to dealing with hybrid warfare or hybrid threats the challenge we face is the blurred line between peace and war. It's difficult to discern when we are in a state of peace, when we transition into war, and how to return to peace. That's the main thing. So, you are deterring, but nothing happens; and we find ourselves trapped in a zero-sum game. Actually, we are in a constant state of hybrid war between democracies and autocracies.

So, let's take a closer look at the hybrid war. We're dealing with two completely different systems. In one system, my argument is that when we are talking about national security or the government security, we are primary dealing with authoritarian regimes. These regimes would like to bolster their resilience against any kind of democratic tendencies or solidy the process of autocratization as a one-way process. At the same time, when we shift our focus democracies, our primary concern is largely centered on human security. Here, we are taking into not only human lives, but other related aspects such as democratic resilience and how to build food security, political security, cyber security, and more.

The main problem when we are talking about hybrid warfare or hybrid threats, we have this strategic rationale that any authoritarian regime conducting hybrid warfare or using hybrid tools simply because they dislike

democracies. This is a fundamental misconception: they are perceived as our enemies. However, my research actually shows that in the case of a hybrid attack, the primary objective is usually to force democracies to exhaust their resources. For example, Belarus induced a migrant crisis directed toward Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. When we are dealing with a hybrid operation, the strategies involve utilizing corruption, targeting businesses, or even establishing political parties, all forcing a transfer of decision-making powerin order to further their own interests by manipulating our political systems and liberal market. When we are talking about hybrid campaign, the ultimate goal is to transform our soldiers into their soldiers. So, we are talking about society. They seek to alter the loyalties of our societies, reducing their engagement in democratic processes, eroding their fascination with democracy, and fostering sentiments against pluralistic societies. This underscores that we are not taking into account a lot of what actually matters to our societies.

So, in this particular case, I want to delve into the concept of having a sixth column. We are familiar with the the fifth column, which is an instrument in hybrid warfare. It involves creating artificial diasporas, employing intelligence agents, and so forth. But what if foreign interference can actually be used by democracies in order to counter autocratization? This is there the sixth column comes into play -- the people we can actually use in order to foster democratic resilience within authoritarian regimes. We seek to effect a transformation of our adversaries. You cannot win a hybrid war just by building the systematic resilience, because all the time what you're going to do is you're going to defend yourself. So, the key is to address the root of your problem, which is transforming authoritarian regimes. I'm using the so-called "Popper's Paradox of Tolerance." You are likely familiar with this concept, especially when we are dealing with militant democracies. If a tolerant society tolerates the intolerant, the latter will eventually undermine the foundations of tolerance. However, what is going to happen if an intolerant society tolerates the tolerant? Maybe the latter will eventually undermine the foundations of intolerance. This is what sixth column actually represents. So, then we are dealing with resisting autocratization or democratic resilience within authoritarian regimes we

are not seeking institutional resistance because the notion of checks and balances is absent. For example, in Russia. . Political resistance is also absent as the right of assembly is denied. For example, in Belarus.

We are primary looking for social resistance. It is crucial to take into account that if we want to build resilience, particurlarly democratic resilience, and integrate that in our deterrence strategy, we must promote social resistance. However, we need to do so in very particular way—by avoiding instilling insecurity and fear in society, which might deter them from engaging in activities that promote democratic resilience.

The main problem is that we are not dealing with the right aspect of resilience. This topic has been discussed extensively today, because mostly we associate resilience with normalization – the capacity to bounce back (basically we are talking about persistence), or re-organization, i.e. capacity to adapt, or renewal, i.e. capacity to systemic change (transformation). So, the sixth column emphasizes transformation and mostly a substantive and improved one.

Here are a couple of examples that you might be familiar with. Let's just look at Russia. The sixth column in Russia, you might say, is the Congress of People Deputies, a transitional parliament. They established initiative of Russian deputies at various levels, from the federal to municipal. In the future, maybe post- Putin, we can actually work with them or maybe with the Cadres Reserve for a Free Russia.

Basically, the institute that has been functioning since 2020, and its mission is to create a community of activists, experts and others working on various projects with international partners. And so, we are socializing them, enhancing their democratic activities. However, the main challenge lies ahead.

In some cases, such as Belarus, we observe very specific cases where enitities like the School of Young . Managers in Public Administration was a good example of the sixth column. The people working in the School established a lot of external relations. They conducted extensive research on topics related to public services, democracy and democratic resilience, and so on. The main problem is that every single person working there is facing prosecution and/or has been sentenced to at least ten years.

Now, what we can learn from Ukraine's example. When you are actually in a state of war, managing democratic resilience and human security, becomes essential if you would like to have a positive peace in the future. Ukraine provides us with a couple of very good examples how we should define the sixth column. For example, the Laboratory of Ideas is a voluntary non-governmental organization. It was operational for a decade, but presently it is engaged with UNICEF, focusing on psychological health and related matters. Additionally, you need a space to convene and conduct various human-security related activities. The Alexandra Dovzhenko Cultural and Educational Center, initially a concert hall, basically, now transitioned into a hub for producing of democratic resilience. This demonstrates that sometimes, it is not necessary to have individuals directly involved in the political field to contribute to building resilience and human security.When considering to foster the sixth column we need to bypass the immune system of authoritarian regimes, which is the main challenge This is why we need to guide authoritarian resilience for persistence rather than avoidance of a crisis. This is what happened in Belarus, and this is why we're having those prosecutions. So, we don't want to trigger authoritarian regimes to learn anything new and innovate in ways that strengthen regimes. Stability -- is a good condition. Instead, we should seeka positive foreign interference by introducing incremental change, focusing rather on transformation rather than causing a shock or something like that (for example, injecting large sums of money). We should operate discreetly, allowing time for changes to take root and avoiding visibilityYes, we need to support non-traditional forms of potential, mostly individual, group resistance based on a capacity of self-organization—churches, hospitals, concert halls, and so on. Assemblies, of course, where people gather. These groups may not be directly tied to the political system, but they trust each other and they have crucial capacity for self-organization. So basically, how we measure success is by potential of citizens to engage in cooperation internally and externally, i.e. first of all, in their local community, and being prepared to communicate in languages that allow us to offer assistance, for example through UNICEF. So, we need a material capacity, for example, community centers. Facilities for culture activities should be prioritized over traditional

educational facilities or research projects. Moral capacity, as I call it, social bonds and trust between individuals, is equally significant.

Therefore, for us, the critical engagement shouldactually not revolve around policies or defence but lean more towards cultural cooperation. In order for us to win a hybrid war, we must aim to transform authoritarian regimes. It is clear that imposing sanctions alone on authoritarian states will not lead to their collapse. Look at North Korea. It's not working. We need to find another way, so, maybe we should try to build a democratic resilience within authoritarian regimes in order to stop autocratization by bypassing the immune system of authoritarian regimes.

DR. STEVEN FLEMING

What I'm going to try to do is connect some dots that we already heard in the last few minutes about the need to use some of these interesting technologies that we now have in front of us, because the paradigm has shifted. So, all good short stories start with "Once upon a time," and they end with "They lived happily ever after. So, we'll start with once upon a time there was this dude named Aristotle back 350 BC, and he was a phenomenal Greek scholar, and he had some really big ideas about the future. And so, his view of the future articulated it pretty well about why we needed to kind of stay in step and learn from each other but don't break the mold. And so, let's reflect on maybe that and then continue the story. And so, along comes this country called the United States, and there was this historical timeline that was followed by government-sponsored what I call GEOINT and Geo Cacheing events. And so, the first one was these two dudes named Lewis and Clark, and so, they went downrange at the bequest of this guy named TJ. So, Thomas Jefferson decided that he wanted to go figure out what was a good way west from what originally traditionally was thought of as the United States. And so, off they went on these many government-sponsored events where we were trying to figure out why place and time mattered. So, a few slides here that reinforce these government-sponsored GEOINT activities.

So, surveying was the first course that was taught at West Point, which was the home of the Army Corps of Engineers. It was actually started there, which was the purpose of West Point once upon a time—to build engineer

officers, and surveying was a cornerstone of that. And so, yes, Thomas Jefferson actually put both of those things in place for this country—the Army Corps of Engineers and the place to train the engineers. And so, we've got these things as leftover surveying markers, and we have the portable surveying distance rod where we can measure distances and measure heights, and so, yes, we've got those things. And then we moved forward into maybe some other events.

So, this was the first early government UAV. This was a World War I approach at how do we collect imagery over the bad guys when we don't have enough information and knowledge on how to fly airplanes. So, we just put them on the bellies of pigeons; we put them in blimps; we put them in balloons; we did all kinds of things and hoped for the best. A little bit fast forward, and in the mid-1900s, 1960 to about 1972, we had an amazing program called the Corona Program. So, for the cadets in the room, this was a satellite program; it was not a great beer that you can drink. So, this is the satellite program, the Corona Program, and, in fact, there's still remnants of this today, the Keyhole Program. And so, the Keyhole Program is still in place today using some amazing satellite imagery, and, at the time, it was used to collect imagery over the USSR. So, it was trying to figure out what was going on, and there was a lot of kind of fact checking going on, and so, we continued on. And so, we have the old school ways of doing mapping, and we had organizations that did that for us, and these things actually still work really well. And, in fact, we still have them used today because this compass that I still have from my times in the Army and this image map that I was able to bring back from Afghanistan—limited distribution, unclassified—and the reason it was limited distribution was because we knew the battlefield was going to change quickly, and we didn't want to print a whole bunch of these things when we knew we were going to print again soon. But it pushed us in the direction of some of these evolving geospatial technologies, and so, in the early 2000s, we started doing this, and we've got some amazing now tools that we all kind of carry around with us. And so, if everyone goes ahead and grabs your mobile device and looks at it and spins it around and thinks about all the things that are in this thing, from camera systems to probably an embedded GPS chip, to the

ability to do voice communication and data communication and connect to the world, we've come a long way, and these technologies are actually embedded in many of these. So, one of those technologies is what we think of in the United States is GPS, Global Positioning Systems. In fact, there's many systems around the world, global navigation satellite systems, that do this work for us, and it didn't just happen by chance. In fact, we've been doing distance navigation for over a century, and we now are using it in the form of a satellite form of communication, and it's a really complex system, and this chart is designed to show you how complex it is. It's very busy, and I could actually spend a whole academic course or two talking about this chart and still not get to all the details of how complex that system is about place. So, yes, we have old school maps and things that we use, but we also have a whole bunch of tools that we use to find locations, and so, our mobile devices actually do what we have in the military now that is collected by many of these kits, and we now have moved into this area where we're using these things called drones, or UAVs, and things that we think of that are prolific now across society and across many military organizations. Thank goodness for them. They saved many lives; they saved my life multiple times when I was downrange. But these are what we call commercial off-the-shelf technologies. Anyone has access to them. They're no longer government-sponsored, and these technologies you can pick up at Best Buy; you can pick up on Amazon; you can pick up on eBay; But, these are not government-sponsored technologies. They may have started in the government way back when, and these particular systems are extremely powerful and impressive, but I would note that the military systems that you see here today are often used for specific sensor technologies that we do not have the ability to purchase at Best Buy. So, some really interesting technologies that we have not yet figured out how to use and use pervasively in society, and then the other piece is many of these systems are actually used as weapons. So, when you take a sensor system and then blend it with a weapon system, it changes, literally, the game of what that system is used for. So, the military still uses these, certainly.

The next thing I would tell you is that there is now a pervasive use of Open Source intelligence imagery that's being collected by satellite systems,

and it continually changes. It's a moving target, but it continually changes, and the thing is that everyone has access to it, not just the United States or the partners of the United States, but everyone has access. It's open source, and, therefore, the "Internet of Things" provides the good guys and then the knuckleheads of the world with the exact same information.

So, I reflect back on what happened not too many years ago, and this is a picture of the digital devices that I was using, the thing called the first digital division. This was back at the turn of the century, and that was around 1999 to 2001. We did this thing called the First Digital Division, and it was when we decided that maps in the analog world were not going to cut it in the future, and so, we started figuring out how to make a digital army. And we stood down an army division and made a Test and Evaluation Division, the fourth ID out of Fort Hood, and figured out that digits, in fact, do work. That is the picture of my Humvee and all that technology about mapping in place. I could do more with this than I could do twenty years ago with that. So, we've come a long way, but we're not there yet.

We then started trying to figure out how to build maps that would work in a dynamic world, and so, we did some stuff down at many schools to try to build this, and we built some products down at the University of Georgia and some other places around the country that were trying to figure out how to do dynamic mapping—maps that changed on the fly when you wanted to pinch and zoom and change the scale, switch an orientation, all those things that we now kind of do and take for granted. These were all technologies that have been developed over the last twenty years. And so, we built these dynamic products which today are in what we call doctrinal manuals. So how the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency does doctrinal use of geospatial intelligence tools.

It was all basically created over the last twenty years as we've developed the technology. So, that's what it used to look like, and today, that's what it looks like. It's inside your car, and we can use it, obviously, pervasively. So, take a look at those words. I would tell us in this kind of context, we've heard a lot already about what's going on with what I call chaos and how we measure it and that more and more people are getting involved in chaos management. Citizens and citizen-soldiers are now part of the drill. And

I reflect back on a couple of times in my history. I heard the word "chaos" mentioned once when I was on the back end of hurricane relief in Hawaii as a young Captain when we showed up on the island of Kauai, and a young soldier looked at me, and I looked at him, and there were cars upside down and babies crying and power lines everywhere, and he looked at me and said, "Sir, this is chaos," and he was right. And then fast forward to Afghanistan 2009 in a safe house, getting ready to go to my unit in a room with a Special Operation Seal, and there was a gunfight outside the window, and he got up and casually turned off the light. He looked at me; I looked at him. We had been there before—done that. He looked out the window, shook his head, and said, "Chaos," and he was right. And so, chaos comes in many different forms, but more and more people are getting involved in chaos management. This is really hot—what I call "On the Press."

I mentioned to some this morning that I just got this slide deck yesterday. We were asked, a group of us, to build some things that are going on about the current ongoing lessons learned from what's going on in Ukraine. It was asked for us by NGA and the OD, and what they've asked us to assess is what's going on and what do we need to be taken in the way of lessons learned from the sidelines for those that are watching but not participating. And when I say participation, I'm talking about the "boots on the ground" folks that are actually in the middle of it. So, these are some thoughts about what's going on and what it is, but these are the big lessons learned, and I'm just going to flash through them and let you take a look at what we're seeing.

So, hybrid warfare and the idea that kinetic operations are now being conducted with a whole bunch of other types of operations integratively at the same time. Platforms and sensors, drones, manned aerial platforms, commercial high-resolution space systems, and VGI (Volunteer Geographic Information)—this is where people are contributing to the intelligence picture. And so, interestingly, you made a comment about information and intelligence weapons of the week, and we also heard that you have to have the will to defend and the will to fight and contributing the best of your knowledge and abilities and passions by everybody. Everyone's in. Societal participation in warfare— what someone thinks they can do, and they can contribute. They may not have a gun in their hand, but what can

they contribute? So, once upon a time the traditional CIA requirement was to provide human—they still do—human Intelligence, but that's the idea of a pull system where we're pulling from people information. But today's world, I would argue, is in a push system of humanity, where we're getting pushed content by a whole bunch of players, and many of them have technology at their fingertips because they're able. So, this is a very different generation—gender, age, technology-savvy individuals have the ability to do some of this, and others can only do things maybe with a gun in their hand because that's what they know. But I'll sling some terms—YouTube, Facebook, Instant Messenger, Snapchat, TicTok, Instagram, WeChat, Telegram, WhatsApp—I've got all those, and the only reason I have them is not to participate, but to understand how the technology works. And those are ways that we're communicating information. I look down and see some other things that are going on. This idea of dynamic precise positioning and pervasiveness is now on the battlefield. We're seeing that. A few more on this line is what we're starting to see that's coming from the conflict, and there's a lot of things obviously that are changing that ask us the question, are we ready to stay up and stay current with information as it's coming at us from all these different angles? So, these are some of the lessons that we're currently learning.

So, the question I would offer is, as chaos managers, how do we keep up with this rapidly changing operational environment, whether it be these combat missions here or these missions, which are arguably just as important? Often, those missions are linked to things like climate change. As we've already heard earlier, it's driving a lot of the requirements for these missions to increase in number, location, and involvement. So, how do we do it? Well, maybe we need to think differently about thinking, and so, this is a quote from Alvin Toffler. He said that the illiterate of the 21st century won't be those who cannot read and write, but it will be those who can't learn, unlearn, and learn again. Now, as a professor, it is very difficult for me to look at a student and tell them that what I'm telling you today I want you to unlearn in four years. And it's not that what I taught them was wrong. It's just that what I taught them is no longer right four years from now; it's a different way of teaching. And I would argue that we probably need to

figure out how to teach people how to unlearn and learn again as much as we need to teach them what they will know for the rest of their life as truth.

So, a glimpse at why we need to do that—look, y'all. Rapid change is pervasive, and so, what does the interactive map of tomorrow look like? You think the map that we're using today is complicated? What is the true essence of 3D and 4D data? Right now, we're thinking of 3D data as what it looks like on the surface. The real 3D data is what all the objects are and the physics-based modeling that we need to know about what's in this room. That is not just a chair. That is a certain kind of chair. It's different than a folding chair, which is different than an armchair, which is different than a chair that I'm going to sit on in my house when I watch a football game. A chair is not just a chair, and a lot of times we get hung up in the idea that the features that we're seeing through what we call image-based systems are all we need to know. But I would argue that 3D modeling is going to change in the future. So, these are some systems that we're going to start seeing, and this system allows you to collect data inside of things and outside of things. It allows you to collect a whole bunch of things that we haven't even done before, and we can collect these things inside of places like SoFi Stadium where we have a lot of activities, as you well know, going on in LA and in that particular complex. And so, I'm not going to go and show you the videos that are linked to this. In the interest of time, we can show you a few, but we've been able to go in and collect a lot of things in that stadium that help us understand the true essence of everything that's going on in that complex—inside, outside, and everything else—so let me go ahead and flash through these without running the video.

The reason for that is what we call reality modeling. When we get into what we think of as "gaming engines," where we're at today is that we use those exact same tools to figure out how to model and simulate the real world, and that's where we are going. And where we're going is going to be a very different version of what we're doing today through those. So, then the question that I would ask just of the young officers-to-be and some of the officers actually that are here in the room is, who will be the next I see? What will it look like in the future, and I hope that when you get through your educational experience, when it's all said and done, if you have the

ability to learn, unlearn, and learn again, if we get it right, then we stand a chance of living happily ever after.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

[I have a] brief question to the entire panel but specifically to colleagues from the Baltic states. Two of you, at least, emphasize these ethnical variables as an important one when thinking of security and the threats imposed by Russia. I'm wondering why we are never thinking of ethnicity or the ethnic structure of Russia, itself. So, Russians are saying that ethnic Russians are 80 percent, while there are only 20 of minorities, which is completely untrue. So, why are we not exploring, at least academically, the ethnic structure of Russia, itself—the Dagestani or people from Chechnya and Russians, simply, and those who are living there, So, maybe this is the direction to go in. And the second comment would be on learning and relearning. I think that this has been done hundreds of years ago by Greeks, by Socrates, who was saying so, maybe this is the direction that we should show our students and ourselves that learning is not about giving definite answers; it's rather the ability to ask questions and critical thinking.

DR. GAJAUSKAITE

Of course, we are doing a lot of research on Russian and Russian ethnicity, and so. The question is why do you need to know this information? That's the main thing. Why it's important to know for you. It's not important if we are talking about, for example, their possibility to launch a military attack against Baltic states. It doesn't matter, because we have like mobilization and they get people from the jails if they need to, and they can send a lot, like thousands and thousands, of Russian Uzbeckis, even, or Buryats, and so on. So, this is one thing.

Another thing—why ethnicity? It starts to matter about ethnicity when we are mostly talking about the change of authoritarian regime, because we're having this discussion of how Russia is going to look like in twenty or fifty years. What we're looking for, like the main thing. So, sometimes we are joking like twenty-five up to twenty-seven different republics, happy ones, with different [garbled] makeup and nuclear weapons. Congratulations.

Maybe it's a better world. I don't know. I don't believe so, but the main thing is that at first, Russia was actually like the real empire and had a possibility to integrate those different ethnicities. Now we are dealing with Russian nationalism and everything that has to do with ethnicity anymore. We think that they are titular, like basically title ethnicities—Russian one, and everyone else is not a part of that empire anymore. So, it's quite easy to use that first of all as ideology and so and so forth, and this is actually a good thing for us, because for empires to be able to expand, they need to have a capacity to include other ethnicities, to say, for example, to Ukrainians or Lithuanians, you're wonderful. Without you, we cannot live. And they are coming to us and saying we would like to destroy you because you are different. So, this is not how empires operate. So yes, we're thinking about ethnicity, but it depends what we are looking for when we are studying Russia's federation.

DR. FLEMING

So, on your other question, I would agree that we do need to use some of the techniques that were already thought of before, and we maybe have looked past them. There's been a very structured approach to build upon the education that you already have. I believe, though, that now we are seeing a lot of technologies that we're learning and just think about a new version of "fill in the blank" software suite that we're using and how we're going to manage, say, a Word document and what you have to unlearn about the previous version in order to even get to using the next version. So, there is a lot of unlearning that has to be done in order to make room for the thing that is right today, which I don't think has been something that we have thought of as a standard practice in education previously. We didn't do a lot of unlearning before. Today, I think we have to in order to keep up.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I have a question especially in terms of information migration. I think that human security activities are based on trust between nations and people. However, recently the technologies of AI have been improved and especially those skills are used for information manipulation, such as

deep fakes and diffusion of wrong information through SNS. And such information [garbled] is possible to break trust and relationship between nations and people. So, what should we do to protect human security from information migration?

DR. GAJAUSKAITE

I can actually talk for a little bit about this cognitive warfare or psychological warfare and artificial intelligence and so on. I have this project on young generation in Lithuania and using technologies and TicTok and how they understand this. And like in Lithuanian MOD and Military, everyone was talking like deep fakes. This is like a huge problem for us. Like we need to take that into account because a deep fake can actually launch some kind of panic or chaos and so on and so forth. So, I conduct a couple of focus groups interviews with basically youngsters, I would call them, and I have met not even one single person that would see that what they see on TicTok they basically find it a reliable source of information. You think it's a joke, irony, and that's it. So, sometimes we're creating threats because this is our job, like when security community everything for us is a threat. I work in defense system, but at the same time sometimes we need to be critical that for us we understand don't put any ideas into the head of your enemy. So, basically this would be my first recommendation not to put any ideas, because sometimes when we are over-securitizing artificial intelligence, you are providing the objects of manipulation for cognitive warfare for your enemy. They think they don't know how to deal with that. We're afraid of that, okay, so we will use for our cognitive warfare in order for them to spend their resources, financial, human, stratcom, and so on fighting something that actually has no real meaning.

DR. TRUUSA

I just have a very quick comment. With the research that we've done on how young people use media and how they use social media, so, basically the echo chambering is it doesn't really happen with the young generation that much because by virtue of being young, they're also very curious, and they do interact between very different social groups. When we come to

a more sort of set or older generation, there it might be a problem, but also creating a panic or distrust between nations takes a little bit more than some groups in the population to have trepidations.

DR. FLEMING

I would add that we need to be working really hard with a lot of our AI systems, and I'm a little different when I think of the word AI. Often folks will say "artificial intelligence." I think of it as augmented intelligence. We're augmenting human intelligence, not creating something that's fiction. The point I would make here, though, is we need to be really good at checking veracity of data in fact checking ChatGPT, as an example. We need to be really good at copy editing. We need to be really good at going in and checking what it did, and we can use systems around us to help us do that. And so, in looking at these sources where some of these fakes, and you've mentioned many of those problems that we're seeing in this world of AI, there are ways to go and check to make sure that the data that was used in generating the product is in fact real, truthful, and so, using machines and having a trust relationship between a human and a machine in order to go back and make sure that truth in this case there is no intent to deceive. So, disinformation is being conveyed. We can use systems to help us do that.

DR. STRINGER

This is for our two Estonian colleagues. You talked about the will to defend. You also talked about the Russian minority in Estonia. You recruit from that minority for your armed forces. Karl or Tia, could you comment on what's the approach for that group since it seems almost like a contradiction? They're willing to defend, but yet they're a minority that might not feel fully Estonian.

DR. TRUUSA

We did a study for MOD regarding the Russian-speaking minority and the Will to Defend and how they conceptualize and understand their part in national defense. So, what we did find out is like we expected. They're not overly head over heels trying to save Estonia because they don't

identify that well with the state, but they do identify very well with our local communities. So, the approach for us now has been to funnel them into interior defense organizations and also try to have them be more active within the communities. So, that is not the military part, but Karl is going to take the military part.

LT. COL. SALUM

Yes, my practical experience at three different levels verifies what you just said. As a conscript, I had fellow ethnic Russians, Estonian citizens, who were conscripts, and I cannot recollect any of them saying that this is all rubbish—I'm going to get this training, and when the wasters come, I will turn my guns against you. Not even in the quiet corners, none of that sentiment was heard. Then, years later, I was a conscript platoon Commander as a young officer, and I had some ethnic Russians in my platoon and the same sentiments, and they were very eager to learn the trade to defend their home country. The secret is that you don't force them to Estonianize. You have to defend your country. You can maintain your identity as an ethnic Russian. That's fine, but you have to learn to defend your country where you're living in. And then the third level of experience is as an officer with other colleagues, with the ethnic Russian officers serving alongside. It's the same attitude that continues. Unfortunately, yes, there are bad apples. A few years ago, the first Estonian military member was captured and convicted of passing secrets to the Russians. He was an ethnic Russian. But those apples can be recruited, blackmailed, or whatever tools used by the Russian Intelligence from the ethnic Estonians in the military, as well.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentations.]

10

Topics in Human Security Challenges

Moderator:

- Robert Dorff, PhD.

Panelists:

- Joanna Dyduch, PhD.
- Varun Gupta, PhD.
- José de Arimatéia da Cruz, PhD.
- Mark Grzegorzewski, PhD.

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

DR. JOANNA DYDUCH

My name is Joanna. I come from Jagiellonian University in Krakow. I'm focusing in my research on Israel studies and public policies—Israeli/European studies on the crossroad, I would say, but from the perspective of objectives, implementations, but also efficiency of the public policies. But precisely I'm very much interested in those public policies which have quite visible and important external dimensions. So, this is foreign policy; this is energy policy; this is a trade policy; environmental recently also. So, the topic of my today's paper presentation is the case of human security perception in the light of securitization and the securitization of Israeli energy policy. Of course, while preparing myself for today's talk, I made some study and research on how the term "human security" has been conceptualized in past years. Is it still relevant for what it has been criticized? And so, everything that has been done for the purpose of this paper for better understanding

and framing this paper, I will just skip due to the lack of time, but I just wanted to highlight that in my understanding what I took from the literature is that the human security conceptualization and perception is determined both politically and rationally, and we when we speak about political determination or determinants of the human security, one is to remember that it's not only politicized, but it is also deeply embedded in the politics. So, it has been yesterday set and underlined that human security stems from, and is very much tied with, democracy and democratic standards, of course, defined very broadly where the civic participation lies actually in the heart of understanding of democracy, and, therefore, promotion of human security or supporting the human security emphasizing encouraging broad participation in political decision making but also local ownership. And this quote has been taken from the European Union introduction to its democracy support strategy released in 2023. Human security is also determined rationally, and this needs to be remembered. So, it always stems from objectively existing human needs. So, having said that, I tried to look into two cases within a broadly defined Israeli energy policy that are embodied into these objectively existing human needs. So, I looked into environmental concerns, or I tried to see how the environmental threats, pollution, climate change are being perceived by Israelis, and what kind of rules are played by different actors being active in conceptualization, fulfillment implementation, and assessment of the energy policy.

The second one is more related to the more conventional traditional understanding of human security, which is related to securing the demand of the consumers of energy resources. So, briefly and quickly, why is Israel a case study? I would argue, but probably I'm not objective in that sense, that Israel serves as a great case study to examine different phenomena. This is a country that is under a permanent—I mean it grows, and it develops in the environment of permanent pressure and tensions. And since it has been established in 1948, in terms of looking through the lens of energy security, it has been described as an energy island. So, due to its difficult, let's say, relations with its neighbors, it was almost isolated. So, the Israeli domestic demand regarding the energy resources had to be covered by the import. This is one.

The second thing is it's really a tiny country located in the Middle East. Also, recently, it is also a heavily populated country with a great dynamic of entrepreneurship but also industrial development, which has a huge impact on the environment that is, of course, observed, seen, and highlighted by several local players including NGOs, media, but also political parties and political leaders. Israel finally is a country that is in a state of not only war or conflict with its neighbors, but it is challenged by internal conflict. I'm not going to go into discussion. If we would like to, we can live it. If the conflict with the Palestinians is internal or it's external from the perspective of public policies in there, it can be said that it has features of internal conflict. So, the authorities due to occupation, due to responsibilities of Israeli authorities to provide the Palestinian population with certain public services. So, because of all of those circumstances I mentioned, it has been said by many authors in the literature, to political scientists and international relations scholars, in Israel everything is a security matter. So, the process of securitization, moving a public issue to a public issue that is under control by the citizens, is transparent, so the citizen requiring civic participation probably in the realm of energy policy should not happen. But surprisingly, and this is the anomaly that is really worth to examine. Energy policy in Israel is a place where several public actors, non-governmental entities, not only organizations, but also individuals, interest groups, media, and also third-party actors (for instance the European union and United States but I would rather focus on European Union because I know much more about that) do really want to desecuritize the Israeli energy policy, and the move to desecuritize is about shifting it from this specific or these specific treatments to the regular policy where the public has an almost full control over the decision-making process—civil society has a control over decision-making processes and has also an influence on their implementation. And, I just wanted to mention just to highlight two cases that I looked into. This is going to be the major part of my presentation. However, I have three minutes, but I just will highlight a couple of things. I looked into two cases.

The first case was prevention and responses to the oil spills. A large oil spill happened in 2021 in February in Israel, but this was just the occasion

to make this environmental claims by the non-governmental entities really visible, and, due to this huge as it was called "beach disaster," the public actors gained much power. So, they visibly entered into the political space. They made politicians to change their decision, and it's so important from the political and security perspective as, for instance, suspension and cancellation later on an important deal between Israeli. Now, this was a European-Asian pipeline company with the Emirati partners about shifting the oil through the Red Sea and then the pipeline to Ashdod and then further to Europe. So, this deal has been first suspended and then canceled because of the environmental consideration, and it cost a lot, not only a lot of money and a lot of efforts, it had international political consequences. But what I want to emphasize is, the public players of civic society were able to force politicians due to environmental considerations to stop this very controversial [thing]. If needed, I can explain why due to environmental issues.

The second case—the European Union in the past thirty to forty years is trying to convince the world that the two-state solution is the best solution, and it is not that. It's about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and it tries to do a lot of things, some successful, most of them unsuccessful, to promote the two-state solution. Recently, the European Union invested in energy and solar renewable energy installation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and this corresponds very well with our yesterday's presentation. The European Union tried to give more autonomy to the local communities in Jerusalem, for instance, to install rooftop solar photovoltaic systems on the schools, and it was a really large project and it was shown, when it was evaluated by two Israeli scholars, exactly what has been mentioned yesterday—that when the Israeli Jewish population is conscious that they have the ownership, that they have the agency, that they can pursue even very difficult agenda, at the same time, the Palestinians, even with involvement of the threat actors, very often are unable to go through not even local simple installation project. They still do not believe that, through such a means or such a step, they can gain more independency, autonomy. And my final conclusion is that despite these failures of this securitization of certain issues of the public concerns, I would claim that this securitization

goes hand in hand with human security and supports the human security agenda because it empowers people; it strengthens the agenda of the agency of the individuals and the communities, but it also promotes democracy as understood broadly not only as through the prism of electoral process, but also mostly participation.

DR. VARUN GUPTA

I am Varun Gupta, and I am an associate professor of logistics and analytics at the University of North Georgia, and I'm part of the College of Business. I joined University of North Georgia in the fall of 2022, and I was at Penn State University before that for past eight years, and my research interests they are at the intersection of supply chain, supply chain risk management, and pricing. Today, I'm going to talk in detail about human security challenges and supply chains. and I am happy to speak on this topic because supply chains have become suddenly very cool and everyone is talking about supply chains since the pandemic. And I'm also going to talk a little bit about how and why some of the issues related to supply chains occurred during the pandemic, and before I jump into that, I also want to briefly talk about that my talk today will be primarily focused on security issues within the United States. I'm not going to go and take an international perspective, per se, and the main focus will be within the United States what the administration is trying to do to secure our cyber security within the supply chains, and we have heard about the Biden administration investing in silicon chips to make sure that a lot of manufacturing that is done overseas, primarily in China, is brought in-house, and there are several steps the administration has taken, and it's not new. That's one thing I would throw out, but right now, given the emphasis on supply chains, this is definitely a very, very important national security concern. So, on the outline of today's talk, I am going to describe the different types of threats humanity faces and how it links to the supply chains, then the role of supply chains in our day-to-day lives in businesses and in the military, then I'm going to talk briefly about the challenges and opportunities that the supply chains present to us, and finally, I will conclude with some of the supply chain initiatives that the U.S. government is taking right now and primarily

focusing on the Biden-Harris Administration, given their recency, and, at the same time, I think we can take a pause and think about how everyone started thinking about more on border control custom since 9/11. And a very similar thing has happened in terms of supply chain since the pandemic. So, if in five years, ten years down the lane, when we look at history, we would see this as one of the pivotal movements in human history, where emphasis on custom protection, border protection, the way airports and security are run after 9/11 are going to be very similar in terms of supply chains looking at security insurance. So, when we talk about threats and conflicts, the most recent one is the war in Ukraine. And we have all seen the increase in prices of majority of the food products as well as the crude oil, because the war led to disruption in both Ukraine and Russia, Russia being one of the primary exporters of crude oil, and a majority of Europe and the United States stopped purchasing the crude oil and everything is entangled in a global economy. So, a war which is thousands of miles away has an impact all over the world, and you would see supply shortages, and those supply shortages lead to increase in prices. So, war is one of the conflicts that can lead to supply chain issues. Other issues where the military is also involved are natural calamities. So, we see instances of earthquakes that lead to disruptions. We see instances of hurricanes, floods that also lead to disruptions, and whenever we experience any kind of disruption, either on the side of consumption, manufacturing supplies, we will always experience issues in supply chains.

I also want to talk about two more threats which are fairly more recent and more recognized. One of the threats is cyber. So, all of us are now very, very well aware of the term cyber security. So, we all fear about losing our passwords, losing all of our sensitive financial information, and similar impact happens with a lot of manufacturing companies, as well as service industry, oil pipelines, and very recently last year there was a cyber attack on one of the major pipelines on the east coast, and that led to an increase in crude oil prices, and it was essentially a national security threat. And besides that, we are all aware about the issues because of the pandemic, and when China refused to open up for quite a while, and they had lockdowns, we were experiencing a lot of shortages in the United States and the rest of

the world because of that. So, in short, in this cyber security and pandemic are a couple of things that supply chains will be tailored, and these are the two threats that all administrations and all businesses, as well as the military, need to prepare themselves for better.

I want to share something fun. So, we all remember the early stages of the pandemic when we ran out of toilet paper, which we had never experienced before in our lifetimes. Major strategic crisis, yes? So, right now we can all laugh about it, and the beauty of it is we never thought about something as a staple as toilet paper or something like milk and eggs running out of stock ever, and that's the beauty of supply chains. If they function very well, we never talk about it, and that's why at the beginning of my discussion, I mentioned that because of the pandemic, everyone thinks supply chains are cool. It's new. It's not new. We have been consuming products throughout our human existence, so supply chains actually have existed throughout history. And one of my favorite references is the book called *Out of War*, and I'm sure [garbled] in the military must have read that book. And it talks about how logistics and supply chains can make or break wars. So, that's a fun read, and I really enjoyed reading that. So, we're just going to give a brief definition of supply chains for anyone who may not be aware. So, a supply chain consists of the entire network from the producer to the end consumer. So, it includes our farmers supplying raw materials or mines that include raw materials that go on to the suppliers, to the manufacturers, distributors, to wholesalers, to retailers, to the end consumers. So, it's a very, very complex network, and it can be across countries. It can be across states, or it can also be sometimes consolidated all around in one place. And given the network is very complex and sometimes cross global, managing these supply chains is definitely much more challenging than we envision. So, that's another quick view. So, raw materials to supplier, to manufacturer, distribution, customer.

Next, I want to quickly wrap up my talk with the supply chain security initiative. So, we see here President Biden holding a small substance in hand. Most of us recognize that as a silicon chip, and if you were in the market looking for cars, automotive trucks, there has been shortage and backlogs just because of the tiny piece of paint. So, the Biden Administration, looking

at that, they signed an executive order in the national security interest, ensuring supply chains for silicon chip manufacturing, enabling capacity investments, and moving a lot of the manufacturing in-house. And, given the investments are billions and trillions of dollars, it can take several years for us to have these manufacturing plants built in, so, even now, there is still a backlog with the manufacturers, which are located in Taiwan and China. So, the Administration, even though they're making progress, it will still take some time. So, this is two years back—February 2021—and we can expect things to stabilize a little bit better in by 2025. So, another thing that the Administration did more after the Silicon Chip Manufacturing Act was, they actually created a task force within the White House that addresses the short-term supply chain issues. So, that was another incentive, and very recently, in March of 2023, with all the cyber security issues that happened last year, the Administration wants to make sure that we are ahead of hackers, and we are ahead of any foreign or national elements that attack those elements. So, we want to make sure that the supply chain security is boosted, and the government wants to make investments and get the help of experts to make sure that the country has a strategy to boost our supply chain security. So, in a nutshell, what I want to conclude with is that there are supply chain issues. There are opportunities to address the concerns because of the supply chain gaps we have, and very recently because of the pandemic and cyber security challenges, the government is trying to react to it, but more or less we will have to be more aggressive as a nation, as a government, if we want to move ahead of the hackers and make sure that we can mitigate that attack before it happens, just like what the military would do. So, we want to have a more aggressive approach on preventing the attack or the threat before it happens. So, that's all from me, and that's my information, and I would be happy to answer questions at the end.

DR. JOSÉ DA CRUZ

I'm at the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership (homeland defense and security issues). So, a lot of the topics that we're talking about today, some are the issues that we're actually trying to address and talk to our students at the War College to make sure that they're

prepared to face the new battlefield, whatever that's going to be in the 21st century, which is constantly changing. So, and again, what I'm going to talk about is essentially my personal view. It's not the view of the United States or any governmental agency. So, there's my email, as well. My presentation is going to basically deal with the emerging technology and what is that doing to transnational organized crime, especially within the Americas. This presentation is part of a much larger project that I'm working on right now looking at transnational organized crime, but also looking at environmental crime, which is the topic of our presentation at one o'clock with my colleague Dr. Devlin and Dr. Jalloh.

So, it's a new environment for us, especially within the Americas. We're used to dealing with crime on the streets, and one of the things that I'm always fascinated about when I teach cyber security to the Savannah Police Department or any other police department, there's always that divide between what I call the "old guard" and the "new guard." The old guys like me go like this is all fun stuff, but crime happens on the street, and then you see the new generations of guys that says this is really important because my mom, who is in her late age, just got robbed. Somebody was in this romance online, and they took a lot of money from her. So, it's kind of interesting to see the new environment, because like I say, the old guard is just kind of like, ah, this is not really happening. On the other hand, the young generation really understands the consequences of the new technology. I think I don't have to tell you this, but probably most of you guys know. And I'm just looking at drones. This is just sort of the top of the iceberg. I could talk about facial recognition, which has become very useful within the Americas, especially in certain kinds of authoritarian countries that have inherited this technology from China and Russia and other places, as well, but I think it's important to know this. The drones are not only for surveillance, but I think most of you probably remember. When I was young, I had a drone, but I didn't use it for any bad activity. I used it for the fun of it. Nowadays, you can use it to transport drugs, which is very common within the Mexico-U.S. border. It's very common within the transporter area in South America, especially between Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, as well. So, that's becoming a very interesting weapon. It's been

used for spying, as well, especially certain areas, especially in Rio, and in Brazil, criminal elements are using them to make sure that the drones are constantly in the air, especially when there's a possibility of a police infiltration of certain areas so there will be an alert right away. In the old days, they used to have kids standing by at the entrance of the shantytown, so when the police car would approach, they would run up the street, or they would fire a firecracker announcing hey police is coming, or they would fly a kite. Nowadays, they don't have to do that, so those kids are in a strategic position with their drones, and they can see everything, up-to-the-minute kind of Intelligence for the criminal organization.

I wish I could show you this, but there was a big bank robbery in the state of Sao Paulo, and they said it was about 300 individuals. They encircled the entire city, and then, as they were robbing the three major banks within the city, the police arrived, and to escape, this was what the criminals did. They put people on the roof of the vehicles and attached a camera to them in addition to explosives, and then they drove the cars out so the individuals on top of the vehicles were essentially providing surveillance and live up to the minute video to the criminal organization that escaped the city. So, the police basically got out of the way because they didn't want to kill the innocent bystanders, and those individuals escaped. And this is becoming more and more common especially in Brazil. I haven't seen any of that in Argentina yet, but you've seen this very technique being used in Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico right now. I'm pretty sure the other countries within our region are probably going to expand beyond, as well. And again, this is some information about the event. One of the things that I forgot to mention, this new technique is called the "new cangaco" especially in the case of Brazil, and the new cangaco is an old adaptation of bank bandits around the 1940s, around the 1930s in Brazil. They would attack the city, rob the banks, and then escape. Well, nowadays, they're calling it the new cangaco because they do the same thing, but they're much more powerful than the police, and now they bring all their new technology into play. They survey the area, they look at other places, they use drones, and so forth. There's a little bit more events that took place in other cities once this happened. Then there was sort of this copycat element within Brazil, and

then you begin to see attacks in Sao Paulo, Parana, Bahia, and Minas Gerais. So, four major states within Brazil. And now you begin to see this spread to other areas, as well, especially in the Amazon region. This is a little bit more about what happened in the state of Sao Paulo.

And then again, of course, the case of Mexico, as well. Mexico is an interesting case because when the transnational organized crime started using drones within Mexico, they began to import the drones from China and Israel, and there was such a demand by the criminal organizations for drones that they said why not produce this locally here? So, there's this kind of reverse engineering with the drones from Israel and China, and now you see drone production actually taking place within Mexico, and it is a major business. So, if you're looking for a good investment, that's the place to do it. And you can see how drones are being used. It's replacing the coyotes, if you remember the people that wanted to cross the border. They no longer have to have somebody with them; they can have just the drones guiding them and helping them. You've seen the transport and shipment of drugs across the border, as well. When I was in El Paso, Texas you were able to see some of that kind of activity. The border patrol is very active within that whole area to prevent anything like this from happening. Again, just some more information about Mexico and where the major cartels are producing drones. So, you can see the major city that's being widely used. And then all the major cartels. Tijuana, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco Cartel—they're all now using this technology to enhance their capabilities and activities.

What do we see in terms of drones going forward? Those are the four major trends over there. You begin to see more and more this weaponization of drones for a single use, a point detonation or multiple use, kind of stand up from bombardment. Second, you begin to see a criminal organization with the ability to create the narrative of the event. Now, the police can say, well, we shot them, because now the criminal elements are saying, no this is what happened. We have evidence, as well. So, that narrative/counter-narrative, and again in the battlefield as most of the old soldiers over here know, and the young generation will know, narratives sometimes win war, believe it or not. So, criminal elements or transnational organized crime has been very sharp on that. They're using

drones for intelligence surveillance, as I mentioned before, night vision technology deployment, and so forth.

When we look at this emerging technology from this lethal empowerment theory, you can see some of the key ideas and attributes of that theory—drones, facial recognition, and all sorts of technology are going to be an integral part as we move forward on the war on crime and transnational organized crime and so forth. So, I'll stop over here, and I'll be happy to entertain any questions we have later on.

DR. MARK GRZEGORZEWSKI

I'm representing the Irregular Warfare Center. For those of you who don't know about the Irregular Warfare Center, or the IWC, it was established in 2021 by the National Defense Authorization Act, and this is an important recognition by Congress since, in fact, irregular warfare is the most common type of warfare, not conventional warfare, which typically gets the most attention and the resources. So, cyber supply chain threats are one of the topic areas important to the Irregular Warfare Center, and, as such, I was asked by them to come here today to discuss cyber threats to the supply chain, having previously worked on a volume with three other amazing authors back in 2019 before it became cool to talk about supply chains. They were all at Embry-Riddle. So, this topic is right in my wheelhouse, so I'll use the comments from that volume plus my own personal insights from working in the DOD for over the past ten years and then throw in a few updated supply chain attacks.

So, to start, I'll just reiterate that the supply chain is a network of all individuals, organizations, resources, activities, and technology involved in the creation and sale of a product. The supply chain encompasses everything from the delivery of materials from the supplier to the manufacturer through to its delivery to the end user. Cyber supply chain attacks refer to when somebody uses an outside provider or partner that has access to your data and systems to infiltrate your digital infrastructure. Because the outside party has been granted the rights to use and manipulate areas of your network, your applications, or sensitive data, the attacker only either has to penetrate the third party's defenses or program a loophole into a

solution offered by a vendor to infiltrate your system. There are many ways in which supply chain attacks can be executed, all of which involve creating or taking advantage of security weaknesses and solutions companies trust. One vector is stolen certificates. If a hacker steals a certificate used to vouch for the legitimacy or safety of a company's product, they can peddle malicious code under the guise of the company certificate. As an example of this, in 2011 a malign actor, most likely Iran, was able to gain access to the accounts of a certificate authority and then went about pushing out its own fake certificates that looked legitimate.

Another vector is malware pre-installed on devices. Attackers put malware on phones, USB drives, cameras, and other devices, and, when the target connects it to their system or network, malicious code gets introduced. Attacks on the supply chain can also come from code included in the firmware of components. Digital hardware is controlled by firmware that helps it run smoothly and interface with users and other systems. An example of a firmware attack comes from the Russian intelligence organization, the SVR, which displayed its cyber espionage expertise in a mass attack. The SVR hacked the monitoring and management company, SolarWinds, whose IT performance monitoring system, Orion, provided privileged access to systems. The Orion software was exploited by hacking a third-party vendor and installing malware, which was then used to push out updates to SolarWinds' 30,000 U.S. clients, 18,000 of whom actually installed the update. This malware pushed out as a genuine update was not picked up by any anti-virus software. Once installed, it gave the SVR access into the IT systems of SolarWinds' customers, and it allowed it to move laterally to other networks. Since the Orion hack provided data on its customers' customers, and some of those affected by this hack included the Department of Treasury, the FBI, the Department of Defense, big names in the U.S. government.

To the military, supply chains are an important risk vector since war-fighting technologies have increasingly integrated information communications technology, and there has been associated changes in the worldwide supply chain. Current and emerging warfighting technologies are composed of significantly more diverse, complex, and commercially

available hardware components and software than at any time in military history. Military modernization introduces complexity into weapon systems in terms of the number and complexity of hardware components, lines of software code (and I'll come back to that later), and the complexity of the code. The supply chain for hardware and software is increasingly diversified, fluid, and global. Consequently, there is a concurrent increase in the attack surface for weapons and support systems, many more and varied opportunities for malign actors to attack the systems through hardware and or software through multiple channels in the supply chain and through all stages of a system's life cycle. As a result, agencies may have little visibility into understanding of, or control over, how the technology that they acquire is developed, integrated, and deployed, as well as the processes, procedures, and practices used to ensure the integrity, security resilience, and quality of the products and services. Between the inception of a component or a system in its final disposal, there are several stages in the life cycle where it can be altered, moved, shipped, tested, packaged, sold, used, and maintained. Likewise, components and systems can encounter several different handlers, engineers, testers, logisticians, consumers, owners, and users during their life cycle. At each of these stages of the life cycle, there are opportunities for malign actors to interfere with the integrity of components or the systems, themselves, for malicious purposes. In fact, adversaries know that in today's strategic competition, information and technology are both key cornerstones, and attacking a subcontractor is far more appealing than attacking a prime contractor. Unintentional acts by suppliers, such as a lack of due diligence or inferior design manufacturing and system testing practices, can also result in vulnerabilities and system compromise. In the case of a product source code, unless the source code has been thoroughly reviewed by programmers or software engineers, what is not apparent is the answer to the question what else does the software do? It is difficult to identify a hidden functionality in compiled code, and this hidden functionality may execute under specific conditions or at a set time. Modern complex systems can contain millions of lines of source code. Bugs, which are identified per line of source code, can range from one bug per 1,000 lines of well-written code up to twenty-five per 1,000 lines for less well-written code. So, clearly,

no longer are adversaries engaging the U.S. solely via kinetic means. They have moved to asymmetric warfare with blended operations that can take place through the supply chain, cyber domain, and human elements. A GAO report noted that from 2012 to 2017, DOD security testers routinely identified critical cyber vulnerabilities in almost all of the weapon systems under development. Another team reported they were able to guess the system administrator's password in nine seconds. Some of these weapon systems incorporated COTS or Commercial Off-the-shelf Technology, an open source software that had not been reconfigured with new passwords to replace default passwords shipped with the system.

I have spoken mostly to hardware and software issues to this point. The biggest vulnerability remains the human. Phishing attacks are the most common cyberattack vectors across both government and industry. Malign actors exploit weaknesses in the psychology of human users to influence them to do something that allows the actor to access information systems. This could be as simple as clicking on a web link, an email attachment, filling in a web form, or replying to an email. Another aspect of the human dimension is insider threats, and they are probably the biggest threat to cyber systems. An insider threat is someone authorized to use a system and often has physical access to that system. Human risk calculus and economic incentives are another aspect. Performance, cost, and schedule, alone, are insufficient for evaluating suppliers. Supplier cyber security is typically not included as an equally essential element of the evaluation process. Should suppliers' cyber security standards be mandated, over 350,000 companies will have to be assessed, and ten thousand trained assessors will be needed, and the companies, themselves, will have to bear the cost of this assessment, which may be problematic for small and medium-sized non-defense companies who are already operating at low margins. So, all these factors combine to present the U.S. government with potential supply chain vulnerabilities through either intentional acts by malign actors or unintentional acts by suppliers with the potential to negatively impact mission outcomes. In closing, the U.S. government is slowly shifting its posture on cyber security and the supply chain from one where cyber security is often an afterthought in products,

to being a foundational element incorporated throughout a product's life cycle. However, there's more that we need to do, and hopefully we can get into that in the Q and A.

DR. DORFF

I think that the panel has done a great job of highlighting a number of these vulnerabilities. But to go back to yesterday in the various presentations we had on the seven dimensions of human security—all of those dimensions are impacted either by technology or by the kinds of conflicts that are going on, as the panel has done a very good job of articulating. So, please keep that in mind, and I will now simply open things up for questions.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

This is actually for Dr. Gupta concerning supply chains. Commercial companies for years have now been looking at Just-In-Time logistics to keep inventories low and save costs and increase profitability. I'd be curious from your research and observation how we might balance Just-In-Time with actually the need for inventory, not only in commercial enterprises for dual-use equipment, but also in the military and particularly in emergency services. I'd be interested for your view of this balancing act.

DR. GUPTA

Thanks for the question. Everyone has been talking about the issues that Just-In-Time creates when rare events such as pandemic or threats emerge. So, far, the consumers have enjoyed low prices and quick deliveries because of Just-In-Time, so we got used to, and kind of got spoiled because of, the reduction in costs and supply chain efficiencies because of the Just-In-Time system. And many companies are trying to move away, and they are recalibrating their supply chains and moving away from a single supplier system and cross-global footprint to more ensuring and having multiple suppliers. Many large companies, including Apple and many manufacturing companies, are moving in that direction. And the second part of your question about the military—so, in my view, the military is very different from businesses. So, they always, always tend

to have inventory. That's my view. The issue with the military is usually the lead time management. There's usually no lack of resources. So, if you want a product in, say, a battlefield or in the event of a natural calamity, the issue is usually in terms of logistics—how fast you can get there? So, I'm honestly not a lot aware about what military is doing currently to manage their logistics, per se, but I'm pretty sure maybe we will hear soon from the administration and from the [unintelligible] reports what the government may have done recently, but I am not the best person to give insights on what the military is doing currently. I know what businesses are doing from the current events and the news, but, unfortunately, I cannot add much there.

DR. DORFF

I worked a lot recently with first responders of all kinds, and all of the issues, including those that lead to conflict, but also those natural disasters and so on as mentioned, are greatly affected by these issues, as well.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Try to help me understand a little more. You talked about the use of drones by cartels and on the Mexican and American border, and CBP is aware of this. In terms of the carrying of the drugs, are the drugs actually inside them, are being carried, and then what does, or can, border patrol do about that? Are they crossing the border, or what all are you seeing and hearing?

DR. MICHELE DEVLIN

It depends on the size of the drone. If it's big enough and has the capacity to carry a load, it will; otherwise, they'll attach like a parachute and then deliver across to the other side. So, the border patrol is well aware of it, and they're actively involved in preventing this from happening. There's certain parts along the border that you see more activity than others. El Paso was sort of the epicenter for a while, and now it has moved to other locations. They are aware, and they're trying to make sure they address the issue.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I'm the Second Lieutenant General Silvestri from Italy. I have a question about the supply chain. When we talk about supply chain, we always focus our attention just on the distribution of products to the final buyers, and I think the last supply chain problems [garbled] resources are not limitless. How can a supply chain develop and evolve in terms of environmental sustainability?

DR. GUPTA

Oftentimes, in the supply chain, we don't know the producers, the suppliers; we don't know a lot of those elements in there, plus there's all these types of subcontractors. In the last Congress, there was an idea put forth to have a bill of materials for everything involved for a product to come all the way to market. It's kind of like a recipe, right? If you were able to track down all the materials that go into a product, again, which we currently don't have, perhaps you could find those materials that are not environmentally sustainable and maybe find other sellers of a more sustainable product. But again, we're not there yet. We're so far from having that recipe for these products. So, I think you first have to get down on paper where are all these things coming from, and then from there, you can make more environmentally conscious choices. I would also like to add to the idea of environmentally sustainable and ESG. Everyone is talking about ESG a lot right now, and when we talk about environment sustainability or sustainability, in general, there are many, many dimensions to it. So, for example, having Fair Trade laws, having labor in countries where we do not have child labor—that is also part of sustainability, and there is essentially not a lot of cost or limitless resources that need to be procured or had to have a supply chain of products where we do not have human traffickers or children producing stuff that we are consuming. And on the same end, we have more and more products and companies where they're trying to ship products with less packaging, products having a local footprint. So, there is definitely more and more being done, and there's always more that can be done.

DR. DA CRUZ

One more thought on that topic. At least in my community, in the military, there's a focus on risk versus security, right? And if you take on more risk, that's going to cost less money, right? Oftentimes, when we have contractors bid for something, we go with the lowest bid on the contract. If you want to think of security in terms of environmental security, I think you have to change the whole paradigm, at least in the military, to think about security as opposed to taking on risk. So, it's going to cost more money, and if that's a hard sell to people to say we're going to increase your taxes for environmental security or other types of security, it doesn't mean it shouldn't happen, though.

DR. DORFF

Yes. I might add to that, too. It would require different thinking in terms of what it is we're trying to accomplish and what we need to accomplish it with, and I think, to some of the other points that were made, that requires thinking in advance. And going back to some of what we covered yesterday, looking at the whole challenge perspective out there from that view, that these are different things that we need to be capable of doing—different capabilities that we need but thinking about them well in advance, because a lot of what we've heard today and some of yesterday, too, suggests that to have the right tools to do the things the right way in the context of human security, while you're also dealing with traditional national security problems, is really the challenge. So, I think of yesterday's conversation about learning, unlearning, and relearning, and I think that was very informative for some of what would we need to be doing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

Interestingly, the pandemic provided us an opportunity to see some of the shortcomings in supply chains. It also allowed us to see where there was some significant concentration in some high-end products, specifically the highest end of chips. Ninety percent come out of Taiwan. The federal government has done some things with the Chips Acts to try to diversify that, and, as Dr. da Cruz pointed out, markets are highly efficient, and

they drive innovation faster than governments. So, the open question is, what is the appropriate measure, or a push and pull between government intervention to help with diversification and allowing markets to be efficient and do the things they do best?

DR. GUPTA

That's definitely a push and pull phenomenon when we talk about government intervention versus free market. And that's always a philosophical question, but let me take a quick thought and put in my two cents on that. Definitely, it's a matter of national security because we are talking about silicon chips. They are used in anything from cars and simple calculators to heavy weaponry equipment and machinery. So, it is definitely of national security concern, and when we talk about natural security, government is the best at national security in my view—so, government intervention and, more importantly, the kind of money that is required. It has to be a collective investment that needs to be done, and, at the same time, we are aware of the security threats with Taiwan along with China. Recently, the Taiwanese premier was in the United States, and we all know what's happening politically there, as well. So, there's no wonder why it makes sense for the Biden-Harris Administration to make sure that the government is invested fully in bringing some of those chips' manufacturing in-house.

DR. DORFF

I just thought of two examples, though. Back in New Hampshire where I'm currently from, we had the hand sanitizer crisis. We had breweries that converted—I think they were really hard liquor breweries. When sales were down in all the bars and everything else, they converted to making hand sanitizer because what they had on hand was capable of flipping pretty quickly. The other one was toilet paper. New Hampshire has a lot of paper manufacturers. When that gap started showing up, they managed to change their production lines to get the product out there because the demand was very high, and the need was there. It may be frivolous in some respects, but I think it does show that there's a certain amount of agility in some

companies, and, if the demand is there and especially if it's a crisis demand, that ability to flip rather quickly to address it was there. The one thought I had—it's less of a government intervention into the global economy and more of an intervention into itself to shake up the supply chains. Right now, government program managers, when they purchase a product, don't get rewarded whether the product works or not. They get rewarded whether that product actually just gets out the door, right? Did you spend all of your money on that product to get it out the door? Maybe we should have the government look at itself and say, all right, did you spend the money, did the product get out the door, and did it work all right? That's the third part of that that's just not being asked. I think that could shake things up.

DR. GREZGORZEWSKI

I'll add one more thing to what has been said already about learning, relearning. Companies are always thinking about first of the month, first to the market. We don't think about the security; we just throw things out there during the development process. We don't care if there's a bug; we just need to get to the market before our competitors, and then we'll fix the problem. So, we need to start thinking more strategically, and then, from a national security perspective, say stop the stuff that could get us in trouble. So, we need to make sure it's working properly. But that's the nature of business—it's first to the market and security comes second.

DR. DORFF

And a classic example of that when we all heard cases where companies scammed the system of the employer. I forget what it was called now, but they got a lot of money for employees that they didn't have, and I guess the opportunities that some businesses respond to are the ones that a little more nefarious businesses respond to, as well.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentations.]

11

It's a Jungle Out There: The Growing Threat of Environmental Crimes to National Security

Moderator:

- Michele Devlin, PhD., RN, EMT

Panelists:

- Michele Devlin, PhD.
- José de Arimatéia da Cruz, PhD.
- Abubakarr Jalloh, PhD.

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

DR. MICHELE DEVLIN

I'm really thrilled to be able to have this conversation this afternoon with you folks in the audience and our cadets and then with my wonderful dear colleagues that I've known for quite a while. So, this is Dr. Abubakarr Jalloh, who is an assistant professor of Global Public Health at Hollins University in Hollins, Virginia, and he's done a significant work in the global health field and refugee field and a tremendous amount of work with the United Nations. And then my dear brother in arms here, Dr. Jose Da Cruz, who is my colleague at the U.S. Army War College. So, he is a specialist in a lot of the underworld issues that we need to be aware of from a securities standpoint and how they affect human population. So, what we wanted to

do this afternoon for just a little bit before you all take off is share some of the impact that we're seeing from an environmental security standpoint and how it's impacting human populations and then, ultimately, regional, national, and global security issues. So, of course, it's all tied in, and I think a lot of times, well I can tell you for sure from the U.S. Army standpoint, a lot of the military efforts right now when we focus on climate issues, a lot of the big priorities on climate at the strategic level are trying to minimize the carbon footprint of the military, itself, but then also doing a lot of work looking at buildings, at infrastructure and how military installations can survive increasingly severe disasters—all very important and something that we're all very concerned with. But this afternoon, while we have these conversations with you, we are actually looking at what we consider the fun side of climate change and looking at what it does to human populations. So, not buildings, not infrastructure, but really what we're seeing around the world globally and how human populations are impacted and what you all in the future as cadets are going to have to be dealing with, because, unfortunately, this is going to just increase in the future. So, it's really, really your world here. And with that, what we wanted to do was start with the topic of environmental crimes, and a lot of times environmental crimes don't even get talked about. Certainly in the U.S., we talk about it some in SOUTHCOM and what we're looking at in Latin America a bit, a little bit in Africa, but it often gets pushed way down to the bottom of the priorities when we talk about climate issues. We would like to see this elevated as a much more significant challenge. Part of the issue is that the overall field of environmental security is not well developed; it's relatively new, and it's like the field of health—it has so many sub-specialties. Again, you can be an engineer working on keeping buildings afloat from rising seas, or you can be doing refugee work on climate migrants and human migration and everything in between and the melting Arctic in Antarctica and the changing geopolitical world order. So, it's kind of everything in-between, and so, it's a very complex human security field, again, that impacts us both locally, regionally, and nationally, and, unfortunately, what we're seeing is that, with environmental security, there are very strong links to humans, to forced migration, conflict, poverty, trafficking, instability, war, and all kinds

of challenges like that. And, unfortunately, as climate change increases, we are seeing a lot of these human outcomes become more severe and to the point, again, that they are affecting us from a stability standpoint and will very much be within your wheelhouse in terms of what you all are going to be dealing with as you go on to become potentially senior officers in your militaries. So, to give you an idea, what I'm basically doing is setting up my colleagues here. I'm going to give you the big picture overview of environmental crimes; then I'm going to turn it over to Dr. Jalloh to talk about the case study from West Africa and Dr. da Cruz to talk about a case study from Brazil. So, you can kind of get into your head how this plays out real time in a country.

But when we're talking about environmental crimes, there are many of them—lots of different ways that this can look. It's certainly things like illegal mining, illegal deforestation, taking advantage of animals, wild animals. Wildlife trafficking is actually huge. It can relate to toxic dumping, pollution dumping. I think you heard the general at our earlier presentation who talked about basically what we bring in, we've got to take home and get rid of. You have all waste left over from many different operations. How are we dealing with that around the world? A lot of it is legal; a lot of it is not being taken care of legally, and what actually happens to that and on a large scale? How can that damage a region? We're definitely seeing major challenges with overfishing and crossing into boundaries and economic zones where illegal fishing should not be happening on a large scale and the potential militarization of these fishing vessels and fishing fleets and use for dual purpose reasons, like surveillance, having them militarized, as well as fishing. We're seeing a lot of challenges from the People's Republic of China and other countries, actually, where this is really happening a lot. And then also murder, kidnapping, assault crimes against the individuals that fight against these environmental crimes. So, murders for instance against indigenous populations, indigenous activists, local people trying to protect their land, their forests, their community, their oceans, and then being targeted potentially by organized syndicates, cartels, governments, in some cases, and having a very personal human security impact on them. But actually seeing environmental crimes, in terms of the revenue they're

rapidly generating, are growing at about seven percent a year, which averages out to two to three times the growth rate of the overall global economy. So, this is very often an underground black market economy—lots of money, lots of victims, lots of customers, lots of potential for the weaponization of environmental insecurity, and, in fact, what we're seeing is the growth is so significant that it now is not just the fourth overall source of revenue globally from illegal operations, but it's actually very quickly becoming the leading source of revenue for non-state criminal actor organizations around the world. So, trillions of dollars are involved with this, and, again, the people that are typically preyed upon tend to be those that are often on lower socioeconomic levels. They're not always minorities within those communities that could be cultural, racial, ethnic minorities. We certainly see women get involved in this, and indigenous groups, in particular, can very often be the victims, and it can involve the people actually doing this. It can range from—we're not talking about individual acts; we're talking about larger scale environmental crimes, typically cartels, TCOs, the transactional criminal organizations that some of you are probably going to be involved with for work. Violent extremist organizations—VEOs—as well as potentially government officials, police officials sometimes, people in power within those regions of those countries as well as potentially neighboring countries, neighboring leaders from other places are involved in making a lot of money off the destruction of the environment, and, of course, this does impact us around the globe. It creates instability not just in that area where it's happening, but within the broader country, within a broader region. I've done a lot of work on climate migrants, climate refugees we were talking about earlier. We're increasingly seeing migration amplified by climate, and if you back it up a few steps, amplified by this kind of stuff going on—environmental crimes, the environmental destruction of an area between climate change, and then the cartels or the groups come in prey upon that area. The people do end up leaving, migrating. Some of them wind up, for instance, on our southern border in the U.S. There are significant links to these types of issues. So, you're really seeing this amplify a lot of the migration. It impacts the local economy. That's illegal money that could have been staying within that local community to better develop

the local economy. It's going out into criminal organizations, creating a lot of environmental insecurity and stability. It's amplified by climate, but it's also contributing to worse climate change. Think of the case of illegal, large third scale deforestation let's say in the Amazon. That's contributing to many more climate challenges that we didn't have before, and, again, ultimately really impacting peace, stability, and prosperity within the region. And I would encourage people to start thinking about it—that's not just a local thing going on with some criminal groups, and who cares, and we don't really see the picture. This stuff is linked. A lot of these criminal networks are linked to other countries, to other continents. It does affect all of us, in addition to pure and simple destroying our planet's ecosystem. So, with that, I will change it over to Dr. Abubakarr Jalloh to talk about his experience and programming here in West Africa, Sierra Leone.

DR. ABUBAKARR JALLOH

Thank you so much, Dr. Devlin, for that amazing overview that actually makes my job much easier. You've touched on most of the stuff that actually I'm going to talk about today.

I'm going to talk about two of the key points Dr. Devlin just mentioned—illegal fishing and illegal logging. This is a very serious problem within Sierra Leone, but also within the West Africa region, itself. Most of you here probably already know where Sierra Leone is. I try to do my best graphic here by pointing that huge purple arrow there, but it's a very small, tiny West African country of over maybe six to seven million people, but the beauty of Sierra Leone is it's very tropical. We are right on the Atlantic on the equatorial, so, as you can imagine, we have a lot of forest, a lot of jungles, and then, of course, we are very blessed with sea marine life and all that kind of stuff. So, when I start talking about illegal logging and fishing, you may probably see the reason why those are very serious issues, and, of course, [garbled] with West Africa which is closer to Guinea, Liberia, and some of the countries around there.

So, let's start with illegal logging. We can see from those images that this is a multi-billion-dollar industry, but, sadly, it doesn't benefit the country because of the crimes that are actually occurring within that

structure. We've had this conversation already, especially our speaker this morning from South Africa talked a lot about the East-West sort of narrative, the East-West competition within the continent. Well, of course, China is striving very well within the continent, itself. So, when it comes to illegal logging of our timber because of the global demand of housing and all that kind of stuff, China has been growing rapidly, s0 they need to get some of those resources from certain places, and Africa is the place where they're trying to extract some of these resources. But unfortunately, they don't always do this through legal means because sometimes when you do true legal means, there's a lot of roadblocks, a lot you have to pay to many different officials to get through that. Because of that, there's a lot of demand, not only from China, but also globally, but we do know the Chinese are usually the top culprit when it comes to this aspect of illegally mining some of these logs. But as Dr. Devlin just mentioned here, again, we are talking about economics, right? So, some of these illegal happenings are actually depriving countries of billions of dollars that could have been used for local economies to improve infrastructure and things like that. But for Sierra Leone, specifically, it's a very small country but yet still you're talking about millions of dollars that actually are illegally going to another country because somebody's logging, and that, of course, does not fall within the rate of the officials or rate of the government. It's only transnational criminals that are doing this. Again, tying back to what Dr. Devlin was saying, the reason why this is a very serious national (also regional) challenge is because there's multiple players involved. Not only local people or the Chinese, but also criminal networks within Sierra Leone, within West Africa that also transport towards east, south, central Africa and things like that. So, again, foreign actors are involved. I know we always like to blame it on the Chinese, but there's also other players that are not only the Chinese that are involved in this kind of play but, of course, Mafia-style groups. I will give you a little bit of an example.

But going back to environmental health and climate migration and then how this ties into the whole narration of refugee migration, well, one of the saddest things as we do know, when you deforest the forest, there tends to be what we call repercussions on people. So, one major example

that happened in Sierra Leone in addition to the Ebola outbreak that we had about five years ago that killed a lot of people, but, also, we've had civil wars. But one additional thing right now the country is really, really struggling with is climate change, because we're right on the north Atlantic and we're heavily forested, but also we have only two seasons, rainy season and dry season. We have a monsoon season where it rains literally six months non-stop. So, when the forest is deforested, if you know anything about geology or soil patterns, you know it creates a problem of erosion. So, whenever there's serious heavy rain, what ends up happening is, it creates a disaster. One example that we saw here is in 2017, when they experienced a mudslide, because, as you can see from the mountain there, half of it is almost gone. People were already building up there, taking out woods and logging to create space. What we did have as a result of a whole week of non-stop rain was a significant mudslide that left, I think, over a thousand people dead, over 3,000 people displaced, and those people have to find a place to go. And this also relates to internal displacement, which also eventually resulted in people looking for greater pastures outside of the country, itself.

And just moving forward, the next other major challenge that we have is overfishing, and this is also a main source not only for Sierra Leone, but also, again, this ties to the whole notion of the Chinese. One more time, here we are seeing a lot of Chinese trawlers that are illegally actually mining in the water. There has actually been recent studies also looking even at Vietnamese trawlers now beginning to show up in those waters, and this has also created a significant economic burden. This is also money that is leaving West Africa—over 2.3 billion dollars, and it's also an estimate, not actual figures. But studies have shown that the number could be much higher than that. And then for Sierra Leone, this also accounts for a multi-million-dollar industry, money that could have been used to develop the economy. But when you talk about security, as you can see from that picture, this was actually an illegal Chinese trawler that was actually interrupted by the Sierra Leone military. So, it has become a significant burden of the Sierra Leone Naval Base because now they have to constantly monitor the waters, constantly patrol the seas to try to ensure they can intercept these illegal trawlers, but it's not always successful, as you will see here in a little bit.

Why? In Sierra Leone, for example, in 2015 alone, over eighty vessels were discovered to be illegally fishing within the waters of the country, itself. And what makes this complicated is because this goes even much deeper, which I will talk about here in a little bit.

So, for example, you could see here the impact of local economies. Michelle mentioned about indigenous. We have a lot of tribes, a lot of ethnic groups. There's so many people in our country that rely on the resources of the forest but also the resources that come from the sea. So, when you illegally overfish these areas, that disrupts the livelihood of this community because there's not enough fish, for example, to fish as a result of overfishing. I wish we had plenty of time. There's a lot of documentaries actually done by Sierra Leone showing the real-life impact of local fishermen. They said that five years ago, ten years ago, they used to catch maybe tons of fish, but now the fish are disappearing because of this illegal overfishing. It's creating a significant burden on local communities in terms of not only sustenance, but also in terms of their own economy. The other thing, an example of which we see with the river, is where people rely on it not only for cooking, but also washing, but also they rely on the water for drinking. But, unfortunately, because of the illegal mine that is happening at the Moa River, one of the biggest rivers in my country that borders Liberia and Sierra Leone and that many communities rely on for water to drink, water to shower, water to do their domestic housework, it has been polluted significantly to the point where local communities no longer have access to that water. So, now you're starting to talk about what our security is in those communities. That's the image right there. You can just see the color of the water there even though the image is not that big, but the other thing also that you see is fish. My country is a very poor country when it comes to diet. We don't have much option. We rely more on marine life as opposed to animals like goats, cows, and things like that. We don't have much of that. So, people rely more on fish for protein. So, you can imagine when the fish have been depleted, it doesn't only affect the economy, alone, but also affects the dietary and nutrient necessary for these families to thrive in the societies. It's become a major serious problem, but also most of this community is relying on this fishing for their own local sustenance, which

also has been depleted. But the other thing also I think Michelle mentioned earlier about the overfishing, because then that depletes the community but also it becomes lots of food and lots of income for these communities, but the other thing also is now somebody's coming and they've been forced to move out of their community. If your water is polluted and then you don't have enough fish to eat, you have to move to the next best possible location, and that leads to what we call internal displacement. But because my country is very poor, some people are forced to even leave the country. They are forced to go abroad either to Guinea or to Liberia, which also are experiencing a similar problem. So, the next step will be maybe looking for another place far up north and of course the other thing that you also see now is they are using some of these dangerous journeys. If they go to Liberia, the same problem is there. If they go to Guinea, same problem. Now they start looking for what may be the best next option, which might be to go to Europe. And going to Europe, if you've been following the migrations happening within the Mediterranean Sea crossing into Europe, tons and tons of people are dying because they are using all these boats that are not necessarily built to transport migrants. So, now you're talking about the first migration that's resulting in the deaths of illegal immigrants, but also not only going to Europe but also trying to find pathways coming to the United States.

There's been a lot of news recently following what's happening on the southern border. Surprisingly for me, it's not a surprise, but apparently for some of the Mexicans or some maybe U.S. Border Security. Africans now from West Africa are making these dangerous journeys through the Sahel, making it somewhere to Latin America, and then from there following the caravan to come to the United States. So, something that starts locally is eventually forcing these individuals to look for much greener pastures, which also is much more dangerous. And then the implication for national security here. This is rampant not only in West Africa; it's a very serious major problem but also you could see lots of biodiversity thinking about climate change and the impact how that what doesn't happen in our environment.

We talk about the Amazon all the time about how the depletion of the Amazon has a major climate impact globally but also biodiversity. West

Africa is very well known for so much biodiversity within the sea, but also within the jungles and the forest. So, when you illegally fish but you also do this illegal logging, we also are forcing species from different areas to actually migrate. Everything just dies out. But the other thing also, you can see also climate change. I'm not going to talk too much about that because Dr. Devlin already hinted on that, but I mentioned the Chinese trawler was actually spotted on one of the highest seas in Sierra Leone. It had a Chinese flag to pretend as if it was legal. These are some of the tactics they use; they fly these flags, so you assume oh maybe they may have a product from the government if they fly a flag, but it's just a cover. But ultimately, when you have transnational crime, because a lot of people are involved, one thing you will see, Dr. Devlin mentioned, is even the government is involved in these kinds of things that are happening. That's why [garbled] because often you're talking about billions of dollars. So, government officials even are involved.

For example, two years ago, there was an investigation journalist that actually in terms of the illegal logging tracked these deals all the way into the vice president's office of the country, itself. So, it's a lot of money involved. It's a lot of issues involved, so it becomes much more challenging even for national security in terms of putting plans in place to address some of these issues.

And again, timber trafficking has fueled civil wars conflict across the region. One major example some of you may know is the famous war that happened in Liberia in the late '80s that migrated into Sierra Leone. Actually, if you know anything about Charles Taylor who was actually the Liberian warlord, apparently there's been a lot of studies that have shown initially it was the illegal timber logging that was found in the area. Some of the money from the Liberia Liberation fund was used to eventually sponsor the Sierra Leone Rebel group, the RAF. So, of course, someone who is illegally logging doesn't always stay to enrich some of his [garbled] but also uses this to funnel and fund instabilities in countries. So, now we talk a lot about mining, but illegal logging also significantly funds somebody's transnational criminal networks, and that is all I have here.

DR. JOSÉ DA CRUZ

I need to make two disclaimers. One is this is my personal view, of course. And the second one is I'm neither an apologist, nor am I an anti-Bolson- Arista. So, what I'm going to talk about is essentially what's happened in the country, because I've given a talk on this issue of deforestation, and somebody in the audience came very close to throwing something at me and saying, "You are anti Bolsonaro. And I'm going like, "No, I'm not. I say no. I'm a Brazilian citizen. I was born in Brazil, but I'm a U.S. citizen by naturalization. So, this is my country. I've lived most of my life here. So, I had to explain to them that what I'm going to tell you is what's happening in our country that deserves the attention of the international community and especially from a national security perspective. So, those are two things just to keep in mind. Take a look at this report by the OCCRP. "As environmental crimes destroyed Amazon, Brazil fails to act." I mean I partially agree with that statement, because we have from 1964 to about 1989 when we had the Brazilian military dictatorship, the purpose of the military was to really transform the Amazon into this kind of economic development to develop the region and bring the indigenous population to the larger population. Unfortunately, the so-called project, military project, really, didn't lead to anything. If you go to the Amazon today, most of the projects that were started by the military have not been completed, especially when it comes to the railroad. But, on the other hand, the military did leave a massive catastrophe in the country. And when I say the military, I served in the Brazilian military, so I was not one of those guys. So, the disclaimer again. But, yes, we have failed to protect the Amazon.

We have failed to protect what many people consider to be the lung of the world, and this is something just for you to read, and I'll just kind of summarize. The Institute Igarape, which is one of the most famous institutes in Brazil, is a think tank compose of conservatives and liberals, so it's a mumbo jumbo of people, and they have a tendency to release really good studies. So, for those of you that are interested in this topic, I highly recommend this website. And as you can see over there where they have painted a very good picture, the environmental crime that's taking place in Brazil has not just been done by transnational organized crime. And

when we talk about transnational organized crime, we also have to talk about the criminal organizations within Brazil. We have primarily three of them. We have the PCC, which is the first command of the capital, which is located in Sao Paulo. And then we have the CV, which is the red command, which controls most of the gang activities within Rio. And then we have what's called The Friends of Friends, which is just a criminal organization that's heavily located in Rio. All three organizations, in conjunction with transnational organized crime, have done a tremendous job in the Amazon. And our federal police, which my brother is part of, is underfunded, under-armed, and those criminal organizations have more power than the federal police. So, they have been able to do pretty much whatever they want and whatever they can, and within the last four years, and this is where I'm going to criticize a former president, Bolsonaro, who took a hands-off approach toward the Amazon. He essentially reduced the budget even more from the federal police. He did away with most of the inspection of illegal logging, mining, and cattle ranching. So, the Amazon within the past four years has seen tremendous deterioration, deforestation, and we're beginning to see now the new government of Lula da Silva tried to remedy some of those previous incidents. So, this is very important for you to keep in mind, and again, it is a top priority for the new government of Brazil. He is very concerned about the consequences, not only to the world in terms of the deforestation of the region, but also for illegal mining, illegal logging and then also this is an area of Brazil that's heavily populated by our indigenous population. This is where the indigenous population of Brazil is located. So, there has been a lot of damage done to that population, especially the Yanomami. If you read any newspaper or the economists, you see a lot of that being reported, and you can see that the ecosystem of fraud, government corruption, and tax and financial crimes are interconnected. So, you begin to see all of this coming together. And again, this is not a criticism of the previous administration, but there was an incident in which there were millions of dollars of illegal logging, and for the first time in the history of the country, the Minister of the Environment actually flew from Brasilia to the Amazon to make sure that illegal logging was able to go through to its final destination, And everybody was kind of surprised, saying, "What the

hell is the Minister of the Environment doing over here, because this is an issue that the federal police should be dealing with." Well, he said that he had the authority to do it, so the trucks full of illegal logging were let go. A couple of months later, we come to find out that there's a scheme that he was the head of. So, you can see this kind of activity taking place not only in Sierra Leone, but also in Brazil in which you have transnational organized crime, local organized crime, and also politicians that have been essentially bought by transnational organized crime. One of the things that we're seeing quite often, too, is that politicians, when they run for office, most of the resources that they use for their finance and everything else come from illegal money, and some of those individuals have been in powerful positions like our former Minister of the Environment. So, this is just something for you to see. Other things over there—you can see how much Brazil has lost in terms of acres for primary farming. I think most of you will probably read that information, and, again, crime, of course—this was alluded to early in the presentation—is associated with illegal logging, mining, and other illicit activities in the Amazon, and it's also been felt in twenty-four of the twenty-seven states within the country. So, the spread of illegal activity is actually sort of interconnected and interdependent with other criminal organizations in several different places because you get the product from one place from point A to point B and then we get to the final destination. Then there are other folks that are involved directly or indirectly in the distribution of it. I always tell my brother that I'm proud of him for doing this. The federal police now under the new administration have taken a more proactive action in regards to the environmental degradation, illegal logging, and environmental crime. The resources that were taken away are finally returning back to the federal police, so they're able to do more, and the new Minister of the Environment has given total authority to the federal police to investigate, prosecute, and arrest those individuals. So, that's a very positive sign. And you can see some of this stuff over there. Nearly half of the police operation investigates crime and protects areas of the environment, including the indigenous population. As I mentioned earlier today, this is a part of Brazil in which we have a huge indigenous population, and those are the people that are being mostly impacted. We often hear about the

Yanomami indigenous tribe, which is located in the state of Roraima, which is a major state within the Amazon. We have two types of Amazon. We have the legal Amazon and this indigenous population is concentrated within the legal Amazon, which is an area protected, or should be protected, by the federal government. They're the ones being impacted quite often. We also have the Munduruku indigenous tribe that you don't hear very much about, but they've also been heavily impacted in the state of Parana. We also have the Sete de Setembro indigenous population, as well, and you can see some of the damage that's been done to more than just the environment, but also to this indigenous population. and this is just a couple of things for you to see. This is illegal logging and gold mining taking place. The next three slides are pictures s0 you can see the damage. This was the illegal logging. You can see there was an arrest. There's just one picture of the truck, and this is the one that our Minister of the Environment said, "Hang on. Nothing happens until I get there." And then when he got there eventually, every one of those trucks that were there, and this is the federal police over there, and it was basically let go, unfortunately.

But the other thing that we have is illegal mining. And this was several small little boats there coming off the tributary of the Amazon that were conducting some illegal activity So, the federal police arrested them. You can see the federal police airplane flying over doing a recon of the area. So, this is becoming more and more of a problem for not only for Brazil, but also has tremendous environmental implications for the entire region of South America.

DR. DEVLIN

It's interesting in both these cases what we're seeing with a lot of the environmental crime issues. The groups committing them are very much the groups that typically are also committing human trafficking—the sex trafficking, labor trafficking, and weapons trafficking. It all goes together, and so, they know how to operate these programs and these types of things very well, very easily. They're making multi-trillion dollars off this stuff, and what they're finding is that you often have less opposition even though we know that humans do become victims of this. We talked about how and

why on the surface you've got trees, rivers, fish, animals, exotic animals, and others that are basically voiceless and can't really protest, so it's less risk to these criminal groups to actually operate these types of things. It's less likely that you're going to have large-scale operations against them. It's a little bit safer than having a ton of women that you're trafficking or young girls or lots of arms, although, again, they tend to do a lot of this stuff altogether. So, yes, we would definitely encourage you, and especially you folks that are going into military careers, this is going to be more and more of your operational situations that you're seeing, and, again, when we talk about climate, it goes far more than just issues with infrastructure and military bases falling apart because of hurricanes. This is stuff that's a lot messier to deal with.

DR. DA CRUZ

I was just going to say I just came back. For three weeks, I took our IAF foreign international fellow students to SOUTHCOM and met with General Richardson, and one of the things that they emphasize in every single meeting that we had was pay attention to the interconnection between international organized crime and national security. Pay attention to this, because this is becoming extremely important in the new operational environment that most of you guys are going to have to work in.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I'm from the Republic of Georgia. I'm learning in National Defense Academy on defense and security, and my question is related to environmental security. What countermeasures can be taken to reduce these kinds of crimes against our environment.

DR. JALLOH

I always like to call this question like the billion-dollar elephant in the room. I think we'll actually have this conversation throughout this session. It's very challenging to address some of these issues, but especially when you talk about environmental crimes, because, as you can see, the players are very complex players. Even the governments are involved in these kinds of

issues. So, how do you go about resolving some of these problems? I think, at least coming from the African context, if you remember, the major who spoke this morning from South Africa mentioned something about good governance and political will, and I always challenge even my own African people that it has to be us that voice—that we have to start electing leaders that actually are there for the people. So, as I mentioned, somebody's crimes go all the way deeper, even all the way to the vice president's office. So, how can you trickle that to the police or even the law enforcement to do anything? That's not going to happen. So, I think maybe starting from talking about these issues, bringing them to the forefront, even international partners, maybe make this a strategic priority when they are funding somebody's governments—I think if we start from that political side of things, good governance and political will, I think that's where, because we are talking about systemic problems. So, at least from an African perspective, I do believe we need to start infiltrating somebody's offices, these higher-level officials, because if we can get them to stop practicing some of these things, like Jose mentioned, even in Brazil you even have a minister who was actually part of this crime. So, if we can start thinking about our leaders and try to change it from the top, I think that will go a long way. But we cannot do that without having that awareness in the conversation first.

DR. DEVLIN

Absolutely, absolutely, and it is such a great question. To follow up on what Dr. Jalloh mentioned, awareness of this as an issue is not talked about enough. It's not looked at enough, even though we have troops that daily are ending up engaging with the results of this is a big issue, and I'm not sure to what level you've had training yet or education on this. In the War College, we use models called "the dime" or "midfield." It's basically strategies other than military strategies to try to address strategic security challenges. So, economic development can help. If we can shift some money up front into more humanitarian aid, economic development. As communities rise in income, they tend to be less susceptible to this kind of nonsense and dangerous issues that are going on, so that's also important.

DR. DA CRUZ

I agree. I think we need to think of it. I always think about Bolivia, for example, if you go into Bolivia and try to eradicate a cocaine plantation. Well, for many people that's their livelihood. So, you have to find an alternative means for them to survive. So, in the case of Brazil, I think that's important and also education. There's a lot more to gain from preserving the Amazon in terms of ecotourism than from destroying it, but for somebody who is concerned about where the next meal is coming from, they don't care about that. They're concerned about what their next meal is. So, there needs to be sort of an educational process that was already stated here. So, I think those are priorities in education. We also need to pay attention, which is hard to do within the context of the Americas, but pay attention to the kind of politician that we're electing. But as some of you from Latin America know, we have a tendency to suffer from political schizophrenia. We have a tendency to vote somebody out one year, and two days later they're back in the office because the crime that they committed we forgot about. So, I think that's very important. So, I think education is extremely important within this context.

DR. DEVLIN

And it gets to this issue, too, and again, I don't know to what level you've had training yet on this issue, but you may have heard of "civmil" relationships—civilian-military relationships. It will be critical to help address these kinds of issues, particularly with indigenous populations in communities. They are disproportionately impacted as the victims of these crimes on a large scale. They tend to be, not always, but tend to be brilliant keepers of their natural resources, and they're certainly sensors. They certainly see things, hear things, know things that may be going on that can be acted upon for protection. Some of them have become armed, frankly, fighting some of the encroachment upon their land and their resources, but to the extent that for security we can partner more effectively with indigenous groups impacted by these crimes, that can help a lot, too. So, again, I think any of you that may have an interest in civil affairs, community relations, those are fascinating careers to get into within the security field, and we need you, really, no matter what your backgrounds are.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I'm fourth year Cadet Mateo Castro Rivera from Argentina. So, in the presentation I saw, we have all those problems. All of them. And I think there is a dilemma, especially for the less developed countries where these activities can help the economy but then, they, as well, are not good for the environment. So, there's always this dilemma, again, that some people go against the environment, but they want to help the economy, and then the others that prefer to keep the environment and go against the economy. So, what would you propose for getting a midpoint for a solution for this, because I see it is common in every country. They can be bigger or smaller, but it happens everywhere.

DR. DA CRUZ

I agree with you, but I think we have to look at this as a non-zero-sum game. It doesn't mean that in order to have economic development you have to destroy your natural habitat. There has to be a commonality, a way to protect and yet have economic development. So, in the case of ecotourism, I think of certain countries around the world. In Africa, Kenya, for example, has a lot to gain by protecting their natural environment and making a lot more money in terms of ecotourism. I think the case of Brazil is a good example of how many people now would not want to go to "the lung of the world" while it still exists. So, I think if the government if the Brazilian government strikes a balance between economic development and preservation of the environment, I think there's a lot more to gain. So, it's not a zero-sum game that you have with economic development that brings destruction versus the protection of the environment at the cost of economic development.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentations.]

12

The Growing Threat of Environmental Crimes to National Security: Antarctica

Moderator:

- Michele Devlin, PhD., RN, EMT

Panelists:

- Michele Devlin, PhD.
- Colonel Davin Bridges, PhD.
- Lt. Colonel Shannon Thompson
- Lt. Colonel Deborah Fisher, PhD.
- Lt. Colonel Jeremy Nelson

As presented at the 2023 Human Security Challenges Symposium
Hosted by the Institute for Leadership and Strategic Studies
University of North Georgia

DR. MICHELE DEVLIN

We're going to continue this conversation about the issue of the nexus between environmental security, climate change, human populations, human security, and how all of that plays into national and global stability, peace, security, and conflict. What we want to do now is give you a take on how this plays out in another region of the world. So, you've heard a little bit about this in West Africa. You heard about in Brazil. Now we're going to take you way up to the north to the Arctic, as well as the south with Antarctica, by sharing with you some of the work that our Army War College students are conducting. Let me introduce you please to four of our excellent US Army War College students: Colonels Davin Bridges, Jeremy Nelson,

Shannon Thompson, and Deborah Fisher. None of them are Engineers, and yet they are all working on climate issues. They are exploring the field of environmental security from a social science standpoint. In other words, they are looking at the impact of climate on human populations in the polar regions, and the nexus to global security issues.

As an introduction to this, it's very important for you to understand from a climate standpoint that the polar regions are critical to global security. Antarctic is warming three times faster than anywhere else on earth. It's an entire continent that's thawing. However, if you at many maps, the continent is not even shown. That is because those maps are out of date by climate standards, and do not accurately reflect the level of geopolitical interest now in that remote part of the world. In the northern polar region, the Arctic Ocean is surrounded by eight countries. The circumpolar north is warming four to seven times faster than anywhere else on Earth. The northern polar region is believed to have 15 percent of the world's untapped oil and 30 percent of the gas, along with significant deposits of rare earth minerals and fisheries. New sea routes are melting and becoming possible in the near future, thereby creating an increase in geopolitical competition by the US, China, Russia, and other nations. So the polar regions are now increasingly important from a global security perspective, due to greater accessibility to them from a warming world. So, with that, I'm going to turn it over to each of our four War College colonels.

COL. DAVID BRIDGES

Good afternoon. My name is David Bridges. I am active army. I am an environmental science and engineering officer So, I'm medical service for this group here. And I have the privilege of starting off our section in this wonderful symposium on our very important topic of how human populations in the Arctic are impacted by climate and what that means from a security standpoint. I'll quickly go over why this is a national environmental security issue, speak on a few climate facts that Michelle has just talked about, migrants and population in the Arctic, and the challenges in the Arctic.

So, this is a U.S. national interest issue. President Biden stated in the National Security Strategy that climate issues are a shared world challenge

that crosses all borders. The White House even wrote a national strategy for the Arctic region in which President Biden's vision is a peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative Arctic region. Now, environmental security and instability and environmental factors have been a concern since the mid- and latter 20th century. Global climate change is undeniable and is impacting security and humanitarian efforts across the globe. This could lead to civil discord, forcing the U.S. to intervene at home and abroad, affecting domestic stability and U.S. strategic alliances. Now, like Michelle was talking about, the Arctic sea ice is deteriorating each decade by three to four percent over the last thirty years, with ice melting faster than previous climate change projection models. This makes this region more accessible to strategic and economic competition. What they're doing is fighting for resources. Now, there's only four million people living in the entire Arctic, so there's a significant labor shortage in the circumpolar world. Northern Alaska is particularly very short on people. So, climate change, changes in the demographic makeup, financial incentives in developing countries are driving human migration towards developed countries like the U.S. People tend to relocate to areas where there's more jobs and opportunities. So, in terms of the U.S. Arctic area, because of the growing need for labor with the new gold rush, more migrants are coming to the Arctic to work from other parts to Alaska and the lower forty-eight states. However, even more migrants are coming to work in the Arctic today from areas like the Pacific Islands, Asia, and the world regions. Migration patterns, epidemiology, fertility and growth rate, settlement structures, and populations vary significantly in the Arctic region, including the indigenous and the non-indigenous people. The residents of North America and the North Atlantic Arctics, such as Alaska, the three Canadian Northern Territories, Iceland, Northern Region Arctic, have increased their populations considerably since 1990 to 2018. Currently, there are approximately forty languages spoken on the northern slope of Alaska, primarily due to immigrant workers. The region is predominantly white and Indigenous, but between 2010 to 2020, there's been a 72 percent increase in the black population, 120 percent increase in Hispanics. The Asian population has increased by 51 percent. Pacific Islanders have grown by 209 percent. So, as the planet continues to

warm, the world will likely see increased climate migration from equatorial countries and mid-latitude countries into both polar regions as laborers. Conflict and climate fluctuations in developing countries will aggravate and it'll just get worse. The movement will go further and further into those areas. So, these countries are pushing people out of the parts of the world where there's devastation. They need to find jobs, and the high salaries and the low-density Arctic are pulling migrants in. Climate change and the impacts on the environment are inevitable and enduring. With the melting of permafrost, like Michelle said earlier, new industries moving into the Arctic region will create jobs for residents and the migrating labor force from outside the area. This growth is due to more accessible access routes to shipping, oil and gas, fishing, tourism, construction workers, hydropower. You can see there are tons and tons of jobs that are going to start developing up into the northern Alaskan area. This can contribute to new challenges and opportunities from a security and a socioeconomic and cultural standpoint in the Arctic in future decades. So, the U.S. needs to prepare for these challenges of the growth in population that's going to happen in the northern Arctic area which will determine the future of the U.S. national interest in the Arctic region.

COL. SHANNON THOMPSON

Dr. Bridges and I have been working together on the issue of future climate migration to the polar regions. Fundamentally, there are push and pull factors involved with human migration. What we came up with were push and pull factors that were going to either pull folks to the Arctic or push folks from their homelands towards the Arctic. My particular area that I was looking at was food security. And as climate changes, as the planet warms, and we start moving through the effects of climate change across the world, food security is going to be an issue that could likely push folks from places like sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, southeast Asia towards the cooler polar environments that are more able to grow crops. The global models currently say that, in the next hundred years, it is unlikely that the areas we currently consider to be the Arctic are going to be viable for agriculture in any significant sense. However, there is a region known

as the Boreal Region, basically the sub-arctic forest that is a huge portion of the world, a large band going across the Northern Hemisphere in Canada, United States, Alaska, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, particularly Russia, and that's important. I'll get there in a second. Those regions, as the planet warms more within the next hundred years, are going to start being able to be agriculturally viable, which means that countries that own land in the Boreal region are going to have vast expanses opened up for additional agriculture, particularly Russia, where 5.12 million square kilometers are expected to open up in the next one hundred years. And that's important in a geopolitical sense, and we can get there.

But flipping that around, places in sub-Saharan Africa around the equator, Central America, and Southeast Asia are going to experience potentially negative effects from climate change. So, their existing crop structures, their existing agricultural systems are going to struggle, and yields are going to decrease. Couple that with an expected population growth in all of those areas, and you have a dynamic that is going to create significant food insecurity in those regions. Those are largely agricultural regions with huge populations of people that have agricultural skill sets who are going to find that those skill sets are not as useful, and they're hungry, and they need opportunities as places open up in the Boreal Region. That's going to create a push-pull dynamic where the Boreal area like David said is looking for workforce, looking for labor that they don't have in order to run these wheat farms across these areas, and there's going to be agricultural expertise in parts of the world that are going to be looking to find opportunities elsewhere, creating a movement from those areas up north towards these regions.

Why is this important to the United States? Well, for one, we have a large portion of that Boreal Region in Alaska, and it's something for us to consider as we start experiencing that same dynamic within our own population, agricultural personnel looking for places to go to use that skill set up north. Large swaths of Alaska are going to become available for agricultural exploitation in the future. On a strategic perspective, as the United States starts to look towards the next hundred years, and the world map changes in terms of resources and countries' ability to feed

themselves, there are going to be geopolitical interests and opportunities for the United States to leverage this effect. Well, you can already see how Russia has utilized their wheat production to influence the rest of the world. There is some evidence to support that the Arab Spring within the Middle East and North Africa was largely impacted by Russian wheat harvests and their reluctance to export that for a particular period. When Arctic Russia gains 5.12 million square kilometers of wheat fields in the next one hundred years, that's just going to exacerbate their ability to influence other nations with food support, with food aid, with food exports. We need to recognize that that dynamic is going to exist, and countries that are particularly going to be vulnerable to food insecurity issues, North African countries, probably, are going to be more heavily reliant on Russian exports of food going forward, and that is going to impact geopolitical rations.

Another location that we're dealing with is in China. Southeast Asian countries are heavily reliant upon the Mekong Delta for their rice production, and it's reliant on the annual flood cycles of the Mekong Delta to be able to grow the rice to be able to feed their people. China has started damming up the northern parts of the Mekong Delta and controlling the flow into those Southeast Asian countries. That basically is a mechanism that China can use to force capitulation from those countries, if necessary, to be able to control their food production, and that's going to be exacerbated by climate change going forward in those Southeast Asian countries. So, the United States being able to recognize that these dynamics are going to exist and form international partnerships based off this could provide opportunities for the United States to leverage these climate change inevitabilities to our advantage.

LTC/DR. DEBORAH FISHER

As Dr. Devlin mentioned at the end of that last panel, the indigenous populations in some of these areas of the world have a lot to offer. So, the project that I'm going to share with you for a few minutes explores just that—how we can partner with indigenous populations in the northernmost Alaska territory to enhance our national security efforts. Throughout much of history, Western Society has disregarded the significance of the Arctic region

in global affairs. Recently, however, the Arctic has evolved into a critical area in which threats to U.S. national security intersect. America's great power competitors, China and Russia, have both oriented substantial resources and activities toward this northern zone while climate change continues to drastically reshape the environment. In protecting U.S. interests from these threats, the American High North plays a pivotal role. Acknowledging the challenges innate to the region, this project considers opportunities for enhanced relationships between Alaskan indigenous populations and U.S. security forces in the Arctic to work collaboratively on this vital national security mission. To establish context for these recommendations, let's first review some relevant characteristics of the Arctic.

The very term "Arctic" derives from the Greek "arktos," meaning bear, and that further relates to the verb "arkeo," meaning to ward off, defend, or be strong, all qualities required to exist in such harsh conditions. Representing nearly 10 percent of all inhabitants living above the Arctic Circle, indigenous peoples have thrived for millennia in this environment, a testament to their innovation and stamina. Yet, contemporary climate phenomena threaten this constancy. Melting sea ice and thawing permafrost cause infrastructure damage, increase the frequency of earthquakes, dispense rust into water sources, and upset fish migration patterns, all of which exponentially impact vulnerable indigenous communities. Furthermore, the increased warming is resulting in the emergence of new waterways across the polar region, facilitating access to the arctic's abundant sources of oil, natural gas, and rare earth minerals. Such a rich yield of resources has indisputably enticed both Russia and China to engage in the circumpolar north, subsequently resulting in the redrawing of the global battlefield and the dissolve of America's once secure northern frontier. Before we discuss opportunities for enhanced partnerships between the U.S. military and Arctic indigenous peoples, let's briefly consider two examples of successful efforts to connect with indigenous populations for national security initiatives.

First, following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, America's concern over defending Alaska from a Japanese invasion led to the formation of the Alaska Territorial Guard, or ATG. This force of unpaid volunteers, many of whom were of indigenous ethnicity, provided critical homeland defense in

the most remote regions of Alaska. Disbanded in 1947, the ATG morphed into the Alaska National Guard.

Second, the present-day Canadian Ranger Program constitutes a similar community-level domestic defense force, which conducts patrolling, intelligence-gathering, and search and rescue missions. Indigenous people, possessing unmatched Arctic proficiency and often motivated by a sense of service, comprise a significant portion of Canadian Ranger membership. These two precedents, then, can inform the development of programs and initiatives applicable to today's complex scenario in America's High North. Within this framework, then, we provide a sampling of recommendations for U.S. security forces to work more effectively with Alaskan indigenous peoples on U.S. national security efforts in the Arctic. The 2022 U.S. national strategy for the Arctic region provides the foundation from which these proposed courses of action stem. Additionally, other factors influence the development of our recommendations.

First, a theme of reciprocity permeates the proposals aimed at enhancing the American High North security posture, while concurrently offering compensation to the indigenous peoples for their participation, such as in the form of money, recognition, or opportunities. For example, conducting military engineering civic action programs (EnCAPs) in indigenous communities impacted by infrastructure failure could generate mutually beneficial and frequent civil-military engagements.

A second theme is centers on local and community interactions, recognizing the importance of personal relationships within indigenous societies. An unwavering investment of time and attention is paramount to growing these relationships. Utilizing military competition teams to participate in Arctic indigenous sporting events or employing military members to conduct Junior ROTC programs in fragile indigenous villages could facilitate the mutual exchange of skills and develop bonds of trust. And more formalized approaches, like instituting an Alaskan Ranger Program or incorporating indigenous trainers into military education, might institutionalize these partnerships into more enduring capabilities. Undoubtedly, challenges to adopting the many recommendations we pose exist. In an environment of perpetual funding constraints, obtaining

the required resources will be difficult. The remote regions of northern Alaska will complicate travel and communication, and cultivating mutual motivation among both the indigenous communities and the Department of Defense entities will be delicate and nuanced. Nevertheless, these projects are worth such investments and provide innovative solutions to enhancing security in America's High North. Alaskan indigenous peoples are, in fact, the original Winter Warriors and, as American citizens with an unmatched talent to thrive in the Arctic, they have much to teach U.S. military forces on strategies to bolster national security in remote extreme and harsh environments.

DR. DEVLIN

You just heard from three colonels from the War College who are working on projects looking at the impact of climate on environmental security on humans that actually live there or will live there or are moving there and that type of thing. Our final panelist, Colonel Nelson, is looking at the issue of the impact of climate, how it's changing the environment, and what does it mean for the troops. What does it mean for the military and different aspects of the military? Do we need to have different groups up in the Arctic eventually? So, on a topic we never thought we would even talk about fifty years ago, Colonel Nelson is looking at the issue of should we have Marines up in the melting Arctic Ocean.

LT COL NELSON

My name is Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Nelson. I'm a marine logistician and currently a student at the Army War College. I might be the only non-arctic expert presenting today, and I believe that's important to mention. First, since I'm not an expert, maybe take it easy on the questions, but second reason, the most important, ask the hard ones. Everybody is the U.S. military currently doesn't have significant Arctic knowledge or experience, and this includes our senior leaders. We may find ourselves briefing a senior military leader lacking that Arctic awareness, and they're simply uninformed. It'll be crucial to provide strategic context and take time to explain the unique Arctic operational environment. Having served in the

Marine Corps for twenty years now, I have only recently begun to think critically about the Arctic. Six months ago, I began to frame a proposal on the benefits and realistic employment of a marine Arctic regiment or similar unit capable of thriving and operating in the Arctic environment, specifically looking at NATO's High North. The Marine Corps dedicates a considerable amount of resources and training in order to win in any time and place, and I came to the conclusion that through enhanced presence and strengthened cooperative military-to-military partnerships, as well as using concepts that were envisioned for the Indo-Pacific against

our current Pacific threat, the Marine Corps and the Navy could be successful in the Arctic. So, in these next two and a half minutes, I'll quickly describe what others already probably know, but what I learned about the unique Arctic operational environment and what I would be inclined to provide a strategic leader to frame that problem, and then through this learning, why I believe the Marine Corps can effectively support maritime campaigns in the Arctic utilizing our current concepts.

I learned that the Arctic is changing, that the Arctic is a transformative environment. What was once an opportunity for cooperation is now a complex security situation. I learned that the Arctic has the potential to be the most opportunistic economic zone in the next fifty years, that increased access and future economic potential are primary motivators to Arctic competition. I learned the Arctic as a maritime domain, that unconventional Gray Zone actions that straddle commercial civilian/military activities can rapidly escalate or transition to conventional military conflict. I learned that increased maritime traffic creates greater demand for commercial interdiction, search and rescue, countering jurisdictional creep and Arctic encroachment, that determining the differences between aggressive fishing patterns or maybe malign activity requires pragmatic approach, proportionality, and judgment. I learned there's a demand for integrated deterrence and all-domain tools in the Arctic, specifically for NATO. Entrenchment, maritime investment, controversial doctrine, new deep water ports and piers have enabled a greater Russian force projection capability. I learned as the current trend continues, Russia will be the only non-NATO Arctic Nation, that China is slowly modifying the narrative to

an Open Access Zone not exclusive to the Arctic Eight. I learned a peaceful negotiation and cooperation are probably needed the most. There is currently no forum for important Arctic conversations. And I finally learned that strategic land power definitely has its critical role in the Arctic region, but the Navy and Marine Corps have specific force projection advantages in the maritime Arctic. And through this learning, the Marine Corps can support maritime campaigns in the Arctic utilizing our two current concepts, which are expositionary advanced based operations and littoral operations in a contested environment or short EABO and LOCE, and these concepts are predicated on the INDOPACOM and the pacing threat.

DR. DEVLIN

So, you can see, I think, between all of this, these case studies and human security and where climate impacts environmental security fits in. It very much is something we're looking at within the military now, within our present security situation. Climate is a threat multiplier.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

I'm Dr. Kevin Stringer. I'm from the Irregular War Center. I'm really excited about this direction of research. I've written several articles on Special Operations forces in the Arctic, and I would just encourage your research. Maybe I can offer two or three comments, Colonel Nelson. Force specialization. I'm in favor of it. Very interestingly, Army Special Forces has specialized a single company now. I found out about this two weeks ago in the Arctic region. Unheard of, given their normal deployment cycles, but that's with temp group. That might be interesting for some further exploration if you think about a Marine specialization. Colonel Fisher, indigenous engagement very supportive. Would encourage you all to look beyond Alaska. I was speaking to one of our Swedish colleagues three weeks ago about the Saami, which are not only in Sweden, but Finland. I typically get to review as an anonymous reviewer for JFQ, and while we see a lot of Arctic articles, I would encourage anyone who wants to write about Antarctica. I think there's a real deficit on Antarctica articles, whether it's law warfare, irregular warfare, similar things, but I think there's a lot to be said, and, at least, in that

publication, we see hardly any submissions. So, it's great work. We encourage you to continue because this is an important line of effort.

DR. DEVLIN

Thank you so much! Any other comments, thoughts? Are you ready for this Brave New World, cadets? What do you think? As cadets and younger commissioned officers, what are your thoughts? I mean, you've had two days of this mind-blowing, complex set of issues that you're going to be addressed with. It's harder today, it's harder in the future, I think, than what many of us dealt with when we were younger.

AUDIENCE MEMBER

So, for us, at least as a cadet from Argentina, we have problems in Antarctica with claims. We had a war forty-one years ago with Great Britain, and some of the concerns that there are now about those islands near Antarctica relates to claims. But I also want to add that in Argentina, there is an upcoming problem of water insecurity. The drinking water we use—sweet water, we call it—we're running out of it from glaciers. And in Antarctica, it's like a gold mine of fresh water and ice, literally.

DR. DEVLIN

It's fascinating, because when I left Ushuaia the other week for Antarctica, this issue came up. It's beautiful. You have an incredible country and Tierra del Fuego and all of that, but, yes, your glaciers are almost gone. It's terrible, but Antarctica's greatest resource is the 97 percent of the continent covered by freshwater ice, like gold with climate change.

DR. DA CRUZ

Don't forget Chile, as well. About three or four months ago, I don't know if you remember, the government of Chile or some members of the government actually had a meeting about establishing a greater presence in Antarctica. The Argentinian government was not happy with it and called the Chilean ambassador to ask some questions, and I don't know the outcome of it. So, it's something we need to pay attention to.

DR. TONY PFAFF

My job is to close out the conference. What I like about coming down here every year (this is I think my fourth or fifth time) is that this conference really does bring together a lot of scholars and practitioners, and it covers a range of conceptual and practical issues and topics associated with whatever the theme is—this time, of course, human security—in ways that engage a variety of global perspectives. So, I find that I learn a lot. I think the conversations are particularly rich, and I want to thank you for participating in them. I think what I would say is what we got out of this. What I would hope we took away out of this conference is, first, the importance of taking human security concerns into account when developing and seeking security outcomes. We also learned how we can better do that, and particularly what that means for how we have to rethink not just how we might apply military measures or military capabilities, but also civil ones, as well, and in doing so, we also got, particularly today, I think, a much better understanding of the complexity of these issues and what it would actually take to address and solve them, and how we connect to things we normally don't associate with national-level security, such as illicit activities, crimes, as well as logistics and supply chain problems, and how that, if we don't solve those, we may not be able to solve many of the other problems that are coming up. So, I hope you guys got a lot out of this. Again, thank you for participating. I'd also like to say a special thank you to the folks in University of North Georgia faculty and staff who have been great hosts. A little round of applause. And, on and on that cheerful note, I declare the conference closed.

[See Appendix for corresponding PowerPoint presentations.]

Appendix

Hope as a Catalyst for Human Security

Dr. Volker Franke




USAID
HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE
Building Collaborative Resilience for Youth in Liberia
FRIENDS
Our human compassion binds us the one to the other – not in pity or patronizingly, but as human beings who have learnt how to turn our common suffering into hope for the future.
- Nelson Mandela
Hope is "the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired goals and to motivate oneself via agency thinking to use those pathways."


For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution?
economic
political
food
Human Security
community
health
personal
environ-mental
Dignity

New Threats to Human Security

- Climate change
- The downsides of digital technology
- Violent conflict
- Challenges to healthcare systems

Most people in the world feel insecure:

- Fewer than 1 in 7 people at the global level feel secure or relatively secure.
- More than half of the global population feels affected by very high human insecurity

Source: World Values Survey


Is Human Security still relevant today?
Human (in)Security
• Values
• Beliefs
Vital Core
• Fear
• Want
• Dignity
• Fear
• Anger
• Safety
• Hopes
• Dreams
• Purpose
• Empathy
Solidarity
SUBJECTIVITIES
Solidarity
Enables
Promotes
Enables
Agency
Enables
Empowerment
Protection
Conflict
Terrorism
Landmines Small arms
Human trafficking
Freedom from fear
Protection
of individuals by the government and the international community
Capacity Development (empowerment)
of individuals and communities to enable them to deal with threats themselves
The concept of encouraging sustainable human self-reliance and the building of society through protection and empowerment, in order to protect each individual from a variety of threats to human survival, livelihood, and dignity, and to achieve the abundant potential of each person.
Freedom from deprivation
Currency crisis
Environmental destruction Natural disasters
Infectious diseases
Poverty
Enriched Human Security Frame

Solidarity

Inclusion and trust

- Generalized trust
- Impersonal trust



- Strengthen local capacity
- Promote agency
- Focus on communities

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- Most generally, International Development (ID) can be described as the pursuit of creating a better world through the elimination of poverty, discrimination and injustice.
- The most comprehensive framework guiding ID is found in the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
  - The SDGs are a collection of 17 interlinked objectives designed to serve as a "shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet now and into the future."
- Harmonize economic growth and eradicate poverty in all its forms and dimensions
  - Promote sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth, create greater opportunities for all, reduce inequalities, raise basic standards of living, foster equitable social development and inclusion and promote integrated and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems.
- The SDGs, as much as ID over the past 70+ years, suffer from a series of systemic challenges undermining their intended purpose.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (ID) CHALLENGES

1. **Increase Dependency.**
   Reliance on external aid may make Less Developed Countries (LDCs) more, instead of less, dependent on donor countries.
2. **Risk of Corruption.**
   Most foreign financial support does not reach the intended recipients.
3. **Economic/Political Pressure.**
   Donors may place economic or political pressure on the receiving country, creating further dependencies.
4. **Local Needs.**
   Foreign aid primarily benefits external actors (e.g., INGOs) and large-scale projects.
5. **Secondary Economy.**
   INGO pay scales create a secondary economy that inflates local prices and distorts local employment structures.

HOW TO ADDRESS ID CHALLENGES

Reduce external dependencies by strengthening local capacity

Localize by:

- ✓Imagining better futures
- ✓Building trust
- ✓Creating shared visions
- ✓Finding local solutions to local problems
- ✓Vesting local partners

Sustain locally led development through co-creation of visions and actions between donors, INGOs, LPOs and local populations.

Transfer responsibility & ownership to local actors expeditiously.

- USAID funded 5-year research and capacity strengthening Program
- Community trauma healing
- 3 counties (Nimba, Grand Gedeh, Maryland); 9 towns/cities; 100s of communities
- Imagine and create a better future



Hope for a better Future

BUILDING RESILIENCE IN LIBERIA

Hope for a better future introduces psychosocial skills to strengthen the capacity of individuals to work through trauma and collaboratively find local solutions to local problems and conflicts.

Hope for a better future has three distinct priorities:

- **Peacebuilding** – community residents and stakeholders create an environment in which conflict resolution initiatives can flourish.
- **Conflict resolution** – youth work together to address problems they face.
- **Psychosocial health** – individuals learn how to build emotional control, create dreams for their lives, map the psychosocial challenges facing their communities. Ideally, they will then share those skills with others in their communities.

HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE:
Building Collaborative Resilience in Liberia

Four Intervention Projects:

1. **Safe Spaces:** (Re)build psychosocial skills to strengthen individual resilience and collaborative capacity.
2. **Facilitated (Youth) Dialogues:** Engage individuals in collective identity formation to strengthen common understanding, empathy and collaborative conflict resolution capacity.
3. **Tents:** Heal prolonged social trauma where individuals learn to address mental and emotional triggers, habits and beliefs that inhibit collaborative problem solving.
4. **Solution Accelerators:** Create an enabling environment to support and sustain local collaborative conflict resolution processes and practices.



Building Resilience



LOCAL DEVELOPMENT = INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Regional Development
Country Development
County Development
Town/City development
Community Development
Tents
Youth Dialogues Safe Spaces
Solution Accelerators
USAID
HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE
Hope for a better Future
Thank you!
Your Questions?

The Role of the Security Sector

Sarah Dawn Petrin



Human Security in DoD:

Consideration of all the risks and threats that make people vulnerable in the area of operations, including the infrastructure and environment they depend on for life.

(suggested definition)

Are humans a strategic consideration?

Yes

- Individuals and communities
- Have rights and protections
- Rule of Law is the foundation
- Human rights are respected
- Military and police coordinate with civilian authorities

No

- In the way
- Replaceable
- Legitimate targets
- Guilty until proven innocent

Human Security Indicators

Global Data Trends

Political indicators

- Armed conflict fatalities
- Conflict related sexual violence

Political – UCDP fatalities from conflict



Political: Deaths from 32 years of armed conflict, 1989-2021

State based violence	1,675,527
Non-state violence	299,980
One-sided violence	887,983
Total deaths:	**2,863,490**

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

- Afghanistan
- Libya
- Myanmar
- Nigeria
- Sudan
- Yemen

- 49 state and non-state groups listed
- 70% repeat offenders for 5 years+
- Intimidation of female leaders
- Men more affected in detention

Source: UN Secretary General Report on CRSV 2021

Health indicators

COVID deaths

Life expectancy

Health: Covid deaths

Global fatalities from WHO

6,887,000



Source: John Hopkins data as of May 2022, chart from the BBC



Source: World Population Review, UN and World Bank data as of 2023

Economic indicators

Country income

Household income



Source: World Bank data as of 2021



Democratic Republic of the Congo	395
Madagascar	398
Burundi	475
Malawi	484
Guinea-Bissau	486
Central African Republic	491
Mozambique	529
Zambia	545
Uzbekistan	591
Rwanda	621

Source: World Population Review, Gallup data as of 2021

Environmental indicators

Climate risk by country

Disasters in the U.S.

Displacement

Notre Dame GAIN Index – Climate Readiness and Vulnerability

Top 5 Countries		*Score*	*Bottom 5 Countries*		*Score*
1	Norway	75.4	178	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	31.0
2	Finland	72.0	179	Eritrea	31.0
3	Switzerland	71.9	180	Guinea-Bissau	30.5
4	Sweden	71.3	181	Central African Rep.	27.1
5	Denmark	71.0	182	Chad	26.6

Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (GAIN) Index as of 2023

Disasters

- $275 Billion in global losses due to disasters in 2022, United Nations
- 18 events in the U.S. resulted in $1 Billion in losses according to NOAA



Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Centers for Environmental Information, 2023

Displacement – UN High Commissioner for Refugees



- Internal displacement, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants
- Increase in homelessness due to disasters and economic loss according to U.S. Census data

Multiple indicator tools

Atrocity risk indicators

Global fragility index

Figure 1: Heat map of estimated risk of new mass killing, 2022–23

Data: Early Warning Project, earlywarningproject.org; cross-hatch pattern denotes countries with ongoing mass killing episodes.

Source: USHMM Early Warning Project, Countries at risk of mass killing 2022-2023

Top 10 countries at risk

1. Pakistan
2. Yemen
3. Myanmar
4. Chad
5. Ethiopia
6. Nigeria
7. Afghanistan
8. India
9. Sudan
10. Somalia

Source: Early Warning Project 2022-2023

Measurements of risk

War and conflict
- Fatalities in armed conflict
- Previous mass killings
- Coup attempts

Socio-economic
- Infant Mortality
- Change in GDP
- Ethnic fracturing

Governance
- Majority/minority rule
- Judicial reform
- Power by social group

Human rights
- Basic freedoms
- Civil liberties
- Political killings

Global Fragility Index

Highest increase in fragility
1. Myanmar
2. Afghanistan
3. Burkina Faso
4. Lebanon
5. Haiti



Source: The Fund for Peace, 2022

- Understanding the operational environment
- Identifying risks and threats
  - By population at-risk
  - Social factors: Age, gender, ethnicity, language, political position, race, religion
- Types of threats
  - Not only armed groups
  - People (social)
  - Places (environment)
  - Things (infrastructure)

Scenarios of concern

Political:	Targeted killings
Health:	Bio-weapons
Economic:	Cyberattack on financial system
Environment:	Migration

Preparing for the worst

Assess	Mitigate	Adapt	Build
Assess country and community conditions	Develop a course of action to mitigate the threat	Adapt to the challenges	Build capabilities for the population to endure crisis = resiliency

What indicators matter the most?

Thank you

Sarah Dawn Petrin
Author of BRING RAIN:
Helping Humanity in Crisis

www.sarahpetrin.com

Human Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Societies

Jaroslaw Jarzabek, PhD.



- The Responsibility to Protect – known as R2P – is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
- The R2P doctrine is not regulated by any specific act of international law. Instead it rests upon other legal acts like Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, Genocide Convention, Convention against Torture etc.

- The R2P's three pillars: **1)** the responsibility of each State to protect its populations; **2)** the responsibility of the international community to assist States in protecting their populations; **3)** the responsibility of the international community to protect when a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations

- At the 2005 high-level UN World Summit meeting, Member States committed to the principle of the responsibility to protect by including it into the outcome document of that meeting (A/RES/60/1)

Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Theoretical framework

- The R2P doctrine endorses the principle that State sovereignty carried with it the obligation of the State to protect its own people. If the State is unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility is shifted to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect them. It **does not assert a basis to use force for this purpose** (other than UN Security Council authorization under the standard procedure)
- Therefore, the main responsibility of states under the R2P doctrine should be **the use of non-military measures to protect the population at risk**

Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Theoretical framework

A 2014 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is one of the most important tools for implementing the R2P doctrine, allowing for the limitation or complete suspension of arms supplies to states which violate human rights and commit the crime of genocide.

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

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R2P norm in practice

- R2P is used and has (some) positive effects:

- actions like international political and diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, arms sales embargoes, travel bans, ICC investigation/judgement, UNSC resolutions, etc. are taken and actions lead to the improvement of the situation of people at risk

- R2P is used but has no/limited effects

- actions like international political and


Uniwersytet Wrocławski
R2P is used and has (some) positive effects
War crimes and crimes against humanity during the Civil War in Syria
Violence perpetrated by Islamist groups in the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger)
Insurgency and attacks by armed extremists from "Al-Shabaab" in Mozambique
War crimes and crimes against humanity during the Civil War in Yemen
War crimes and crimes against humanity during the Civil War in Libya

Uniwersytet Wrocławski
R2P is used but has no/limited effects
Civil War in Yemen since 2014
Taliban regime in Afghanistan since 2021
Violence between government forces and armed separatists in Cameroon since 2016
Civil War in the Central African Republic since 2020
Crimes against humanity committed by state authorities in North Korea
Armed groups violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
War crimes and crimes against humanity against Palestinian


Uniwersytet Wrocławski
R2P is not used (no actions/very limited actions are taken)
The persecution of Uyghurs and other majority-Muslim ethnic groups in China
Widespread human rights violations and occupation of Tigray (Ethiopia) by the government of Eritrea
Insurgency in Tigray and inter-communal violence in Ethiopia


Uniwersytet Wrocławski
Conclusions - challanges to R2P
Role of non-state actors and how it challanges R2P
Fragile states
UN SC member states
Other states that enjoy protection of UN SC member states

Human Security Challenges in Post-Conflict Societies

Cristina Matiuta, PhD. and Raluca Viman-Miller, PhD.



Defining human security

- The protection of individuals and communities from harm, from threats to their well-being and physical security
- The idea that every individual has a right to be protected from systemic violence related to inter- and intra- state conflicts, environmental threats and disasters, and medical crises
- A more recent understanding of security that focuses on humanitarian concerns and the idea that the all individuals should be free from violence, environmental concerns, health disasters, and more
- Security provisions- general practice of preventing or mitigating harm or of providing assistance and resources in response to situations of insecurity at the individual, state or international levels (Andersen-Rodgers and Crawford 2023)
- The shift in the responsibility for human security from states alone to the combination of states and outside actors (humanitarian agencies, foreign states, international organizations, NGOs etc.)

The human factor

- Russia's war in Ukraine has caused the largest humanitarian crisis in Europe after the WW II
- More than 8 million refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe -as of February 2023 (UNHCR)
- More than 5 million people estimated to be displaced inside Ukraine (UNHCR)
- Over 17.6 million people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance inside Ukraine (UNHCR)
- Interactive map

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/

- Ukraine's western neighbors as well as poor countries like the Republic of Moldova took in millions of refugees and they are also serving as conduits to the military and humanitarian aid flowing into Ukraine


Refugees from Ukraine by destination country, since February 24, 2022- until February 2023
Data source: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine
Poland
1,563,386
Germany
1,055,323
Czech Republic
490,802
Italy
169,873
Spain
167,726
Canada
167,585
United Kingdom
162,700
France
118,994
Slovakia
109,828
Romania
109,630
Moldova
109,630
NORWAY
FINLAND
Gulf of Bothnia
Helsinki
Oslo
Stockholm
Tallinn
ESTONIA
UNITED KINGDOM
North Atlantic Ocean
North Sea
Baltic Sea
LATVIA
Riga
RUSSIA
Moscow
DENMARK
Copenhagen
LITHUANIA
Vilnius
Minsk
NETHERLANDS
IRELAND
Dublin
Amsterdam
Berlin
Warsaw
BELARUS
POLAND
London
GERMANY
Celtic Sea
English Channel
Brussels
BELGIUM
LUX.
Prague
CZECH REP.
Kyiv
UKRAINE
Paris
SLOVAKIA
Bratislava
LIECH.
Vienna
AUSTRIA
SLOVENIA
HUNGARY
Budapest
MOLDOVA
Chisinau
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
Bay of Biscay
ITALY
Ljubljana
ZAGREB
CROATIA
ROMANIA
Bucharest
BOS. & HER.
Belgrade
SERBIA
BULGARIA
Sofia
Black Sea
MONACO
SAN MARINO
Rome
Podgorica
Tirana
ALB.
VATICAN CITY
ANDORRA
PORTUGAL
Madrid
SPAIN
Lisbon
Mediterranean Sea
Ankara
TURKEY
GEORGIA
Tbilisi
ARMENIA
Yerevan
AZERBAIJAN
Baku
KAZAK.
Caspian Sea
Sea of Azov

Refugees taken in as a proportion of national population- top countries

Romania ranks 20th, with 592/100.000

Data source: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine



The most relevant support programs for Ukraine from supranational organizations

- **United Nations'** ***Refugee Response Plan*** (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia)
- The EU and its financial institutions, in a ***Team Europe*** approach, are making available €37.8 billion to support Ukraine's overall economic, social and financial resilience. This has been in the form of macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response and humanitarian aid (https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine_en#strong-and-comprehensive-eu-response)

Relevant statistical data on Ukrainians' refugee in Romania

(as of January 2023- source Romanian Government- Source:
https://protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/analize-si-statistici/)

3.242.209	Ukrainian arrivals at the border
107.241	Ukrainian refugees in-country
47.851	Ukrainian children in-country
103.773	Ukrainian refugees with Temporary Protection
4.397	Ukrainian Asylum Seekers

Romania's state authorities response to refugee crisis

(https://protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ANNUAL-STATUS-REPORT-ROMANIA-DEC-2022-2-1-1.pdf)



Romania's state authorities response to refugee crisis

(https://protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ANNUAL-STATUS-REPORT-ROMANIA-DEC-2022-2-1-1.pdf)

6	**Sector Working Groups** including labour, housing, education, health, children and youth, and vulnerable persons.
20+	**Pieces of legislation passed** to support the protection and inclusion of Ukrainian refugees.
150+	**Types of activities provided*** by government institutions, civil society, NGOs, UN agencies, and the private sector.
300+	**NGOs who have operated in the response***
2.45M	**Beneficiaries reached*** with services ranging from temporary housing to formal education to medical treatments.
€565M	**Amount budgeted*** for Romania's response, inclusive of all activities by the Government and its partners

*Estimated based on reported figures

Over 20 pieces of legislation adopted to meet the needs of Ukrainian refugees

the most relevant refers to:

- Implementing mechanisms of support and humanitarian assistance by the Romanian state to people coming from Ukraine
- Establishing the conditions under which the temporary protection of all persons who were forced to leave Ukraine is ensured
- Granting of gratuities and facilities for the transport of Ukrainian refugees
- Reimbursement of accommodation and food expenses for citizens who host Ukrainian refugees
- Facilitating and encouraging continued donations for the benefit of Ukrainian refugees, and for international organizations to have a simpler mechanism for cooperation
- Enrollment of Ukrainian students at educational institutions in Romania in the absence of supporting documents

Partnerships – state and non-state actors

- *Bucharest Forum: Towards a Common European Platform for Refugee Inclusion*, organized by the Government of Romania in September 2022 with the participation of the delegations of 23 Member States and OECD and UN Agencies
- Romania's response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis hinges on partnerships across the Government, humanitarian sector, civil society, and private entities
- https://protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/ - an governmental online platform with all information on the rights and services available for Ukrainian refugees (since their arrival in Romania, hotlines, health, transport, legal support, education, single children, learn Romanian, apply for temporary protection, temporary housing, working in Romania, vulnerable people)
- Suceava HUB, **established in March 2022 as a** point through which humanitarian assistance has been supplied to Ukraine, extending the capacity of the EU Member States to provide assistance to Ukraine(reception, storage, handling, redistribution of the aid). 62 international missions bound for Ukraine has been received to Suceava HUB as for January 5, 2023 (according to official data)

Protection and Inclusion

(Data source: https://protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/analize-si-statistici/)

The need to improve the refugees' access to the labor market and to strength the administrative capacity of the public employment sector to support their integration

- Over 5.000 Ukrainians are currently working in Romania;
- 1.300 Ukrainians mentored during the socio-occupational integration process;
- 5 job fairs organized; over 700 beneficiaries.

The necessity to facilitate the enrolment of Ukrainian children into the Romanian educational system

- over 3,000 children registered as listeners;
- 882 children enrolled in schools in Romania;
- 4,060 children and youth participating in bridge courses/remedial/catch up classes and extracurricular activities including language courses;
- 6,516 children and youth have received recreational and basic learning materials and recreational kits;
- 262 educators trained on quality, safe, and inclusive education.

Protection and Inclusion

(Data source: https://protectieucraina.gov.ro/1/analize-si-statistici/)

Housing - the Romanian Government established a program to reimburse citizens hosting Ukrainian refugees

- Over €76.000.000 for housing- spent as for January 5th 2023
- €31.000.000 for food
- An average of €352.846 spent per day on the program

Health- Ukrainian refugees with temporary protection in Romania are included in national public health programs

- 19.594 Ukrainians received emergency medical services
- 3.170 Ukrainians were hospitalized
- 27.109 children, youth, and caregivers at risk received psychological support

Social services- Local authorities and existing service providers are developing procedures and tools to meet the need of vulnerable groups

- 1.038 elderly Ukrainian refugees have requested social services since the beginning of the crisis

Conclusions and further research

- The war in Ukraine triggered a humanitarian crisis of great proportions, demanding a quick and coordinated response from neighboring countries to receive, host and assist refugees
- Romania's state authorities, together with other EU Member States, UN Agencies and civil society organizations are working for the protection and inclusion of Ukrainian refugees in different areas : education, health, labor, housing, vulnerable persons
- Further research is needed with representatives of state authorities at the local level as well as with representatives of non-governmental organizations involved in the protection and integration of refugees in order to evaluate their needs, their perceptions, the effectiveness of the legal framework, the collaboration of state authorities with non-state actors and what would be made for the better integration of refugees

The Role of National Defense in Mitigating Human Security Challenges

Lt. Colonel Karl Salum

Russian pressure on the Baltic states

Conducted across the full PMESII spectrum with the end goals to sow discord, increase tensions and reduce governance.



Some Russian ways of manifesting pressure:

Hybrid warfare
Political warfare
Information warfare
Economic pressure
Compatriot policy
Military exercises

2

Ethnic composition of the Baltic states

Percentage of ethnic Russians comprising the population of the Baltic States.

State	% of ethnic Russians			
	1989	2001	2011	2020
Estonia[3]	30.3	28.1	24.8	24.7
Latvia[4]	34.0	-	31.2	24.9
Lithuania[5]	6.31	5.81	5.37	4.5

Coolican, 2021



3

Two-pronged approach to resilience
Protect the society
– Enhance resilience in all aspects
– Anticipate social challenges, devise preventive or countermeasures
– Reduce dependence on Russian connections, increase connections to the West
– Reduce availability of Russian propaganda, establish competing info channels
Engage the local Russians...
– Messaging and engagement
– Enhance titular language learning options
– Maintain employment options
...but keep an eye on them.
– Successes in detecting and prosecuting Russian agents
4
Frozen conflicts
Grey Zones
Russia
European Union
1. Opposition to national govt
2. Armed clashes
3. Russian military presence
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015
5

Topics in Human Security Challenges

Varun Gupta, PhD.



Outline of Today's Talk

1. Types of Threats to Humanity
2. Roles of Supply Chains
3. Challenges and Opportunities
4. Supply Chain initiatives by the U.S. government

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Threats – Conflicts

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Threats – Natural Calamities

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Threats – Cyber and Pandemic

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Supply Chains – Remember?

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Supply Chains – Toilet Paper Shortages

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

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Supply Chains



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Supply Chain Security Initiatives

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Supply Chain Security Initiatives



February 2021

UNG | UNIVERSITY of NORTH GEORGIA™

Supply Chain Security Initiatives

June 2021

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Supply Chain Security Initiatives

Biden's new strategy looks set to boost supply chain security

March 2023



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Questions?

THANK YOU!

For more information about the contents of this presentation.

Reach out to Dr. Varun Gupta, Email: varun.gupta@ung.edu

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Topics in Human Security Challenges

José de Arimatéia da Cruz, PhD.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Drones, Crime, Emerging Technologies, and Human Security Challenges in the Americas

José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Ph.D./MPH
Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL)
Homeland Defense & Security Issues
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STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Introduction

- **This presentation illustrates the challenges Latin American law enforcement organizations face with the rise of innovative technologies of criminality. The presentation also discusses how these recent technologies are impacting regional human security.**

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Drones, Crime, Emerging Technologies, and Human Security Challenges in the Americas

- **Drones are becoming integral to criminal organizations' toolboxes, challenging law enforcement agencies. Drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles or systems (UAVs or UAS), are becoming more common along the US-Mexico border.**
- **Drones can transport drugs without putting resources at risk, be used as lookouts or spies, and provide up-to-the-minute intelligence information for criminal organizations as observation platforms for reconnaissance and surveillance.**

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Brazilian Gangs Utilize Human Shields, Explosives, and Drones in a New 'Cangaço' Style Urban Bank Raid in Araçatuba, São Paulo

- Short video to show how TOCs are using emerging technologies to their advantages:
  - Yuri Macri on Twitter: "Na fuga, os reféns foram amarrados nos veículos. Tentativa de impedir qualquer contra-ataque da polícia ao grupo. Deus guarde essas pessoas e todos de Araçatuba. Todas as agências bancárias do centro foram invadidas - informações preliminares. https://t.co/lu0hBlcTCu" / Twitter
- On Sunday 29 August 2021, at approximately 2200 hours, around 20 armed gunmen conducted a series of raids on three banks in Araçatuba, São Paulo, killing at least three. The armed commando wore bulletproof vests and helmets and used assault rifles, explosives, and drones. Hostages were also used as human shields to hamper their capture and facilitate escape.
  - The "*Novo Cangaço*" ("New Struggle") refers to a type of brigandage or social banditry reminiscent of that form of criminality found in Brazil in the 1920s-1930s. Typically, these attacks are characterized by brazen urban bank robberies. These incidents resemble light infantry assaults.

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Brazilian Gangs Utilize Human Shields, Explosives, and Drones in a New 'Cangaço' Style Urban Bank Raid in Araçatuba, São Paulo

- In the recent 'Mega-Robbery' sequence, around 15-20 armed criminal commandos attacked three banks in the center of Araçatuba, Western São Paulo.
  - Hostages were taken and used as human shields to deny counter-fires, streets were blockaded to facilitate escape and evasion (E&E), and explosives were deployed to hinder interdiction. The offenders' assault succeeded, resulting in the death of three persons.
- Between the 5th and 16th of April [2021], there were at least ten attacks in different cities in four states: São Paulo (SP), Paraná (PR), Bahia (BA) and Minas Gerais (MG). The targets were at least 13 bank branches and one financial [institution].
  - The gangs prefer to attack, for the most part, institutions that keep money in small towns, where the security forces do not have the military power to face heavily armed gangs.

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Brazilian Gangs Utilize Human Shields, Explosives, and Drones in a New 'Cangaço' Style Urban Bank Raid in Araçatuba, São Paulo

- The complexity of this attack demanded synchronized response from São Paulo's Military and Civil Police (*Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo* – PMESP and *Polícia Civil do Estado de São Paulo* – PCESP) and ultimately Brazil's Federal Police.
  - This type of complex attack sequence is like the 'urban siege' tactics developed by terrorists. Indeed, many of the same issues of tactical and operational co-ordination are required to address the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed in *Novo Cangaço* scenarios.
- This bank assault sequence, initiated by a heavily armed and highly coordinated criminal gangs, along with and similar incidents in recent years, suggest that these criminal armed groups (CAGs) are evolving in sophistication and now possess operational capability beyond those possessed by most municipal or state level law enforcement agencies

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Drug cartels attack enemies and spread terror with weaponized drones in US, Mexico

- Drones are becoming an integral part of criminal organizations' toolbox, challenging law enforcement agencies. Drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles or systems (UAV or UAS), are becoming more common along the US-Mexico border.
  - Drones are replacing the coyotes and mules utilized by the Mexican cartels since drones is less risky for drug traffickers.
  - "cost significantly less than drug tunnels and semisubmersibles and are even able to transport cash shipments from the US into Mexico without being detected" according to Brenda Fiegel

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Drug cartels attack enemies and spread terror with weaponized drones in US, Mexico

- In addition to being used as a mode of transportation, drones replace the *halcones*, or lookouts and spies.
  - Drones can be used to transport drugs without putting resources at risk, can be used for surveillance, and provide up-to-the minute intelligence information for criminal organizations as observation and reconnaissance platforms
- Mexico-based companies are manufacturing the drones being used by the Mexican cartels in cities such as the Federal District, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Querétaro, and Tijuana. Mexico's notorious cartels, the Tijuana Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel, and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG), have been reported to use the technology widely.

STRENGTH and WISDOM

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Four Trends Regarding Combat Drones

- The first combat trend:
  - The cartel weaponization of drones either for a single-use (point detonation) or multi-use (standoff; bombardment).
- The second combat is drone video use for propaganda and related purposes.
  - Drone videos provide criminal organizations with the ability to create their narrative of events, thus turning law enforcement officials into foes or so-called enemies of the people.
- The third combat trend is the integration of drone intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance into combined arms operations
  - focusing on mounted infantry forces deployed in Improved Armored Fighting Vehicle (IAFV) command units (176).
- The fourth combat trend is drone night-vision technology deployment
  - especially near the US--Mexico border or within megacities (179).

STRENGTH and WISDOM

It's a Jungle Out There: The Growing Threat of Environmental Crimes to National Security

Michele Devlin, PhD., RN, EMT

OVERVIEW

Environmental security relatively new field

Recognizes secure, stable environment needed for peace & prosperity

Environmental insecurity linked to conflict, poverty, forced migration, and social destabilization

Strong links between climate change disasters causing and being impacted by organized enviro crimes against vulnerable groups



THE SCOPE

Includes illegal mining, wildlife trafficking, illegal deforestation, waste dumping, over-fishing, murders of environmental activists, etc.

Growing by 7% year, 3x global economy

Primary revenue for violent non-state actors

Prey upon vulnerable, poor, minorities, and indigenous

May involve govts and other nations; TCO/VEOs, and trafficking

It's a Jungle Out There: The Growing Threat of Environmental Crimes to National Security

Abubakarr Jalloh, PhD.



Talking Points

- Illegal Logging
- Illegal Fishing
- Implications for National and Regional Security


Illegal Logging
Driven by Chinese & other international demand for timber.
Illegal timber trafficking costs African economies over $15 billion per year.
A multi-million dollar business in Sierra Leone.
Players:
Criminal networks;
State-embedded actors;
Foreign actors,
Mafia style groups.
2017 Mudslide in Freetown, Sierra Leone

Illegal Fishing

Primarily driven by Chinese trawlers

A multi-million dollar business in Sierra Leone.

Illegal fishing costs four West African countries, including Sierra Leone nearly $2.3 billion annually (loss of revenues).

A maritime battleground for Sierra Leone and the West Africa region.

In 2015 alone, 80 vessels spotted fishing illegally in Sierra Leone.

Impacts on Local Economies

Loss of livelihoods and economic instability

Example: Moa river polluted by timber logging, making it extremely challenging for local communities settled along the river to fish in order to feed their families.

Sierra Leone rely heavily on fish as a one of the principal sources of protein, but also as a source of income and employment for tens of thousands of people.

Illegal fishing leads to overfishing.

Loss of food and income for fishing communities.

Forced migration (internally & abroad)

Dangerous journey through Africa's Sahara & Mediterranean sea en route to Europe.

Treacherous migration through Central America to make it to the U.S.

Implications for National & Regional Security

Illegal Logging and Fishing is rampant in West Africa.

Loss of biodiversity, including endangered species.

Impact of Climate Change.

Transnational organized crime involving government officials.

Implicated multiple officials in the Sierra Leone government, including a minister and individuals close to the office of the Vice President

Timber trafficking has also fueled security threats from organized criminal groups and violent extremist organizations.

Example = During the civil war in Liberia & Sierra Leone, timber trafficking was one of Charles Taylor's prime means of financing. It also facilitated Taylor's support to the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone.

THANK YOU

The Growing Threat of Environmental Crimes to National Security: Antarctica

Michele Devlin, PhD., RN, EMT